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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal and state courts are increasingly confronted with the unenviable task
of giving legal definition to matters affecting relations between religion and gov-
ernment.' Many of the lawsuits pitting church against state are surface manifes-
tations of a more fundamental disintegration of an American public philosophy.2
I The Religious Freedom Reporter, a monthly publication of the Center for Law and Religious
Freedom, has been digesting cases concerning religious liberty in the state and federal courts since
January 1981. Approximately 1,000 known cases are currently pending at various trial and appellate
levels in the United States. Roughly one-third of these cases concern the religiously motivated actions
of individuals and two-thirds involve the relationship between government and organized religion.
2 See generally A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985); R. NEUHAUS, THE
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACy IN AMERICA (1984); M. HARRINGTON, THE POLITICS
AT GOD'S FUNERAL: THE SPIRITUAL. CRIsFs OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION (1983); W. SULLIVAN, RECON-
STRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1982); Reich, Toward a New Public Philosophy, ATL. MONTHLY May
1985 at 68; Krauthammer, America's Holy War: Proposal for an Arinistice, NEw REPUBLIC Apr. 9,
1984 at 15; Stackhouse, An Ecumenist's Plea for a Public Theology, THIS WORLD Sp./Sum. 1984 at
47.
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Simply put, the unabated expansion of our much-celebrated democratic pluralism
has also considerably diminished those ultimate values on which Americans can
claim a broad political-moral consensus.3 If there are rents in the social fabric,
ideological border wars will surely follow. This is especially inevitable in the case
of organized religion, for most world religions make theological claims beyond
the personal and the private.4 Both Judaism and Christianity, for example, are
ways of looking at the totality of reality. Thus, uncompromising claims are made
by them concerning the nature and limited role of the state, and qualifications
are placed on the individual believer's allegiance to the state and its civic demands
for compliance with public duties.5 As the state also makes affirmative demands
on citizens and social institutions, often imposing a uniformity insensitive to the
very religious pluralism it promotes, tensions follow many of which find their
way into civil court. 6
By and large, the legislative and executive branches can maneuver around
these border clashes by simply refusing to deal with them. Not so with the civil
courts, for if the matter is justiciable, their duty is to hear the parties out and
render a judgment. A final judgment is a very particularistic result, necessarily
yielding a "winner" and a "loser." This is bound to stir emotions and generate
sharp debate, for the social implications of deeply held religious views are simply
not amenable to judicial resolution such as, for example, the terms of a com-
mercial transaction gone awry.
At the level of the United States Constitution, the courts have at their disposal
a regrettably tentative, tersely expressed, and by no means umambiguous set of
legal categories, since those provided by the first amendment7 and Article VI,
para. [3]8 supply but limited direction. Most opinions by the United States Su-
preme Court following the 1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education9 have
been read by some as shameful concessions to organized religion, and by others
as reinforcing the secularization of public life and the concomitant privatization
of religious faith.'0 The result has been that all the disputants are dissatisfied at
I Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1981); Hitchcock, Church,
State, and Moral Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1981);
Hitchcock, Competing Ethical Systems, IMpRimIs Apr. 1981 at 10.
4 See H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974) (all traditional religions in
the West have a concern for social order and social justice that causes them to be concerned with
government and law).
See, e.g., Noll, Is This Land God's Land?, 30 CHRISTIANITY TODAY July 11, 1986 at 14.
Carlson, Regulations and Religion: Caesar's Revenge, REGULATION May-June 1979 at 27.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses together read: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."
Id.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, provides in pertinent part: "[N]o religions Test shall ever be required
as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10 Compare Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of
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some time, and the "troops" are further activated for a sustained campaign in
or against the halls of justice. Clarity is only momentarily achieved by each of
the Court's judgments, the concurring and dissenting opinions taking their toll,
and the justices seem resigned to await another opportunity to rethink their po-
sition and decide again next term.
This, of course, is how the law grows. But it is also the means by which
confusion-and some mistakes-are introduced into juridical arrangements that
were thought to be settled. This peculiarly American zeal for progress through
judge-made law, an attitude that gives little regard for social conventions of the
past, along with increased litigiousness in society, are responsible for the rash of
new theories sounding in tort being filed against churches, clerics, and lay religious
officers. Such tort claims are properly seen as part of an overall increase in
government intervention in religious affairs." However, unlike those church-state
conflicts involving direct federal and state bureaucratic regulation of the activities
of religious organizations, the only governmental involvement in private law ac-
tions in tort is through the referee-like role of the civil courts. Although this
engagement between church and state was not initiated by government, none-
theless, when the civil courts hold that such tort actions state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, serious issues arise concerning interference with church
affairs and thus religious liberty.
The more highly publicized tortious claims of this nature have been actions
by church members against their church for excommunication meted out for sexual
indiscretions, 2 claims of clergy malpractice where injury is said to have resulted
from inadequacies in pastoral counseling,' 3 and allegations of fraud or other ov-
erreaching brought by ex-members of new religious movements or "cults." 4 There
" See generally GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (D. Kelley, ed. 1982); Gov-
ERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS-SECOND (D. Kelley, ed. 1986). See also authorities
cited in supra note 6.
32 See, e.g., Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, Okla., No. CT-81-929 (Tulsa, Okla.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 7, 1983) (unpublished order) (state trial court refused to dismiss action by former
church member for invasion of privacy claim arising out of church disciplinary proceeding), appeal
denied, No. 59,623 (Okla. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 1983) (unpublished order), cert. deniedsub nom. Church
of Christ of Collinsville v. Graham, 464 U.S. 821 (1983), on remand, Guinn v. Church of Christ of
Collinsville, Okla., CT-81-929 (Tulsa, Okla. Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 1984) (judgment for $390,000 following
jury verdict), appeal docketed, No. 62154 (Okla. Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 1984). Guinn is discussed infra
notes 613-18 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, No. NCC 18668 B (Cal. Super.
Ct. Los Angeles Co. Oct. 2, 1981) (unpublished opinion) (dismissal of clergy malpractice suit by
parents of suicide victim who had been obtaining counseling from church staff), rev'd, 157 Cal. App.
3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984), on remand, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,
No. NCC 18668 B (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles Co. May 16, 1985) (unpublished opinion) (motion
for nonsuit granted for reasons of religious liberty and for insufficient evidence), appeal docketed,
No. B015721 (Cal. App., 2d Dist. Mar. 20, 1986). Nally is discussed infra notes 482-510 and ac-
companying text.
4 See, e.g., Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982)
(reversing judgment of two million dollars on fraud claim against church and remanding for new
[Vol. 89
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are numerous other novel tort theories that have not caught the attention of the
popular media, and they will all be surveyed in this article. 5 These claims are to
be distinguished from those arising out of automobile accidents by persons on
church business, 6 and the now commonplace "slip and fall" and other premise
liability type of torts, 7 actions for which churches have rightly been liable since
the abandonment of the charitable immunity defense.' 8
The advent of these new torts has been greeted with much thoughtful concern
and, in some quarters, exaggeration and alarm. A president of a local bar as-
sociation in California said:
Recent malpractice litigation seeking to hold the clergy liable for the quality and
content of its counseling advice and services could jeopardize the historical "wall
of separation" between the church and the state by stifling the willingness of the
church to continue providing its free pastoral counseling services .... Clergy mal-
practice litigation... has been marked by extensive queries into the religious doc-
trines and beliefs espoused by church leaders in not only one-on-one counseling
but their pulpit sermons as well. '9
Another commentator wonders at the full scope of this litigation explosion:
There has been an outpouring of claims and lawsuits against church corporations,
church officials, and the clergy as a result of alleged wrongdoing. One hears the
buzz words "clergy malpractice," but the malpractice allegation is but a part of
the broader field which includes such items as child abuse, embezzlement, in-
adequate teaching, paternity, and improper counselling."
Finally, the director of a parachurch ministry views lawsuits over church dis-
cipline, as contrasted with tax regulations pertaining to churches, as a struggle
over the very right of the church to exist as distinctive from the dominant culture
it is called to reform:
One of the jurors in [a church discipline] case summed up its central issue when
he said indignantly, "I don't see that it's the church's business to tell people how
to live." In other words, can a church insist that its members live by biblical
standards of righteousness?
Does the greater threat to religious freedom in this country involve how we handle
mammon or how we respect biblical commandments of holiness?... Even if there
trial), appeal dismissed, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983), on
remand, No. A7704-05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah Co. July 19, 1985) (mistrial declared after jury
verdict of $39 million; awaiting new trial). Christofferson is discussed infra note 671 and accompanying
text.
" See infra notes 474-675 and accompanying text.
'1 See, e.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal.2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (accident involving automobile
driven by minister in course of his employment attributable to church).
"1 See, e.g., Stevens v. Bow Mills Methodist Church, 111 N.H. 340, 283 A.2d 488 (1971) (church
liable for trip and fall by invitee on church premises).
11 See, e.g., Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940).
Wise, Clergy Malpractice Suits: First Amendment Under Siege, 8 L.A. LAW. 20 (1985).
McMenamin, Clergy Malpractice, 90 CASE & Com. 3 (1985).
1986]
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is an issue of religious liberty in the [tax evasion] case, the threat in the [church
discipline] case is demonstrably greater. If the U.S. government seized all of our
bank accounts, it could not destroy the church; but if it successfully prevented
the church from requiring that its members obey biblical standards, we might as
well close our doors.
2
'
This article will develop the argument that the first amendment, insofar as
it addresses the matter of organized religious societies, regiments the nature and
degree of involvement between the institution of the state and the institution of
the church.2" The degree of involvement should be a limited one, but it is also
clear that the interrelationship need not and cannot be eliminated altogether. '3
Although the exact calculus of the desired separation has proven to be a continuing
controversy, the goal of institutional separation is not so divisive. The aim is for
each to give the other sufficient breathing space.2 4 The ordering principle at work
is one of mutual forbearance whereby "both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its
respective sphere." ' '5 Those who were influential in our nation's history envisioned
the churches and the state in a kind of parallelism, with neither subordinate to
the other.26 Each should be guarded from being co-opted by the other, and each
required to refrain from dependence upon and undue entanglement with the in-
strumentalities of the other. Importantly, if the first amendment's structural or-
dering of these two circles of influence in society is reciprocal, then religious
organizations are afforded a high level of immunity from governmental inter-
ference with their internal affairs. This means that many of these new tort claims,
certainly those of clergy malpractice and the injury-to-reputation type of claim
flowing from ecclesiastical discipline of church members 27 are incompatible with
the separation of church and state.
To be sure, the desire to safeguard the institutional liberty of the churches
and the desire to interpose the state on the side of persons who are said to have
21 Colson, Friends of Religious Liberty: Why the Embarrassing Silence? 30 CHRISTIANITY TODAY
56 (1986).
2 R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 129, 135 (1981); see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 94 (1980).
2' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 213, 225 (1963); Id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 315 (1952).
J j. ELY, supra note 22 at 97.
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (disallowing religious instruction on
public school campus).
21 Derr, The First Amendment as a Guide to Church-State Relations: Theological Illusions,
Cultural Fantasies, and Legal Practicalities, CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 75, 82 (J. Hensel ed. 1981).
27 The type of church discipline discussed throughout this article is solely ecclesiastical. Neither
corporal punishment nor a civil penalty enforced by the state courts could ever be permissible church
discipline consistent with the First Amendment. Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982)
(zoning ordinance that gave civil "veto power" to churches to prevent issuance of liquor licenses in
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received tortious injury at the hands of a religious society are in tension. Because
of their very temporality, churches and other religious organizations are not with-
out wrongdoing. Their activities, as opposed to beliefs, therefore, cannot be totally
autonomous from the state when it comes to matters of high order, such as health,
safety, and public peace. The state must have the power to intervene in truly
exigent matters, even when it means overriding religious authorities acting upon
sincerely held beliefs.2 Thus, a balance must be struck between the needs of the
religious community and the protection of citizens from tortious injury, even when
these individuals voluntarily connected themselves with the church they now wish
to sue. But the first amendment weights the scale on the side of liberty. That is
one of the choices-call it a price, if one prefers-of living in a free and plural
society.
Whenever the relationship between church and government is examined, fun-
damentally there are three possible approaches to the study. First, the religious
organization is evaluated by the political authority in terms of the state's own
understanding concerning governmental responsibility for order and justice. This
is the method of the political philosopher. Second, one can draw out the church's
own conception of the state and society, matters significantly shaped by the church's
consciousness of a believed devine mission within history. This is a study of the
work of the theologian. Finally, third, the courts and their work product, the
case law bearing on religious freedom, are seen as instruments meting out con-
stitutional theory, typically reflecting a juridical view of religion's historical role
and social utility. 29 As to this third approach, it must be said that an exclusive
focus on the case law in the courts necessarily yields some bias favoring the
underlying political view of religion held by the state-that is, the third meth-
odology is a particularization of the first approach.
Part II of this article will begin with this third methodology. United States
Supreme Court cases which bear upon the question of noninvolvement with re-
ligious organizations so as to preserve their institutional integrity and freedom to
2' See M. BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY 301 (1945):
[U]pon occasion individuals and religious bodies alike have erred grievously against the
moral sense or the felt need of solidarity in the community... .The State as the authority
of the organized community has continually abused the argument of solidarity and even
that of moral standards....But it is difficult to see how any other authority than the State,
inspired and checked by the convictions and sentiment of the whole community, can carry
this necessary responsibility of guarding society and its other members against the eccen-
tricities-if they are seriously harmful-of one or a body.
Hence, the right of religious liberty is not absolute in extent but is subject to definition and
interpretation by the community, at costly risk, in the State and its laws. Id. Cf. Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (racial discrimination in education); Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (no parental right to withhold necessary blood
transfusion from child); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child-labor laws); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Mormon polygamy).
T. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CONCEPTS OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND
APPROACHES FOR THE FUTURE 1-3 (1964).
1986]
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act in society will be analyzed. Attention will be given to the development of the
concepts of nonentanglement and the avoidance of civil resolution of intrafaith
disputes. Parallels will be drawn between these concepts and the Court's reluctance
to probe the sincerity of an individual's religious belief or to measure its centrality
(i.e., the importance of a given religious duty to the religion) for first amendment
purposes. It will be proposed that these somewhat scattered doctrines be mar-
shalled into a general theory under the first amendment barring claims in tort
that compromise churches in organizing and controlling their staff and lay of-
ficers, defining the nature and distinctive character of their membership, and in
carrying out their ministerial calling as they understand it. Part III of this article
will take the second approach, that of examining how various religious traditions
understand themselves and their functions of self-government, teaching, coun-
seling, and discipline. Finally, Part IV will survey the new tort claims that are
now being brought in the state and federal courts. Those claims which implicate
religious liberty will be identified and distinguished from those that do not, fol-
lowed by application and eventual defense of the stated thesis. Since church au-
tonomy cannot be without limit, it will be suggested that tortious claims be
permitted, even where it hinders religious liberty, if compelling societal reasons
of health, safety, or public peace are demonstrably present.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY OF CHURCHES IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Theory
Both the text of the first amendment and the very nature of democratic plu-
ralism in Western political theory provide strong arguments for the juridical rec-
ognition of a sphere of autonomy for religious organizations. Now that the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses have been incorporated through the fourteenth
amendment and made applicable to the states,30 both doctrinally and in socio-
political theory, the first amendment provides a defense immunizing churches from
the recent tort actions being filed against them that touch on matters of creed,
teaching, and ecclesiastical discipline.
Although the text of the first amendment has been construed to afford a
limited freedom of association by implication only, the establishment clause nec-
essarily acknowledges the ontological existence and limited autonomy of religious
organizations through the requirement of church-state separation, The mandate
of institutional separation is addressed to government and any involvement it
contemplates with identifiable sectarian societies and their particular modes of
religious practices. The command is not, of course, to separate government from
individuals who choose to hold religious beliefs. The latter would be virtually
3' The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and the Establishment Clause was first incor-
porated in Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
[Vol. 89
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impossible, for when a citizen of the state is also religious, separation can be
achieved only by exile, death, or cleaving the human heart in two.3' Unlike all
other voluntary associations, the separation mandate demonstrates that the place
of religious associations has been recognized as a special problem for which the
very text of the establishment clause makes special provision. 32 Through often
painful experience, the American arrangement is to now distance, within the larger
free society, the state from the organized church. 3  To achieve this desired
separation, the distinct existence or ontology of the church is inescapably ac-
knowledged by the civil judicial system. Moreover, the institutional separation
implemented by the establishment clause is for the mutual benefit of both church
and state. Accordingly, the church refrains from using the state and the civil law's
coercive power to achieve its sectarian purposes, and reciprocally the church qua
church is immune from undue governmental interference within its sphere of com-
petence.
Theoretically, the same result can be achieved even without the institutional
separation requirement of the Establishment Clause. Democratic pluralism in po-
litical theory reasons that the ongoing development of a liberal society can thrive
" W. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA Xiii-
xiv (1964).
The 'wall of separation between Church and State' was not and could not be a Chinese
Wall to separate the eternal and the temporal. The real relationship between Church and
State, in America and in every country where religion is strong, is a thing of the spirit,
the infusion of the spirit of religion into the ordering of the affairs of society. A wall of
separation which would bar that spirit from making itself felt in secular concerns can never
be built, because it would have to bisect the human heart.
Id.
[A]s sharply distinct as they may be, the Church and the body politic cannot live and
develop in sheer isolation from and ignorance of one another. This would be simply anti-
natural. From the very fact that the same human person is simultaneously a member of
that society which is the Church and a member of that society which is the body politic,
an absolute division between those two societies would mean that the human person must
be cut in two.
J. Maritain, Man and The State 153-54 (1951). See G. Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism
404 (1927).
'2 The Juridical Status of Churches, INSTITUTE OF CHURCH AND STATE: PROCEEDINGS 1, 29,
36, 47-49 (O'Toole ed. 1958) (comments by Brady and Pfeffer); cf. Richardson, Civil Religion in
Theological Perspective, AMERICAN Civ. RELIGION 161, 178-80 (Richey & Jones eds. 1974).
" Care must always be taken to resist attempts to subsume all of society under the institution
of the state. See Hehir, Religious Transnationalism: Personal Conscience, Civic Loyalty, and Political
Legitimation, CHURCH & STATE ABROAD 2, 3 June 1986:
No idea is more centrally located in the American political tradition than the distinction
between society and state. The state is only part of the society; it is constitutionally limited
to fulfill specific functions, but is never to be identified with the society as such. Such an
identification is the essence of a totalitarian state. To accept the separation of church and
state does not mean to accept any notion that the church should be separate from the wider
civil society. It is precisely here, in this wider area of freedom, that the religious communities
exercise a public role through preaching, teaching, establishing educational and social in-
stitutions, and bringing their specific voices to the wider public policy debate.
1986]
9
Esbeck: Tort Claims against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The Fir
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
only in responsible freedom. Unless citizens exercise their freedom responsibly
out of self-restraint, the coercive power of the state cannot recede into the back-
ground. Moreover, people are by nature social creatures, naturally forming small,
like-minded communities. Since much of the life of a culture is shaped by these
nongovernmental communities and organizations, many of which are rich sources
of duty, authority, and discipline, the state would stifle society if it overly con-
trolled the lives of these voluntary associations.14 Affording jurisprudential rec-
ognition to these intermediate social arrangements has two consequences that are
politically desirable: it checks the centralization of power in big government by
diffusing leadership throughout society, and it retards the march of rampant in-
dividualism by channeling personal freedom in meaningful ways. The theory of
democratic pluralism, therefore, posits more than the protection of individual
rights." It also recognizes the contribution to freedom of socializing institutions,
such as voluntary organizations and cultural or ethnic subgroups, and thus holds
in high regard associational rights. 6 The aim is to sustain society's intermediate
institutions and thereby maximize an ordered liberty, that is, the freedom for
moral and rational development within a variety of differentiated communities.
A jurisprudence which affords limited spheres of autonomy for voluntary
associations (as against individuals who wish to be totally free of the association's
authority) must meet the argument that law is taking away individual freedom
in order to save it. The charge is false and those who make it fail to understand
that individual freedom is only the means of democratic pluralism, not its ultimate
goal." A democratic society is first of all a society. Society is not solely composed
of wholly autonomous individuals; it is composed of individuals and institutions
3 M. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 240, 241 (2d ed. 1981); D. FELL-
MAN, THE CONSITU.IONA. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 37, 104 (1963); R. HORN, GROUPS AND THE CON-
STITUTION 18, 155-60 (1968); R. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER 70 (1962); C. RICE, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION 54 (1962); Howe, Forward: Political Theory and The Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 91 (1953); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993,
1021-29 (1930); Note, Developments in The Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HAgv. L. REV. 983, 986-88, 991, 995, 1055 (1963); see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 618-19 (1984) ("[Clertain kinds of personal .bonds have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster
diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.").
- M. BATES, supra note 28, at 398-99.
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (college's denial of recognition to student political
group violated first amendment guarantees of expression and association); Brotherhood of Ry. Train-
men v. Virginia St. Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (injunction prohibiting union from advising members and
recommending legal counsel held contrary to first amendment guarantee of freedom of association);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled disclosure of membership list
constitutes unlawful restraint on freedom of association); cf. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (acknowl-
edging that some associations are sufficiently private-but not the Jaycees-so that they are immune
from civil rights legislation). See also M. Abernathy, supra note 34, at 239-44; D. FELLMAN, supra
note 34, at 2, 34, 104; R. HORN, supra note 34, at 14-16, 152; H. LASKI, FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
245-46 (1921).
" Cohen, The Problem of Pluralism, Religion and The Free Society 35, 45-47 (1958).
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that may choose to submit to all sorts of authoritarian groups (whether they
purvey the absolutisms of ideology, passion, or religious belief) and yet be po-
litically free. What makes a society politically free is the arrangement whereby
individuals may consent to be bound by the values and rules of their chosen
group. So long as the individual acquiesced in being bound to the discipline and
order imposed by the association, the individual is still politically free.
Those who would deny legal protection to the association as against its dis-
sident members would impose by force of law a libertarian-type individualism
upon all society, against the will of those who seek communal benefits and au-
thority. The proponents of individualism are in error because, in their opposition
to a limited autonomy for associations, they convert individual liberty into the
only absolute. A purely individualistic conception of liberty denies associations
the very characteristics that enable them to offset government power, thus making
all authority which does not reside either in the individual or the state the op-
ponent of the well-being of the body politic.3" And inevitably, the wholly au-
tonomous individual offers inadequate resistance to the state's tendency to arrogate
increasing power to itself so as to bridle runaway individualism and maintain
order. Rather than a dispersion of power along a differentiated, if uneven, social
landscape, the consequence is the nonpluralistic, leveling tendency of a state con-
forming all private associations to public standards. 39
Churches and other religious organizations are among the mediating structures
in a culture, occupying the space between the individual and government, and
serving as loci of responsibility, commitment, and identity for many people. 40
" Id.
9 See, e.g., Calhoun, Democracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT. L. FORUM 31, 36 (1960):
One of the earmarks of the totalitarian understanding of society is that it seeks to make
all subcommunities-family, school, business, press, church-completely subject to control
by the State. The State then is not one vital institution among others: a policeman, a referee,
and a source of initiative for the common good. Instead, it seeks to be coextensive with
family and school, press, business community, and Church, so that all of these component
interest groups are, in principle, reduced to organs and agencies of the State. In a democratic
political order, this megatherian concept is expressly rejected as out of accord with the
democratic understanding of social good, and with the actual make-up of the human com-
munity.
11 P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES
IN PUBLIC POLICY 1-8 (1977). Sociologist Peter Berger has identified such institutions as family, neigh-
borhood, and church as the value-generating and value-maintaining agencies of a society. These struc-
tures are poised between the public institutions of the modern nation-state and the solitary individual.
Intermediate structures, therefore, are situated to be useful to both the political order and the in-
dividual.
It is a crisis for the individual who must carry on a balancing act between the demand
of the two spheres. It is a political crisis because the megastructures (notably the state)
come to be devoid of personal meaning and are therefore viewed as unreal or even malignant.
Not everyone experiences this crisis in the same way. Many who handle it more successfully
than most have access to institutions that mediate between the two spheres. Such institutions
have a private face, giving private life a measure of stability, and they have a public face,
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Next to the family, religious organizations comprise the largest single group of
societal institutions which generate, mold, and propagate those shared norms es-
sential to a reasonably cohesive society capable of self-government. 4 And it is
recognized that important aspects of religion find meaning and expression only
in the social form we call the church. 42 Worship, for example, is not commonly
a solitary experience in either Christianity or Judaism. Thus, Western democratic
theory argues for the institutional integrity of churches because of their socio-
political utility. As for themselves, churches have a very different perspective as
to the reason for their existence 43 and the rationale for immunizing them from
tortious claims which intermeddle in their sphere of competence.
Some have argued that freedom of association is simply derivative of indi-
vidual rights, a necessary implication, it is said, of the obvious fact that persons
can more effectively exercise their civic rights when they band together with like
minded people and pool resources. 44 However, democratic pluralism recognizes
an associational freedom for churches and other pervasively sectarian organiza-
tions that goes beyond the mere enhancement of individual liberty. That is, ac-
knowledging a limited autonomy for churches is not simply an indirect way to
corporately protect the free exercise of religion for each of a church's members.
If that were all the courts intended by the institutional rights of churches, then
those rights would be entirely derivative of the individual liberties of those who
make up a church's membership. Church autonomy, were it rooted in a purely
individualistic conception, would dissolve in the face of, and to the extent required
by, an individual's claim to deprivation of religious liberty. This is merely tau-
tological, for if the rights of churches are constructed for the sole purpose of
advancing individual liberties, it cannot simultaneously be made to defeat them.
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized in the first amendment a nonder-
ivative conception of liberty held by religious organizations. 41 Were that not so,
transferring meaning and value to the megastructures. Thus, mediating structures alleviate
each facet of the double crisis of modern society. Their strategic position derives from their
reducing both anomie precariousness of individual existence in isolation from society and
the threat of alienation to the public order....
Without institutionally reliable processes of mediation, the political order becomes de-
tached from the values and realities of individual life. Deprived of its moral foundation,
the political order is 'delegitimated.' When that happens, the political order must be secured
by coercion rather than by consent. And when that happens, democracy disappears.
Id. at 3.
11 Id. at 26-30; R. NEUHAUS, CHRISTIAN FAITH & PUBLIC POLICY 178 (1977). Recent figures from
224 religious denominations in the U.S. show a combined membership of 142,172,138, an increase
of 0.9 percent over the prior year. THE YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN CHURCHES (Jacquet
ed. 1984).
4- D. Kelley, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 49 (1977).
41 See Richardson, supra note 32 at 161, 178-80; see also infra notes 201473 and accompanying
text.
. See R. HORN, supra note 34 at 5-7 (Hobbes and Rousseau argued against locating any au-
tonomy from the state in voluntary associations).
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churches would not be seen as having countervailing legal rights against a dissident
member who has sued his or her own church.
As an illustration, assume an energy crisis causes a state to enact legislation
banning all automobile driving on Sunday. The idea is facially neutral, namely
to conserve gasoline while causing minimal disruption to the economy. The rights
of First Church and its 100 members who feel constrained to worship on Sunday
are unquestionably impinged. First Church could bring an action against the
government in its own name, or some of the 100 members could join in an action
that names each individually. The choice of party-plaintiff makes little difference
because the liberty of First Church qua church and the sum of the collective
liberties of the individual members coincide. That is, the result is the same whether
the religious liberty of First Church is either conceptualized as nonderivative of
or merely instrumental to the free exercise rights of the individual members. So
long as the members are not internally divided in their claim for protection against
the state, the nonderivative and instrumental theories of associational rights con-
verge. 4
6
When the members are divided, however, and the individual rights of one or
more members are pitted against the group, the choice of underlying theory is
critical. Assume that First Church calls a meeting at which the church board
announces that it has employed a woman to fill the current vacancy in the pas-
torate. Seventy-five of the 100 members strongly object to the selection of a
female pastor on the basis that such a move is contrary to a proper interpretation
of doctrine. The church board, nonetheless, refuses to reconsider the employment,
for the polity of First Church, as evidenced in the Church's constitution and by-
laws, places the board in control of such decisions. If the seventy-five members
complain that their liberty to freely exercise their religion is denied, and they
institute a civil suit to have the employment contract rescinded, the courts will
reply that their liberty as the law recognizes it is not denied. 47 The seventy-five
consented to the leadership arrangement of First Church when they became mem-
bers. Having acquiesced in the authority of the Church as constituted, the dis-
sidents (for that is how the law views them, even if they number in the majority)
have no legally cognizable claim. If others, either outside or inside First Church,
believe a nondemocratic and thus unjust result has been reached, that is no con-
cern of the first amendment. Were a church simply instrumental of individual
religious exercise, it would be treated like a commercial partnership, the enterprise
would be dissolved and the assets divided by the court. The religious autonomy
of First Church is not, however, derivative of the members' individual liberties
regardless of how sincerely they hold their doctrinal opposition to a female min-
" See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (rights of Old Order Amish and that of
Amish parents coincide); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (rights of church school
and parents of school-age children coincide); cf. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 ("The intrinsic and in-
strumental features of constitutionally protected association may, of course, coincide.").
" See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). These cases are discussed infra, at notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
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ister. The recourse is for the seventy-five either to reconcile themselves to a female
pastorate or to break off and form a new church more to their liking, a matter
which, of course, the courts will vouchsafe.
The operative legal principles at work here are the consent of individuals to
be governed by the authoritative arrangement of the church they voluntarily joined,
the concomitant sphere of autonomy for the church within the ambit of its com-
petence, and the reciprocal noninterference inherent in church-state separation.
The same complementary principles are at work when members or ecclesiastical
officers sue their own church alleging various torts which implicate the religious
liberty of the church.
B. The Supreme Court Case Law
1. Ecclesiastical Disputes
As with other voluntary associations, occasionally divisions arise within the
membership or among the officers of churches and other pervasively sectarian
associations. Considering their professed purpose, churches are seldom placed in
a more unfavorable light than when one of the factions files suit in civil court
to resolve a schism. Although the civil courts have little choice but to accept
jurisdiction, their role is constrained by the first amendment's "promise of no-
nentanglement and neutrality' 48 which compels the avoidance of questions "made
to turn on the resolution. . of controversies over religious doctrine and prac-
tice." '49 Thus, the Supreme Court's cases dealing with intrafaith disputes are co-
generic with nonentanglement concerns: 0 the avoidance of involvement in doctrinal
and other religious questions, the prevention of civil authorities shaping the pur-
pose and scope of religious programs and the duties of church personnel, and a
reluctance to delve into financial matters of religious organizations."
A useful division of the Court's pronouncements is to separate those religious
disputes that concern primarily ecclesiastical matters, such as appointment of clergy
or the discipline of a member for misconduct, from those disputes that are before
the civil courts principally to declare the present ownership of property between
two rival factions. Clearly, there is a greater governmental interest in the orderly
1 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
. See infra notes 108-168 and accompanying text. Accord, Little v. First Baptist Church, Crest-
wood, 106 S. Ct. 1802 (1986) (cert. denied) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
11 Government involvement in what are essentially religious decisions or acts of religious dis-
cipline may arise in several ways. For example, governmental involvement may arise in (1) disputes
concerning the terms and conditions of employment, including discrimination; (2) the discipline or
discharge of an employee; (3) the discipline of an individual served by a ministry, including suspension
or withholding of services to the individual; (4) complaints from members of the public to government
officials concerning a ministry's refusal to admit them or otherwise offer services on a nondiscri-
minatory basis; and (5) disputes within the governing board over a ministry's policies and direction.
[Vol. 89
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resolution of matters concerning title to property. Questions concerning who may
hold a church office, the discipline of a recalcitrant member, or an alleged de-
parture from doctrine, however, are wholly outside of civil competence. The con-
trariety of views within the Supreme Court exists only concerning the limited role
of civil courts in intrafaith disputes over title to real estate. In disputes which
do not concern the control of property, the Court consistently has held that civil
authorities have no jurisdiction.
In Watson v. Jones,12 the Supreme Court established the first broad principles
of judicial deference to the internal dispute resolution processes of religious bod-
ies. The federal court had diversity jurisdiction in the case, and the rule of decision
was based on federal common law. 3 Watson involved a struggle between two
factions of a local Presbyterian Church for control of the church building. Title
to the property was in the name of the trustees of the local church. The deed
and charter of the local church, however, "subjected both property and trustees
alike to the operation of [the general church's] fundamental laws." '54 The general
church was the Presbyterian Church of the United States. Its governing body was
called the General Assembly. The ecclesiastical rules of the General Assembly
stated that the assembly possessed "the power of deciding in all controversies
respecting doctrine and discipline." 55
Following the Civil War, the General Assembly ordered the members of all
local congregations who believed in the devine character of slavery to "repent
and forsake these sins."15 6 A majority of the local church was willing to comply
with the directive. A minority faction, however, deemed the resolution of the
Assembly a departure from the doctrine held at the time the local church first
joined with the general church. The minority's theory was that the general church
held an interest in the property of the local church, subject to an implied trust
in favor of the doctrine to which the original church was devoted. Any departure
from doctrine by the general church meant a breach of trust and thus forfeiture
of its interest in the property occupied by the local church. Accordingly, the
minority faction claimed that the majority relinquished any right to control the
property when it repudiated the original, pro-slavery doctrine. The minority al-
leged that they were the true church, and should control the church grounds. 7
The implied trust theory, with its origin in English law,58 was rejected by the
12 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
51 Since Watson was decided prior to Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in following
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts did not hesitate to deviate from state
substantive law. Further, the first amendment religion clauses had not yet been applied to the states.
See supra note 30.
.' Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 683.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 691.
' Id. at 691-94.
I Id. at 727-28. Apparently the English cases have their genesis in the acceptance of a church
established by the state.
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Supreme Court because its departure-from-doctrine feature required the civil res-
olution of a religious question. The Watson Court gave three reasons: (1) civil
judges are incompetent to resolve questions concerning religious doctrine; 9 (2)
members of a hierarchical church have voluntarily joined the general church body,
thus giving implied consent to its internal governance;6° and (3) the structure of
our political system requires a severe limit on involvement by the civil courts in
the affairs of religious bodies so as to secure religious liberty. 6'
A rule of judicial deference to church authority as enunciated in Watson, if
strictly applied in conjunction with the principle of implied consent by church
members, would mean that a hierarchical church judicatory has almost unlimited
power over its local churches. Reflecting this concern, subsequent decisions of
the Court have wrestled with how best to balance the religious liberty value of
governmental noninterference with concern for individuals arbitrarily or even op-
pressively treated by a religious hierarchy.62 Most important to the inquiry, how-
ever, is that the Court's qualifications of the judicial deference rule have all related
to the civil disposition of property. 63 The Watson rule remains uncompromised
Id. at 729, 730 and 732. For example, the Watson Court said:
It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the
ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in
reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in
the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.
Id. at 729.
w Id.
61 Id. at 728-29, 730. Quoting with approval from Harmon v. Dreher, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 87
(1844), the Court said: "The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty,
rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious
liberty from the invasion of the civil authority." Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 730. The Supreme
Court used words which were later to be read into the first amendment. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
713-14; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 113; cf. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 446. The Watson Court
delineated those matters which were not to be penetrated by secular authority:
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law
have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in
their application to the case before them....
[I]t is a very different thing where a subject matter of dispute, strictly and purely eccle.
siastical in its character...-a matter which concerns theological controversy, church dis-
cipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the
standard of morals required of them-becomes the subject of its action....But it is easy to
see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the
doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization
of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care,
for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the
ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court.
Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727, 733 (emphasis in original). Cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (holding that religious societies have complete discretion in picking their
own minister, including choice of an alien residing outside United States).
6 See L. TRIBE, supra note 45 at 882-83.
3 Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 347, 353.
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on matters of doctrine, church discipline, religious office, and religious practice.6
The Supreme Court .wasted little time putting into practice this rule where
the dispute involved a congregational church and intertwined acts of member
discipline with ownership of the church building. In Bouldin v. Alexander,65 in-
quiry was permitted by the Court into whether an expulsion from church mem-
bership was truly an act of the church or of persons not so empowered and who,
consequently, had no authority to excommunicate others. Following a dispute, a
small minority of members in the church had issued a resolution of excommun-
ication designed to remove the trustees and a large number of church members,
thus leaving in themselves possession of the church real estate.6 Since the polity
of the church was congregational (meaning majority rule), and this was clear from
the church manuals on governance, the Court held the action of the small minority
"was not the action of the church, and that it was wholly inoperative." 67 But in
doing so the Court acknowledged it had "no power to revise or question ordinary
acts of church discipline, or of excision from membership," 6 nor to "decide who
ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been
regularly or irregularly cut off."169 So in applying the rule of deference to the
highest church judicatory in matters concerning property, the Court may still
assure itself that the ecclesiastical body claiming final authority is not making a
false claim concerning its power. 70
14 The Watson rule of judicial deference was expressly reaffirmed in Shepard v. Barkley, 247
U.S. 1 (1918), a case involving property litigation that followed the merger of two Presbyterian bodies.
Eleven years later, in dictum written by Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Arch-
bishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), said that the judicial deference rule would not be binding in instances of
"fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" by a church tribunal. Id. at 16. Gonzales involved an appeal from
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court which had declined to overturn a decision by a Roman Catholic Archbishop that the petitioner
was not qualified for appointment to an ecclesiastical office. As Justice Brandeis noted, the petitioner's
main interest appeared to be the substantial money from a trust which accompanied the desired
appointment. Id. at 18.
" Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872). The church property was in the District
of Columbia, hence the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction.
6 Id. at 133-34.
67 Id. at 140.
1- Id. at 139.
Id. at 139-40.
10 In the decades before and after its Watson decision, the Supreme Court passed on a variety
of intrafaith disputes involving property. Some involved bequests, as in Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 119 (1866); Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U.S. 352 (1879); and Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U.S.
586 (1887). None of these cases, however, sought to invoke the civil courts in the resolution of
questions touching religious doctrine or practice. Others involved disputes concerning property held
communally and where one member had left the society and now sought restitution for his labor,
such as the German Separatist colony at Zoor, Ohio, in Goesele v. Bimeler, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 589
(1852), and the Harmony Society of Beaver County, Pennsylvania, in Baker v. Nachtrieb, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 126 (1856); and Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 377 (1887). In Baker, the Court refused to
get involved in the religious dispute because the plaintiff had accepted money and a contract in release
of his claim, and in Speidel, the claim was over fifty years old and barred by laches. Finally, in
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Watson v. Jones was elevated to a rule of first amendment stature in Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.7' The Kedroff Court perceived in Watson a rule which
"radiates...a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
and doctrine."' 72 In Kedroff, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute
that displaced control of the Russian Orthodox Churches from the central gov-
erning hierarchy located in the Soviet Union with a church organization limited
to the diocese of North America. The perceived need to transfer the control of
ecclesiastical polity was linked to the Revolution of 1917 and doubt concerning
whether Moscow had "a true central organization of the Russian Orthodox Church
capable of functioning as the head of a free international religious body. '", Be-
cause the statute did more than just "permit the trustees of the Cathedral [in
New York City] to use it for services consistent with the desires of the members,"
and transferred by legislative fiat the entire control over domestic churches, 74 the
Court held that the statute violated the "rule of separation between church and
state."75
The Watson Court repudiated the implied trust rule used to sanction the
departure-from-doctrine standard, but only as a matter of federal common law.
A number of states continued to follow the departure-from-doctrine standard or
English rule as a matter of state common law. 76 Kedroff, however, clearly fore-
shadowed the sweeping aside of the local law in all states that followed the English
rule.
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church,77 the rule in
Watson was firmly established as a matter of church autonomy required by the
first amendment. Presbyterian Church presented a hierarchical church dispute
between a general church and two of its local member churches over the right
to control the local churches' property. The controversy began when the local
churches claimed that the general church had violated the organization's consti-
Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), the Court was asked to assist in the division
of common property when the Methodist Episcopal Church split over the abolition question. Smith
might well have been decided differently had it been taken up following the Court's new direction
in Watson.
" Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94.
72 Id. at 116.
71 Id. at 106. The specific dispute in Kedroff concerned which religious body had the authority
to make a clerical appointment to St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. The Court's review,
however, necessarily drew into the dispute the entire statutory scheme.
74 Id. at 119.
7" Id. at 110. In Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam), the decision
in Kedroff, invalidating legislative action, was extended to a later state court judgment which sought
to accomplish the same transfer of ecclesiastical control.
' Kauper, supra note 63 at 350-51.
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440.
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tution and had departed from accepted doctrine and practice.7 8 Georgia followed
the implied trust rule with its requisite fact-finding into alleged departures-from-
doctrine. On the basis of a jury finding that the general church had abandoned
its original doctrines, the Georgia courts entered judgment for the local congre-
gations.
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that states have a legitimate interest
in church property disputes, and thus courts properly may take subject matter
jurisdiction.7 9 The first amendment, however, does not permit a departure-from-
doctrine standard as a substantive rule of decision. The "American concept of
the relationship between church and state"80 "leaves the civil courts no role in
determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property dis-
putes.""' Notably, without spelling out in detail a legal standard which would
withstand first amendment scrutiny, the Court advised that "there are neutral
principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied ' 82
without determining underlying questions of religious doctrine and practice.83 With
these instructions, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
78 Id. at 442 n. 1. The Presbyterian Church Court quoted from the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Georgia, summarizing the alleged departures from doctrine by the general church:
'ordaining of women as ministers and ruling elders, making pronouncements and recom-
mendations concerning civil, economic, social and political matters, giving support to the
removal of Bible reading and prayers by children in the public schools, adopting certain
Sunday School literature and teaching neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession of Faith and
Catechisms, as originally adopted by the general church, and causing all members to remain
in the National Council of Churches of Christ and willingly accepting its leadership which
advocated named practices, such as the subverting of parental authority, civil disobedience
and intermeddling in civil affairs'; also 'that the general church has.. .made pronouncements
in matters involving international issues such as the Vietnam conflict and has disseminated





Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 449. The Presbyterian Church Court recalled the narrower procedural review suggested
by the dictum in Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16 (see supra note 64; infra note 89), that a decision by
church authorities could not stand if found to be the result of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness,"
as possibly meeting the neutral principles requirement. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 451.
"1 In the term following Presbyterian Church, the Court dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question an appeal in a similar case from a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam). In the Court's
view, the property dispute was resolved by the Maryland courts without inquiry into religious doctrine.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated that the Court's decision in Presbyterian Church
permitted a state to "adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so
long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship
or the tenets of faith." Id. at 368 (emphasis in original). Brennan then went on to broadly outline
three such approaches. First, there is the Watson approach of judicial deference to the decision of
the highest governing church authority. Where the identification of this governing authority "is a
matter of substantial controversy," the civil courts cannot, consistent with the first amendment,
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In a dispute similar to the ecclesiastical differences presented in Kedroff, the
Supreme Court in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Mifivojevich 4 rejected a bish-
op's resistance to the reorganization of the American-Canadian diocese of the
Serbian Orthodox Church and his removal from office. Unlike Presbyterian Church,
which was essentially a suit over the control of church real estate, Milivojevich
involved primarily the religious concerns of church administration and clerical
appointments, matters more insulated from civil review under the first amend-
ment.
s5
In Milivojevich, there was no dispute between the parties that the Serbian
Orthodox Church was a hierarchical church and that the sole power to remove
clerics rested with the governing body that had decided the bishop's case.16 Nor
was there any question that the matter at issue was a religious dispute of eccle-
siastical cognizance.8 7 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with these stipulations.
Nevertheless, the court decided in favor of the defrocked bishop because, in its
view, the church's adjudicatory procedures had been applied in an arbitrary man-
ner.s On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the "arbitrariness" exception to
the judicial deference rule of Watson when the question concerns church polity
or church administration. 9 When the issue is primarily religious, rather that prin-
cipally over the control of property, there may be no examination by civil courts
into whether the church judicatory body properly followed its own rules of pro-
cedureP ° No civil court jurisdiction "is consistent with the constitutional mandate
[that] the civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories
of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law." 9' The reasons for
this injunction are three-fold. First, civil courts cannot delve into canon or ec-
clesiastical law.92 These matters are too sensitive to permit any civil probing be-
cause inquiry may prove too entangling. Second, civil judges have no training in
"probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a church so as to decide where religious
law places control." Id. at 369. Second, there is the "formal title" doctrine, used by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, requiring study of the local church deed and the church's organic law-charter,
constitution, and bylaws. Id.at 370. Third, there is the enactment of a statutory approach, carefully
drawn to avoid interference in doctrine. Id. at 370.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696.
I /d. at 709, 713, 720, 721. In Milivojevich, the resolution of the claim concerning the clerical
office would determine any incidental property questions. Id. at 709.
- Id. at 715.
Id. at 709.
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill. 2d 477, 503, 328 N.E.2d 268, 281-
82 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
- Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 712-13. The "arbitrariness" exception had been established by the
dictum in Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1, 18. See supra notes 64, 82. Presumably the exceptions for "fraud
and collusion" still obtain.
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canonical law. 93 Finally, the "[c]onstitutional concepts of due process, involving
secular notions of 'fundamental fairness' cannot be borrowed from civil law
and impressed upon internal church governance consistent with church-state sep-
aration. 94
The Supreme Court also reversed the state court's disapproval of the diocesan
reorganization, holding that the Illinois Supreme Court had relied impermissibly
on its "delv[ing] into the various church constitutional provisions" relevant to
"a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical
affairs." 95 The enforcement of terms in controlling church documents could not
be accomplished "without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible
inquiry into church polity."
96
Linking its decision to the Establishment Clause's "promise of nonentangle-
ment," the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wol9 7 attempted to delineate more pre-
cisely the nature of the neutral-principles-of-law approach suggested in Presbyterian
Church. Jones v. Wolf presented a typical hierarchical church property dispute
between a local church, represented by a majority of its congregation, and the
general church allied in the lawsuit with a minority faction of the local congre-
gation. A majority of the local congregation adopted a resolution to separate
from the general church and then affiliate with a different denomination. The
majority faction retained possession of the property and assets of the local church
and excluded the minority faction from its affairs. The general church responded
by appointing an administrative commission which issued a judgment declaring
the minority faction the "true church." Further, the commission's ruling pur-
ported to retract all of the majority faction's privileges in continued use of the
local church real estate. 9
Applying a neutral-principles-of-law approach, the Georgia courts reviewed
the state statutes on implied trusts, the deeds to the disputed property, the organic
law of the church, the corporate charter to the local church, and the constitution
of the general church (Book of Church Order). 99 The state court found nothing
implying a trust in favor of the general church. The deeds gave legal title to the
local church and its trustees. Without further analysis, the state court awarded
title in the property to the majority faction,'00 implying that the Georgia courts
presume the majority faction constitutes the "true local congregation" when there
is no evidence to the contrary.' 0 '
" Id. at 714 n. 8.
' Id. at 714-15.
I Id. at 721.
Id. at 723.




,o Id. at 607.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the minority faction challenged the Georgia
presumption in favor of local majority rule. The minority faction argued that at
least as to a hierarchical church, the state could not adopt a legal presumption
which contradicted a ruling by the general church commission concerning the
"true congregation."' 02 The Supreme Court, however, approved a majority-rule
presumption as part of a neutral-principles-of-law approach, since a "majority
faction can be identified without resolving any question of religious doctrine or
polity." Such a legal presumption must be rebuttable, however, in the face of
evidence by the minority faction that the relevant documents and state statutes
place title to the property elsewhere.' 4
The Jones v. Wolf Court made clear that the neutral-principles approach was
not mandated by the first amendment, but was an alternative to the judicial
deference rule of Watson. 05 Moreover, when applying the neutral-principles rule,
if a civil court examines church documents and finds that they incorporate "re-
ligious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property," the
courts must defer to the interpretation of the documents given by the authoritative
ecclesiastical body. 0
6
In short, civil authorities must always forego questions which are essentially
religious as a matter of noninterference in the affairs of religious associations.0 7
1-2 Id.
'1' Id. The Court in Jones v. Wolf noted that problems may occur when the identity of enrolled
members, presence of a quorum, or the tally on the final vote are disputed. Id.
" Id. at 607, 608 n. 5. Since the nature of the presumption in Jones v. Wolf was unclear, id.
at 608, or whether Georgia law instead required application of the Watson judicial deference rule,
id. at 608-09, the Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 610.
os Id. at 602.
Id. at 604. In Jones v. Wolf, the dissenting justices argued that only the Watson judicial
deference rule was permitted by the first amendment when disputes arose in hierarchical churches.
Id. at 616-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1w Accord, Little, 106 S. Ct. 1802 (cert. denied) (Marshall and Brennan, J.J., dissenting). Little
involved the schism within a local church of congregational polity over whether a majority of the
members had voted to dismiss the pastor. Members who desired to remove the pastor filed suit alleging
that a majority had voted to fire the pastor but that he refused to accept that vote and vacate the
office. Rather than inquire as to the plaintiffs' claim that they represented the majority faction within
the church and that the members had indeed elected to remove the pastor at a properly called con-
gregation meeting with a quorum present, the trial court directed that a new election be held under
the auspices of a commissioner appointed by the judge. In dissenting from the Court's denial of
certiorari, Justice Marshall stated his view that the trial judge's "action threatens to erode the First
Amendment's prohibitions against entanglement between religious and secular authority," id. at 1803,
and summarized the current state of the law as follows:
Because religious organizations may own property and enter into contracts, it is inevitable
that they will become involved in legal disputes. However, where the use of property or
the terms of contracts necessitate reference to ecclesiastical principles or authority, courts
must exercise extreme care to avoid taking sides on matters of religious belief.... [T]he Wat-
son approach is simple. A court may apply neutral principles of secular law to the dispute
at hand. When that process requires a court to determine the validity of a church decision,
the court ordinarily must discern from the relevant canonical law what body is authorized
[Vol. 89
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Included in such matters are doctrine, discipline, appointment and removal of
religious personnel, church polity, internal administration, and religious practice.
In disputes principally over control of real estate, however, states may adopt a
neutral-principles-of-law approach so long as civil judges do not become entangled
in questions essentially religious in the course of the rule's application.
2. Establishment Clause
The wall of separation erected by the Establishment Clause, although not im-
permeable, theoretically screens out undue traffic originating from either side.
Supreme Court opinions are replete with statements, albeit obiter dicta, that the
Establishment Clause filters out improper involvement traveling in either direc-
tion. 08
The Supreme Court has been active in Establishment Clause cases that
determine impermissible state aid to religion, but seemingly has avoided cases
that have offered the Court the opportunity squarely to hold that the clause
cuts both ways, thus prohibiting governmental intrusion into the concerns of
pervasively sectarian associations as well.' °9 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
to make a particular decision within the church, and what decision that body has reached.
Having done so, the court may not inquire whether the decision was made arbitrarily or
whether it conflicts with the ecclesiastical precepts of that organization.
Id. at 1803.
- Consider, for example: "[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added). "[T]he purposes underlying the Establishment Clause
go much further than [preventing coercive pressure on religious minorities]. Its first and most im-
mediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy gov-
ernment and to degrade religion." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (emphasis added). "The
objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [state or religion] into the precincts
of the other." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. "The purposes of the First Amendment guarantees relating
to religion were twofold: to foreclose state interference with the practice of religious faiths, and to
foreclose the establishment of a state religion familiar in other Eighteenth Century systems. Religion
and government each insulated from the other, could then co-exist." Larkin, 459 U.S. at 122 (emphasis
added). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970) (emphasis added):
[Rjigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that
no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.... [W]e will
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion.... IT]here is room for.. .a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise
to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Each value judgment.. .must...turn on whether particular acts in question are intended
to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so.
Adherence to the policy of neutrality...has prevented the kind of involvement that would
tip the balance toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious
practices.
'" Churches and other pervasively sectarian organizations (see infra note 123) are to be distin-
guished from those that are primarily commercial in nature, even if connected to a religious orga-
nization. See Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985). In Alamo the Court
turned back a first amendment challenge to the application of federal minimum wage and maximum
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Chicago,"0 the Supreme Court came closest to affording Establishment Clause
protection from governmental regulation,"' but the Court dodged a determination
of whether or not the government's actions were unconstitutional,"' Although
the broad language in the National Labor Relations Act clearly included religious
schools within its scope, the Court conceived a new rule of construction, holding
that it would not assume that Congress intended to regulate parochial schools
unless it had expressed so specifically. The constitutional question, therefore, never
was reached. Nevertheless, Catholic Bishop stands for the proposition that the
prospect of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) jurisdiction over lay par-
ochial school teachers raises "difficult and sensitive questions" and a "significant
risk" that the separation principle would be infringed."' The first amendment
problems anticipated by the Court in Catholic Bishop concerned heavy involve-
ment by government employees in religious affairs. The majority opinion discussed
two examples. The first was an unfair labor practice charge defended on the basis
that the practice was required by religious faith. Such a charge would involve
the NLRB in a determination of the good faith of the defense and its relationship
to the religious mission of the school." 4 Second, the National Labor Relations
Act makes all terms and conditions of employment subject to mandatory collective
bargaining. The all-inclusive scope of the Act necessarily "implicate[s] sensitive
hour legislation to the business operations of a nonprofit religious organization. Although the Alamo
Foundation did have a religious purpose for many of its activities, the Court properly did not exempt
those operations "which include service stations, retail clothing and grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing
and electrical construction companies, a record keeping company, a motel, and companies engaged
in the production and distribution of candy." Id. at 1957. The Court took care to say that Alamo
presented a different problem from the parochical schools in Catholic Bishop. Id. at 1960 n. 18. A
distinction between pervasively sectarian organizations (infra note 123) and commercial operations is
inevitably an important factor in the calculus that parses associations with intrinsic sociopolitical value
from other assoications formed largely for commerical reasons. See Roberts, 464 U.S. at 634 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring) (drawing distinction between ideological and commercial organizations); Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80-81 n. 4 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). Echos of this commercial-
ideological dichotomy are heard in the Court's less rigorous protection of commercial speech. See,
e.g., Zauderer v. Diciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2274-75 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
1"' NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See generally Durso & Brice,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago: Government Regulation Versus First Amendment Religious
Freedom, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 295 (1980); Pfeffer, Unionization of Parochial School Teachers, 24
St. Louis U.L.J. 273 (1980).
" See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (legislative ban on
cleric holding public office "manifests patent hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion; forces
or influences a minister or priest to abandon his ministry as the price of public office; and, in sum,
has a primary effect which inhibits religion."); Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Dayton Christian Schools,
106 S. Ct. 2718 (1936) (case remanded on jurisdictional grounds, thus obviating necessity of ruling
on establishment clause challenge to application of sex discrimination laws to teachers in parochial
school).
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
Id. at 502, 507. Cf. Alamo Foundation, 105 S, Ct. at 1960, n. 18 (no such risk when dealing
with commercial operations of otherwise religious organization).
"I Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
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issues that open the door to conflicts" between organized religion and govern-
ment.115 Since the Roman Catholic schools resisting federal regulation in Catholic
Bishop were the very entities the Court deemed too religious to be proper recipients
of state aid in numerous cases from Lemon v. Kurtzman"6 to Byrne v. Public
Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey,"7 it is understandable that the Court
would not be so double-minded as to permit parochial schools to be regulated
by the NLRB. Nevertheless, the hesitance to ground the holding squarely on the
establishment clause is puzzling.' 8
The final element in the tripartite test in Lemon v. Kurtzman"9 is the in-
junction against excessive entanglement between religious organizations and gov-
ernment. An entanglement analysis is necessarily a balancing of interests. As the
Supreme Court stated in Roemer v. Board of Public Works: 20 "[t]here is no exact
science in gauging the entanglement of church and state. The wording of the
test. . . itself makes that clear. The relevant factors we have identified are to be
considered 'cumulatively' in judging the degree of entanglement.'" 2'
There are three factors to which the Court has directed attention. 22 Each
factor was fashioned in public aid cases, but is logically applicable in a claim of
undue interference with religious associations. The first factor concerns the pur-
poses of the organization which is benefited or inhibited. If the religious orga-
nization is "pervasively sectarian,"' 23 it is unlikely that the governmental contact
"I Id. at 502-03.
"1 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
"' Bryne v. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 442
U.S. 907 (1979).
"I The innovation by the slim majority in fashioning a new rule of construction is pointed out
by the four dissenting justices: "[The majority's] construction is plainly wrong in light of the Act's
language, its legislative history, and this Court's precedents. It is justified solely on the basis of a
canon of statutory construction seemingly invented by the Court for the purpose of deciding this
case." Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See St. Martin Lutheran Church
v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981). In St. Martin, a more orthodox canon of construction
was utilized to circumvent the establishment clause question which would arise if unemployment taxes
were assessed against church-affiliated schools. Id.
"1 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. The entire Lemon test is framed as follows:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed
by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.., finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
110 Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion).
,21 Id. at 766.
22 Id. at 748; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
I" Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758. In Roemer, the Supreme Court turned back a challenge to the
constitutionality of a state funding program which afforded noncategorical grants to eligible colleges
and universities, including sectarian institutions that awarded more than just seminarian or theological
degrees. In discussion focused on the fostering of religion, but equally applicable to the inhibition
of organized religious bodies, the Supreme Court said:
[T]he primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private educational activities,
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is permissible. Second, courts examine the nature of the aid provided or the
regulations imposed by the government. If the regulation provides the public of-
ficial with sufficient discretion to trespass upon sectarian concerns, the involve-
ment is likely prohibited. Third, the Court has focused on the resulting relationship
between government and the religious authority. If that relationship is one re-
quiring continued surveillance by public officials, the entanglement is likely ex-
cessive. Concerning all three elements, the overriding principle is to avoid
governmental involvement where there is an "appreciable risk" that the contact
will be "used to transmit or teach [or inhibit] religious views. ' 2 4
The exemption for churches from the payment of real estate taxes was upheld
by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Commission'25 in part because exemption
by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds. Hunt [v. McNair, 413 U'S. 734
(1973)] requires (1) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so "pervasively sec-
tarian" that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular
activities can be separated out, they alone may be funded.
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755 (emphasis in original).
The Baptist college in Hunt and the Roman Catholic colleges in Roemer were held not to be
"pervasively sectarian." The record in Roemer supported findings that the institutions employed chap-
lains who held worship services on campus, taught mandatory religious classes, and started some
classes with prayer. In addition, there was a high degree of autonomy from the Roman Catholic
Church, the faculty was not hired on a religious basis and had complete academic freedom except
in religious classes, and students were chosen without regard to their religion. The challenged state
aid in Hunt was for the construction of secular college facilities. The legislation granted the authority
to issue revenue bonds. The Court upheld the legislation, commenting on the primary-effect test:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows
to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions
are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in
an otherwise secular setting.
Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743.
A comparison of the colleges in Roemer and Hunt with the elementary and secondary schools
in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68 (1973), will help to clarify the term
"pervasively religious." The parochial schools in Nyquist, found to be pervasively religious, conformed
to the following profile: the schools placed religious restrictions on student admissions and faculty
appointments, they enforced obedience to religious dogma, they required attendance at religious serv-
ices, they required religious or doctrinal study, the schools were an integral part of the religious
mission of the sponsoring church, they had religious indoctrination as a primary purpose, and they
imposed religious restrictions on how and what the faculty could teach. The state aid in Nyquist was
held to be prohibited by the establishment clause. Accord, Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105
S. Ct. 3216, 3223 n. 6 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3238 and n. 8 (1985).
Although the foregoing "pervasively sectarian" analysis was formulated in the context of the
primary-effect element of the Lemon test, the primary-effect and nonentanglement elements often
require study of the same facts and relationships. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 768-69 (White, J., dissenting).
The distinction is that the primary-effect element keys on whether sectarian interests are advanced
or inhibited to a measurable degree. Nonentanglement focuses on the resulting interrelationship or
structure between government and church. Id. at 754-55.
'1' Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). See Grand Rapids School
Dist., 105 S. Ct. at 3225 ("[R]espondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious
indoctrination in this case .... But the absence of proof of specific incidents is not dispositive.").
2 Watz, 397 U.S. at 674-76.
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occasioned a lesser degree of entanglement between government and religion than
imposition of the tax. Elimination of the exemption would necessitate property
valuation, tax liens, and nonpayment foreclosures. Importantly, the Court was
unwilling to justify the exemption on the quid pro quo of churches providing
social welfare services to the community. A quid pro quo requirement would have
caused "governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular
social welfare programs, thus producing a continuing day-to-day relationship"
which is undesirable.126
Gillette v. United States27 presented a classic example of the entanglement
concept used to avoid the involvement of government in difficult classifications
of religious concerns. The petitioners in Gillette claimed that limiting the statutory
exemption from conscription to those who objected to all wars violated the Es-
tablishment Clause because the exemption discriminated against religious faiths
which permitted fighting in only "just wars." The Court rejected the claim, noting
that the "petitioners ask for greater 'entanglement' by judicial expansion of the
exemption to cover objectors to particular wars.' '1 28 The Court reasoned that
' "the more discriminating and complicated the basis of classification for an ex-
emption'... the greater the potential for state involvement" in determining the
character of persons' belief and affiliations, thus "entangl[ing] government in
difficult classifications of what is or is not religious," or what is or is not con-
scientious. ,29
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,'3" the Supreme Court first stated the nonentanglement
concept as a facet of the Court's Establishment Clause test separate from the
legislative purpose and primary-effect elements. The state programs to aid religious
schools in Lemon had erected several regulatory controls to ensure that funds
and state services did not aid sectarian activities. The regulatory bulwark, however,
ran afoul of the entanglement test. Lemon involved statutes from both Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania. The Rhode Island program affected only Roman Cath-
olic schools which were found to engage in substantial religious activity and to
have as a purpose inculcation of the Catholic faith.131 The legislation supplemented
the salaries of teachers who were under religious authority and control, and who
had responsibilities which "hover on the border between secular and religious
I d. at 674.
., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
Id. at 450.
IN' Id. at 457 (citations omitted). "While the danger of erratic decisionmaking unfortunately exists
in any system of conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers
would be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were honored in theory." Id.
at 458. See Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 604 n. 30 (1983) (entanglement avoided when tax
exemption denied to all schools on neutral basis regardless whether racial policies had a religious
motive or not).
1 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. See generally Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion
Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. RE. 1195 (1980).
"I Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-16.
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orientation" of pupils.132 No actual advancement of religion was shown, and the
mere presence of this hazard was sufficient. To prevent aiding religion, Rhode
Island had provided for "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance" over the activities of qualified teachers.'33 The textbooks and other
materials had to be those used in the public schools. In certain events, the statute
called for examination of school records to determine amounts spent on secular
as opposed to religious education, causing state evaluation of the religious content
of a church-related program. '14 The Pennsylvania statute shared the entanglement
problems of the Rhode Island statute. Additionally, it provided direct monetary
aid to parochial schools with the attendant post-audit inquiries to ensure that no
cash was spent on "subjects of religion, morals, or forms of worship."'"3
In Tilton v. Richardson,3 6 decided the same day as Lemon, the Supreme
Court upheld public construction grants for college and university facilities. Al-
though the colleges assisted by the grants were church-affiliated, the Tilton Court
found no impermissible entanglement. The Court distinguished Tilton from Lemon,
holding that the aid in the form of capital improvements was religiously neutral,
therefore not requiring surveillance to prevent diversion to sectarian use. Further,
the grant was a one-time, single-purpose event, which engendered no continuing
relationship. 37 Finally, the institutions involved were considerably less permeated
with sectarian purpose. 38
In companion parochial-aid cases, Levitt v. Committee for Public Education3 9
and Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,'40 the Supreme Court invalidated
several New York law provisions. Specifically, the Levitt Court held unconsti-
tutional the reimbursement of the costs of state-required testing and record keep-
ing. No attempt was made in the statute to ensure that the teacher-prepared tests
were free of religious instruction and inculcation of religious precepts, and none
could be constitutionally fashioned which would not become entangling. "4' In
"12 Id. at 618.
" Id. at 619.
' Id. at 619-20. The Lemon Court also expressed concern about disagreements that may arise
between teachers and the religious authorities over the meaning of regulatory restrictions. Id.
"I Id. at 620-21. The Pennsylvania statutory scheme again came before the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). The issue presented was the retroactive application of the Court's
1971 decision to expenses already incurred by parochial schools in reliance on the state legislation.
A majority held that the 1971 ruling striking the programs should not be retroactively applied, thus
releasing a payment of some $24 million to church schools. Payment of the disputed sum would
compel no further state oversight of the instructional processes. Only a single post-audit was required,
entailing no continuing relationship, and any payments would not reoccur. Id. at 201-02.
, Lemon, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
', Id. at 687-88.
' Id. at 681-82, 685-87.
"9 Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
'' Levitt, 413 U.S. at 479-80. The Levitt Court made no finding that the funds were actually
used to teach religion, but found a "substantial risk" sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 480.
In a sequel to Levitt, the case of New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977), turned
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Nyquist, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional validity of loaning sec-
ular textbooks, but disallowed state reimbursement for building maintenance, tu-
ition reimbursement, and income tax credits to parents paying tuition. 42 Nothing
in the statute in Nyquist barred a school from diverting the funds it received for
maintenance to a religious purpose, and no restrictions were possible without
violating the entanglement criteria. 43 To ensure nonsectarian use of the funds,
the state would have had to conduct frequent audits and make other incursions
into a church school's financial matters. 1"
The Supreme Court found that South Carolina's program to assist church-
related colleges through the issuance of revenue bonds bordered on excessive en-
tanglement in Hunt v. McNair. 45 Since the benefited institution was a Baptist
college, it closely approximated those schools profiled in Tilton. The Court, how-
ever, was concerned that the legislation enabled the administering agency to "be-
come deeply involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions of the
college."' t46 The South Carolina Supreme Court had defused the problem by giving
the legislation a narrow interpretation restricting the agency's power unless there
was a default on the bonds by the college. 47 The state administrators, therefore,
exercised no discretion over the colleges' operations or fiscal policy absent the
unlikely event of a default.
back an attempt to reimburse parochial schools for testing and record-keeping expenses incurred
between the time of the enactment of a state-aid statute and the time it was struck down in Levitt.
The prospect of even a one-time audit to determine if the expenditures were utilized for sectarian
purposes would entangle the state and the civil courts in an "essentially religious dispute." In essence,
the audit would compel the state auditors to pry into possible religious content of classroom ex-
aminations written by parochial school teachers. Id. at 132-33.
"2 In a case that presented an issue similar to one in Nyquist, the Court in Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983), upheld a Minnesota tax deduction for parents who incurred expenses of tuition,
textbooks, and transportation on behalf of their children attending elementary or secondary schools.
Nyquist was distinguished on the basis that the Minnesota statute provided the deduction to all parents
whether their children attended public or private schools. Id. at 397. Moreover, there was no en-
tanglement between Minnesota and the religious schools because any benefits to the schools came
only as "a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children." Id. at
399. The Mueller Court also held that the "political divisiveness" aspect of the entanglement test
(see infra note 184) was not violated and "must be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial
subsidies are paid to parochial schools or teachers in parochial schools." Id. at 403 n. 11.
"' Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774. In Nyquist, the tuition tax and reimbursement schemes were found
to violate the primary-effect test. Id. at 780, 794.
I'" In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), a state law providing aid to church-related schools
was again before the Court. The Court continued to uphold the lending of secular textbooks, but it
rejected the provision of counseling, remedial classes, and therapy by public school professional staff
on the parochial school campus. Surveillance would be required to ensure that religious instruction
not become part of the professional's activity, and such surveillance would constitute impermissible
entanglement. Id. at 369-72. The Meek Court also noted the potential for conflict between the public
employees and religious authorities. Id. at 372 n. 22.
"' Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
'. Id. at 747. The concern of over-involvement was not that it might actually happen, but that
there was a "realistic likelihood" that it could happen. Id.
I ld. at 747-48.
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In Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 4 the Court continued its practice of
permitting aid to church-related colleges, upholding noncategorical grants in the
form of annual subsidies. A plurality of the Court held that the aid did not foster
an entanglement with religion because the colleges in question performed essen-
tially secular educational functions; the annual payment did not alone implicate
excessive entanglement; and the possibility of occasional audits was not likely to
be more entangling than inspections and audits involved in the course of normal
college accreditation inspections by the state. 49 The case draws a sharp distinction
between the "pervasively sectarian" primary and secondary schools such as those
in Lemon, and the church-affiliated colleges in Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer.150
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball' and Aquilar v. Felton,12 comprise the
Court's most recent look at aid to parochial schools. In Grand Rapids, a local
school district had adopted two programs, called Shared Time and Community
Education, that provided classes to parochial school students at taxpayer expense
in classrooms located in and leased from the local parochial schools.'53 Because
the schools involved were "pervasively sectarian,"It" and because the Establishment
Clause is violated when there is a "substantial risk" that public funds be used
to inculcate religion, 5 the Court found the two programs had the primary effect
of advancing religion. Moreover, insofar as religion was taught to parochial school
children with the assistance of government funds, the message of the church spon-
soring the school was compromised by "tainting the resulting religious beliefs
with a corrosive secularism."' 5 6
Aguilar was decided the same day as Grand Rapids and struck down a federal
education program that paid the salaries of public school employees who taught
Roemer, 426 U.S. 736 (plurality opinion).
' Id. at 762-65.
"- In the next two pronouncements by the Supreme Court on the continuing parochial-aid con-
troversy, the church-related schools were more successful. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977),
the Court upheld therapeutic, remedial, and guidance counseling held at sites away from the parochial
school campus, diagnostic services provided at the parochial school campus, and standardized tests
and test scoring provided by nearby public schools. The Court rejected as unconstitutional the fi-
nancing of field trips and the provision of classroom educational equipment. In Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
the Court upheld state reimbursement of the costs for the administration by parochial schools of
state-prepared tests and the keeping of official records. In Regan, the state had avoided the entan-
glement pitfalls by directing its aid to secular services which are "discrete and clearly identifiable"
so as to permit straightforward and routine reimbursement with little danger of excessive entanglement.
Id. at 660-61. In Wolman, the services for which the Court prohibited state aid could be diverted
to sectarian use. Any administrative controls to prevent improper use of the aid would be too en-
tangling. 433 U.S. at 254.
'I Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. 3216.
Augilar, 105 S. Ct. 3232.
'" Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3218-20.
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low-income, educationally deprived children enrolled in public or private schools.5 7
Insofar as the program aided parochial schools, the Court held that the aid vi-
olated the Establishment Clause because of excessive entanglement between church
and state. 5 In order to insure that public funds not aid religion, the educational
law adopted a system of monitoring in the parochial schools. In thereby avoiding
the effect of aiding religion, however, the monitoring created a permanent and
pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving the aid.'5 9 The prohi-
bition on excessive entanglement was said to be rooted in two concerns: freedom
of religious belief for those not aided by the state, and an equal concern to
safeguard "the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination [aid by the
state from being] limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters."'"6
Thus, the Court in Aguilar again reiterated that the church-state separation em-
bodied in the Establishment Clause is for the mutual benefit of both.
The recurring themes of avoiding governmental involvement in the task of
classifying religious practices and of avoiding the monitoring of religious ministries
were brought together in Widnar v. Vincent. 61 Although permitting use of uni-
versity buildings and other facilities by student groups, the state university in
Widmar sought to justify barring use by student groups that had a religious
purpose. On the basis of speech and associational freedoms, the Supreme Court
upheld the right of student groups with a religious focus to use university facilities
on an equal basis with all other student groups. 62 The lone dissenter, Justice
White, argued that the Establishment Clause permitted the university to bar use
of public facilities for "religious worship," although he agreed "religious speech"
could not be excluded based on the Court's precedents prohibiting content-based
censorship.' 63 The majority rejected the suggested distinction between "worship"
and "religious speech" for entanglement reasons. The Court pointed out that the
distinction would (1) compel the state university "to inquire into the significance
of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances
by the same faith,"' 64 and (2) foster "a continuing need to monitor group meetings
to ensure compliance with the rule."' 65
Although nonentanglement' 66 and the avoidance of the civil resolution of in-
trafaith disputes' 67 are often viewed as distinct doctrinal developments, they spring
from the same underlying principle: government must avoid any involvement with
'" Augilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3234-35.
"' Id. at 3237.
"' Id. at 3237-38.
z" Id. at 3237.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Id. at 268-69.
Ui Id. at 283-84 (White, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 269 n.6. See also id. at 271 n.9, 272 n.ll.
Id. at 272 n.11.
' Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
161 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679.
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pervasively sectarian societies that may touch upon the matters central to their
religious identity and mission. These matters are so highly reactive when placed
in contact with civic authority that religious liberty requires that any appreciable
risk 61 of interference be avoided.
3. Free Exercise Clause
A useful parallel may be drawn between the concern that government not
unduly involve itself with organized religion and the Supreme Court's treatment
of claims under the Free Exercise Clause. As a threshold inquiry in every Free
Exercise Clause case, the claimant must show that his religious belief is sincerely
held.' 69 Some objective evidence of sincerity is required, lest a free exercise claim
become a basis for fraud or too ready an excuse for avoiding many unwanted
civic obligations. Nevertheless, the sincerity test is necessarily a truncated exercise
in fact-finding because of the injunction against civil authorities testing the truth
of one's faith.' 70 The Court has said that only claims "so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation" should be denied free exercise credence.' 7' Stated dif-
ferently, sincerity is not so much a test of what a person believes, but whether
one really believes it-a fervency test.
Of course, religious organizations are not immune from criminal prosecution 7 1
nor are they exempt from civil suits where acts such as false imprisonment have
caused personal injury. ' 3 The claims of religious fraud and intentional infliction
of mental distress allegedly caused by the purveying of false religious doctrine
are more problematic. 7 4 In United States v. Ballard,75 a criminal prosecution for
I' The term "appreciable risk" was adopted from Regan, 444 U.S. at 662, where the Court
noted that certain state aid to parochial schools did not result in any "appreciable risk" of government
entanglement in the schools ability to inculcate its religious values. See infra note 124 (discussion of
Regan). The Court has been quite consistent in the rule that the Establishment Clause is violated
when there is only a risk of church-state conflict. See, e.g., Levitt, 413 U.S. at 480 ("the potential
for conflict inheres in this situation"). See also Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125.
'- See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (compulsory school attendance claimed to be "at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (not
working on Saturday claimed to be "a cardinal principle of her religious faiths").
"0 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-
87 (1944).
"I Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-15 (1981).
,7. See, e.g., Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1945) (bona fide religious beliefs do not
absolve one from conviction under federal kidnapping act); See United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Hubbard v. United States, 456 U.S. 926 (1982) (alleged
criminal violations of theft of Department of Justice Documents); cf. Founding Church of Scientology
v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969) (attempted condemnation
of religious artifact and literature for false and misleading labeling pursuant to Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act).
,71 See, e.g., George v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, No. 27-75-65 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Orange Cty., reported in 5 NAT'L. L.J. 6 (June 6, 1983)) (civil suit alleging "brainwashing and
false imprisonment"). See infra note 666 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 655-675 and accompanying text.
I' Ballard, 322 U.S. 78. Ballard involved a religious movement called "I Am," founded by Guy
[Vol. 89
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss1/4
TORT CLAIMS AGAINST CHURCHES
mail fraud, the Supreme Court held that the judicial system could never place
the burden on a defendant to prove the truth or falsity of his religious beliefs. 7 6
The principal elements of fraud are proof that a defendant knowingly made a
representation and that it was false. Proof of these two elements runs counter
to Ballard when the statements said to be false relate to religious faith. Plaintiffs
alleging tortious fraud frequently seek to circumvent the holding in Ballard by
sifting out the secular representations from the religious and founding their claim
of tortious fraud only on the secular statements.' The Free Exercise Clause prob-
lem soon catches up with this distinction, however, because many of the rep-
resentations involved cannot easily be categorized as religious or secular. Common
sense, of course, dictates that certain representations are clearly secular or clearly
religious. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Ballard, gives the example of an action
for false representation where a charlatan raises funds to construct a church when
in fact donations are being diverted to personal use.' Such representations are
secular and thus do not implicate free exercise concerns of faith and religious
experience. Thus, not every promise by a religious organization or cleric is immune
from legal process, including claims in tort. As to those representations that are
and Edna Ballard and their son. The Ballards were convicted in federal district court for using, and
conspiring to use, the mails to defraud. Through supernatural powers, the Ballards had represented
that they could heal persons of diseases, some ordinarily classified as incurable. They had also claimed
to have cured hundreds of persons afflicted with these ailments.
17 Id. at 86-87. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Ballard, sounded a ringing tribute to
freedom of belief:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free
men. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. It embraces the right to maintain
theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of
the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what
they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.
Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.
Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be
made suspect before the law. Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would
hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of de-
termining whether those teachings contained false representations. The miracles of the New
Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the
religious convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile
environment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of
religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one
religious creed on which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government
which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's relation to his
God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased
and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views. The religious views espoused
by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then
the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake
that task, they enter a forbidden domain. Id.
Id.
1" See Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 597-600; Van Schiack, 535 F. Supp. at 1141; both discussed
infra at notes 65961, 667-68, 671-72 and accompanying text.
-, Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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quasi-religious, however, adherence to the Ballard rule prohibits most attempts
to sort them out, and dismisses those representations stemming from religious
belief and making actionable the rest. The courts must refuse to engage in such
delicate probing because either the inquiry is impossible or fraught with the like-
lihood of error. When a representation is arguably religious, 79 the matter is not
cognizable in fraud for first amendment reasons. This accords with the Supreme
Court's repeated warnings to avoid engaging in the classification of religious con-
duct.8 0 Necessarily, this means that certain wrongs will go without civic remedy,
but with the high purpose of not doing even greater harm to constitutional free-
doms.
The Court has also stated that the Free Exercise Clause does not permit public
officials to become embroiled in qualitative assessments of professions of religious
duty. For example, in United States v. Lee,' the government conceded that the
claimant, a member of the Old Order Amish sect, objected on religious grounds
to payment of social security taxes on behalf of his employees. No challenge was
made to the sincerity of Lee's religious beliefs. The government, however, sought
to challenge the centrality of this conviction, that is, the importance the Amish
faith placed on the belief that they should provide for their own elderly and needy
and, therefore, their opposition to participation in the national social security
system. The Lee Court said:
[Tihe government [contends] that payment of social security taxes will not threaten
the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance. It is not within "the
judicial function and judicial competence," however, to determine whether [Lee]
or the government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; "[courts]
are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."'8 "
The Supreme Court's reluctance to have civil courts delve either into the
objective truth of religious doctrine (Ballard) or even its centrality to a claimant's
system of belief (Thomas and Lee) is further evidence of the importance the Court
places in the separation of state from the activities of worship, discipline, or
teaching of the tenets of faith held by religious associations.
' ' See L. TRIBE, supra note 45 at 828. Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981)
(only religious claims which are "bizarre" are without protection under the first amendment).
"0 See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text, and infra note 181.
"' United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310,
1316 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), arguing that U.S. Air Force regulations against wearing visible
religious garb was not only consistent with the free exercise clause due to the special needs of military
discipline, but also desireable because the rule is neutral, thereby keeping superior officers away from
making evaluations concerning the character of a religious adherant's request for exception to the
Air Force rule on the basis of a multifactor test consisting of "functional utility, health and safety,
and the goal of a polished, professional appearance." Id. at 1315.
112 Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (citations omitted). Until Thomas, it was thought that the Court also
required the claimant to show that this belief was central to his faith. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at
218; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); L. TRIBE, supra note 45 at 859-65. It is now clear, however,
that centrality is not required. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
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4. Freedom of Expression
The American Republic is neither a sectarian state, nor is it a radically secular
government. The power of the sovereign lies in the first instance in "the people."
The people, however, as the ultimate repose of civic power are in turn ruled by
the ideas and ideals which have captured their hearts and minds. When ideas are
in conflict, truth is to be sought by permitting unhindered debate. All citizens
and organizations, including the religious, bear a heavy responsibility to contend
for the truth. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Walz v. Tax Commission,'83
"[a]dherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong
positions on public issues including. . . vigorous advocacy of legal or constitu-
tional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens
have that right.' ' The role of the liberal state is to keep the public arena-the
marketplace of ideas-open for unhindered debate. 85 And the principal burden
of keeping the channels of communication clear falls on the free speech and press
clauses of the first amendment.
86
To be sure, the right of free expression is limited by the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses. For example, should religious organizations ever be suc-
cessful in imposing their efforts at creedal propagation or inculcation through the
force of civil law, the Establishment Clause would be violated. 8 7 Likewise, should
legislation attempt to coerce personal faith, a mode of worship, or a particular
religious practice, the Free Exercise Clause would be violated.' 88
Walz, 397 U.S. 664.
' ld. at 670.
The problem of "political divisiveness" is occasionally combined with nonentanglement principles
in the Court's discussion. Assessing "[p]olitical fragmentation...on religious lines," Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 623, dictates examining whether the community served is local or widely dispersed, the intrusion
involves primarily religious bodies or those of no religious affiliation, and the degree of autonomy
from the sponsoring church. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 765-66 (plurality opinion); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971). The aim is to avoid what is loosely described by the Court as the "risk
of politicizing religion." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 (1982).
For reasons of freedom of expression, the political divisiveness test has been severely criticized.
See, e.g., Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in
Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980); Ball What is Religion?, 8
THE CmISTIAN LAWYER 7, 12-13 (1979). If taken literally, the "political divisiveness" test runs counter
to the freedom of speech for religious organizations. As suggested by Walz, religious organizations
cannot be excluded from common discourse where organized religion along with others articulate their
values, visions, and hopes. In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 683-85 (1984), the Court all but eliminated the "political divisiveness" inquiry by down-
grading its relevance to little more than a warning that the matter should be given additional scrutiny.
Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the
character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself.").
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02 (1984).
' U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press..... Id.
'", See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (Bible-reading in public school); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (prayer in public school).
I" See e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (taking of oath declaring belief in God
required for public office unconstitutional).
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By and large the federal courts have recognized that a church separated
from the state need not be a silent church.'89  So long as expression
by religious people and organizations is protected at the same high level
as is expression of philosophical, political, economic, or artistic content, 19
there need be no fear for the first amendment rights of churches and
ecclesiastics of all persuasions to believe, 9' speak, 92 publish, 93 petition and
1 See Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (state university must make facilities on campus available to student
groups on equal basis, including all religious organizations); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
106 S. Ct. 1326, 1336, 1337-38 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), Id. at 1338-39 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(principle established in Widmar applies in public secondary schools as well). The idea that speech
of religious content must be given the same protection as other speech is codified in Congress' Equal
Access Act, 24 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (Supp. 1985).
11 McDaniel, 435 U.S. 618, 640-42 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Hehir, Religious Trans-
nationalism: Personal Conscience, Civic Loyalty, and Political Legitimation, CHURCH & STATE ABROAD,
June 1986, at 2, 3:
There is no indication in history, law or policy that the First Amendment was meant to silence
the voice of organized religion. Although the First Amendment assures the secular character
of the state, a secular state is not synonymous with a secularist society, which in principle
would seek to exclude religious insight, values, and activity in the public life of society. A
secular state leaves the religious institutions free to engage the debate about power and
legitimacy.
"I For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the implied first amendment guarantee
of freedom of belief or thought, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (sustaining
claim by Jehovah's Witness that state requirement that motor vehicle license plate bear the motto
"Live Free or Die" violates freedom of thought guarantee which includes the "right to refrain from
speaking at all"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (religious test for public office invades
"freedom of belief and religion"); Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 ("Freedom of thought, which includes
freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance invades the "sphere of
intellect and spirit").
-"1 For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the rights protected by the free speech
clause, see Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (state university cannot, consistent with the "rights of speech and
association," deny student religious groups access to facilities provided to all other recognized student
groups); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (reversing conviction of Baptist minister, who
gave inflammatory sermon on public street after being denied permit to hold a meeting, as a prior
restraint on "the right to speak"); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (holding uncon-
stitutional as a "previous restraint on the right of free speech" an ordinance used to deny use of
loud-speaker in park by Jehovah's Witness); Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) (reversing conviction
of Jehovah's Witness for breach of the peace and failure to have permit to solicit money and sell
literature as contrary to free exercise of religion and "freedom to communicate information of opin-
ion"); cf. Heffron, 452 U.S. 640 (upholding restrictions of the selling, exhibiting and distribution of
printed material at state fair as reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the right to com-
municate); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (conviction of Jehovah's Witness
upheld for violating law against "fighting words" which did not reasonably impinge upon the "priv-
ilege of free speech").
"I For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the rights protected by the free press
clause, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (trespass conviction of Jehovah's Witness
for distribution of literature in company-owned town reversed because of "freedom of press and
religion"); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 520 (1946) (consistent with "freedom of press and religion,"
state cannot punish Jehovah's Witness engaged in distribution of literature in village owned by United
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assemble 94 relative to matters of faith. Although the Supreme Court has not had
occasion to decide upon an instance where a church or cleric was sued for
defamation, the Court has spoken with clarion voice concerning the lengths to
which religious liberty of churches is inextricably tied to their freedom to give
voice to the temporal implications of their creed, even when offensive to many.
Thus, in Fowler v. Rhode Island'9- the Court, reversing a criminal conviction of
a pastor for speaking in a public park without a permit, said:
[I]t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity
for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment. Nor
is it in the competence of courts under our constitutional scheme to approve,
disapprove, classify, regulate, or in any manner control sermons delivered at re-
ligious meetings. Sermons are as much a part of a religious service as prayers.
They cover a wide range and have as great a diversity as the Bible or other Holy
Book from which they commonly take their texts. To call the words which one
minister speaks to his congregation a sermon, immune from regulation, and the
words of another minister an address, subject to regulation, is merely an indirect
way of preferring one religion over another.9'6
States); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944) (license tax on sales of literature imposed
on resident minister selling religious books contrary to the "freedom of religion"); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (striking down license fee required by solicitation ordinance when
applied to Jehovah's Witness selling religious literature door-to-door as contrary to the "[f]reedom
of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion"); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943)
(reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness who violated a city ordinance concerning door-to-door
solicitation and distribution of handbills as invalid denial of "freedom of speech and press"); Largent
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness under ordinance for-
bidding distribution of religious publications without permit as abridging "freedom of religion, of
the press and of speech"); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943) (ordinance restricting distri-
bution on city street of handbills bearing religious message as restraint on "freedom of press and
religion"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (conviction of Jehovah's Witness for canvassing
without a permit as abridging "freedom of speech and press"); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451
(1938) (municipal ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills without permit was restraint on
"freedom of press" of Jehovah's Witness).
- For cases concerning religious liberty as an aspect of the rights protected by the freedom of
assembly clause, see Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (discriminatory denial of permit
to Jehovah's Witness to hold services in public park is preferring one religious group over others);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (discriminatory denial of permit to Jehovah's Wit-
nesses to use city park for public gathering denied "equal protection of the laws, in the exercise
of ... freedoms of speech and religion"). Cf. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (sus-
taining conviction of Jehovah's Witness for conducting a religious meeting in park without a license;
petitioner had failed to pursue remedy through local court action); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941) (upholding conviction of group of Jehovah's Witnesses who paraded without required permit
because law was found to be precisely drawn time, place and manner regulation fairly enforced).
"' Fowler, 345 U.S. 67.
' Id. at 70. See also Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296 (reversing criminal conviction of itinerant evangelist
for breach of the peace):
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both
fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others
to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to
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Logically, when a church or religious officer is sued for defamation or other
speech-related tort, the same first amendment concerns apply that cause our law
to disfavor such claims. 97 Thus, the injured party who is a public figure will
have to show actual malice with clear and convincing clarity. 19 Where truth is
alleged as a defense, the plaintiff must carry the burden of proving falsity. 99 By
virtue of the freedom of assembly and of speech, economic boycotts organized
by religious leaders receive significant constitutional protection from business-
related torts as well.
2
00
III. THE CHURCHES' VIEWS
As noted above, 20 a second approach to the study of the interaction between
church and state entails viewing this relationship from a theological perspective.
Every aspect of reality, from metaphysics and epistemology to law and social
relations, can be analyzed in terms of presuppositions that are fundamentally
religious. Whether based upon reason or revelation, or some mixture of the two,
entire theological structures and systems of thought and practice can be formulated
to explain why things appear as they do, how they got that way, and how they
should be ordered. Of course, the various paradigms will be more or less internally
consistent depending upon the degree to which they conform to their underlying
presuppositions.
To a certain extent, every human being operates in terms of some under-
standing of ultimate reality, whether explicitly articulated as religious belief or
merely held as a philosophy. Thus Corliss Lamont, for example, admits, albeit
somewhat grudgingly, that Humanism, the philosophy to which he adheres, can
legitimately be viewed as a religion. °2 Because one's views of ethics and morality
are generally derived from metaphysics and epistemology, the line of demarcation
between sacred and secular is not always readily discernible.
This does not mean, however, that the civil courts should become the hand-
maidens of a particular ecclesiastical body, representing one theological perspec-
tive. Nor, on the other hand, should the courts treat any particular moral philosophy
as if it were ipse dixit binding on them. Rather, when it comes to resolving disputes
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church and state, and even to false
statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite
of the probability of excesses and abuse, those liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
Id. at 310.
McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 640 (Brennan, J., concurring).
' See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
" See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
, C. LAMONT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM 144 (1982).
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which touch and concern religious belief and practice, courts should zealously
safeguard the boundaries erected by the first amendment. Indeed, even democratic
pluralism, if uncritically adopted by the courts, could theoretically be used to
suppress religious movements or break up churches which attract large numbers
of adherents. 203 The express language of the first amendment, and the necessary
implications of church-state separation, stand squarely in the way of attempts
either by the state to regulate ecclesiastical bodies or by churches to employ the
machinery of the state to promote their own parochial goals.
The purpose of this part of the article, then, is to specially equip jurists in
the difficult task of discerning that sometimes elusive boundary between church
and state. This requires information, both historical and theological, unknown
to most lawyers. That this part proceeds from the church's perspective should
not be cause for alarm. The very notion of religious liberty means that courts
must necessarily examine the setting in which certain disputes arise in order to
establish jurisdiction and prevent one sphere from dominating the other. Setting
forth the church's view as to its own nature and mission simply helps those
charged with the task to see the issues more clearly and to maintain the boundaries
more effectively. Further, limiting the following discussion to Christianity must
not be construed as a denigration of other faiths. Christianity simply claims the
greatest number of adherents in the United States. In order to adequately protect
first amendment rights, similar studies should be done for Judaism, Islam, and
others.
The first section presents the history of confession and discipline. One purpose
is to note that many modern practices, particularly in the area of ecclesiastical
discipline, are of ancient origin. From its earliest days, the Christian church has
seen fit to protect its integrity and encourage its adherents to personal reformation
through the exercise of some form of institutional discipline. In fact, discipline
is properly viewed as encompassing the teaching, counseling, and confessional
functions as well as the punishment of transgressors. To confine one's under-
standing of church discipline to the punishment of sinners would be to misinterpret
the nature and mission of the church as it has historically understood itself.
Another purpose of this historical overview is to illustrate that ecclesiastical
practices, once adopted, are not thereby "set in stone." There are always mod-
ifications and developments as certain aspects are found not to work in practice,
or as subsequent practitioners attempt to correct what they believe are erroneous
precepts in earlier theories. History has witnessed serious schisms, indeed the
establishment of entire denominations, based upon someone's attempt to restore
a proper understanding of truth and practice.
-" It is no longer unthinkable that a great number of formerly autonomous ecclesiastical bodies
could reunite under one organizational structure. Numerous discussions have already taken place
among Lutherans, Episcopalians, and the Roman Catholic Church.
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The second section sets forth current standards and practices of church dis-
cipline as employed by representative denominations. There are bound to be de-
partures from these enunciated standards as circumstances require. Nevertheless,
the various official pronouncements do provide those operating in the civil sphere
with useful guidelines for navigating through unfamiliar territory.
A. The History of Church Discipline and Confession
1. Early Centuries
The earliest accounts of the institution of the church are found in the Bible
itself. The Book of Acts, for example, offers a glimpse of the work of the apostles
as they began to evangelize after the crucifixion of Jesus. Schaff fixes the date
of the Council of Jerusalem mentioned in Acts 15 at A.D. 50. 204 Other letters
and pastoral epistles-designed to give encouragement under persecution, °0 offer
instruction on church doctrine, governance, and discipline, 206 and point to the
destiny of the church2°7-were probably written prior to the destruction of Je-
rusalem in A.D. 70.20 These writings therefore provide the foundation for sub-
sequent developments in church polity and practice.
Several passages bear directly upon church discipline and confession. Of first
importance are the teachings to the disciples in the gospels. Matthew reads:
And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and
the gates of Hades will not overcome it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom
of heaven; whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever
you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.2
"Binding" in this passage was understood to refer to retaining sins, while "loos-
ing" refers to liberation from sins. Traditionally, the church has interpreted this
to require strict standards of admission and discipline.2 0 Another passage cited
by the church in support of its authority and responsibility in discipline members
appears in Matthew 18, an example of procedural guidelines for dealing with
errant members:
If your brother sins against you, go and show him his fault, just between the
two of you. If he listens to you, you have won your brother over. But if he will
not listen, take one or two others along, so that "every matter may be established
by the testimony of two or three witnesses." If he refuses to listen to them, tell
1 P. SCHAFF, HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 136 (1910).
Cf. Hebrews; James.
Cf. Romans; I & 2 Corinthians; I & 2 Timothy; Titus; Jude.
2 Cf. Revelations.
2 D. CHILTON, PARADISE RESTORED 159 (1985).
-1 Matthew 16:18-19. All biblical passages are taken from the New International Version.
.," N. MARSHALL, THE PENITENTIAL DISCIPLINE OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH 17 (1844). The Roman
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it to the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, treat him as you
would a pagan or a tax collector. 21'
Finally, in John 20, Jesus symbolically breathes on the disciples and says, "If
you forgive anyone his sins, they are forgiven; if you do not forgive them, they
are not forgiven. ' ' 21 2 Once again, the church has viewed this passage as granting
authority by "express charter" to implement a system of foregivenness and ex-
communication. 213 That the church considers this to be of divine institution makes
the matter all the more serious and imperative. Thus, in spite of differences in
application, all denominations today provide for some method of church disci-
pline.
When the apostles began to plant churches in regions far removed from Je-
rusalem they understandably encountered a wide variety of belief systems and
practices. In Corinth, for example, the Apostle Paul faced opposition in the syn-
agogue, where he always began his preaching, and turned his attention to anyone
who would listen. 21 4 Professor William Lane has referred to Corinth at that time
as "a pagan center known for the extravagance of its pleasures and vice. ' 215
Apparently the church at Corinth had tolerated a practice offensive even by Cor-
inthian standards. By his authority as an apostle, Paul ordered the church to cast
a man guilty of incestuous relations with his stepmother out of the assembly.216
Moreover, all who claimed fellowship as a church member, yet who were in reality
"sexually immoral or greedy, an idolater or a slanderer, a drunkard or a swindler,"
were to be similarly expelled and denied social intercourse with members in good
standing. 17 Evidently the expulsion served to cause the offender to reform, for
there is a reference in a subsequent letter to the church at Corinth urging them
to restore the one who showed appropriate sorrow and not to be overly severe.,"
At this juncture it is helpful to ask the broader question concerning why the
church thought discipline in its various forms was necessary to begin with. What
did the apostles understand to be the nature and mission of the church? Again
a passage in the gospels provided a partial answer. Matthew 28 reads:
All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me [Jesus]. Therefore go
and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and
211 Matthew 18:15-17. Various denominations apply this procedure somewhat differently de-
pending upon their ecclesiastical polity. This will become clear in the subsections on current standards
and pactices. See infra notes 365-472.
212 John 20:22-23.
-13 N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 10.
21 Acts 18:1-5.
G" 0. BARKER, W. LANE & J. MICHAELS, THE NEW TESTAMENT SPEAKS 163 (1969). Lane believes
Paul first visited Corinth about A.D. 50.
216 1 Corinthians 5:3-5. Paul refers to the excommunication process as "hand[ing] this man over
to Satan, so that the sinful nature may be destroyed and his spirit saved on the day of the Lord."
Id. at 5:5.
217 Id. at 5:9-11.
'"x 2 Corinthians 2:5-11.
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of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have
commanded you. And surely I will be with you always, to the very end of the
age.21
9
This passage the church understood as setting forth, first, the lordship of Jesus
over all reality, and second, the subordinate, delegated authority of the church
to bring the whole world into ethical conformity with the teachings of scripture.2 20
The apostles took this very seriously as is evident from repeated references to
the necessity of reflecting divine holiness.2' In fact, they viewed the church as
consisting of those called by God through the preaching of the gospel to conform
to the ethical character of Jesus.m Therefore, the ministry of the church was
seen as human participation in the reconciliation between God and man made
necessary as a result of sin. The New Testament documents, then, reflected the
apostles' belief in the fulfillment of the covenant God established with his people
in the Old Testament.m Thus, the church believed that for it to neglect its re-
sponsibilities, individually and corporately, would bring disastrous conse-
quences.2 4
From this biblical foundation one can now trace developments of these doc-
trines in the early church. The apostles often included salutations to important
co-workers in local churches at the end of their epistles. Some of these workers
evidently rose to positions of prominence. Thus tradition holds that Clement,
mentioned in Phillipians 4:13, eventually became Bishop of Rome. His letter to
the Corinthian church, written about A.D. 95, 221 was designed to put an end to
dissension and insubordination in that congregation.2 6 After rehearsing the history
of redemption, Clement said to the troublemakers, "[y]e therefore that laid the
foundation of sedition, submit yourselves unto the presbyters and receive chas-
tisement unto repentance, bending the knees of your heart, learn to submit your-
119 Matthew 28:18-20.
2 This was not taken to mean that the church was commissioned to dominate all other spheres
of human activity, nor that the church had automatic jurisdiction over everyone. Rather, the goal
was to win converts through preaching and then to train them for works of godliness. Those outside
the church would, it was thought, be dealt with by God in his own time. I Corinthians 5:12-13. Cf.
Ephesians 4:21-24; Titus 3:8.
22 Cf. I Peter 1:15; Colossians 3:12; Ephesians 5:8-10.
m Thus Paul refers to his Roman audience as those "who are loved by God and called to be
saints." Romans 1:7. He develops this point in detail in the letter to the Ephesians, noting that those
who believe the gospel had been destined to be as sons of God. Ephesians 1:5. Cf. 1 Peter 1:1; 2
John 1 and Jude 1. This has important implications for church membership. See infra note 261.
21 See 2 Corinthians 6:16-18, where Paul refers to Christians as "the temple of the living God"
and reminds his followers of the covenantal promises of the Old Testament.
2 Cf. Deuteronomy 28; Hebrews 12:28-29.
22, N. MAstSHLt, supra note 210, at 20-21; J. B. LIofrHFooT, THE APosToLic FATHERS 11-41 (1956).
J. B. LIGHTFOT, supra note 225, at 33. "It is shameful, dearly beloved, yes, utterly shameful
and unworthy of your conduct in Christ, that it should be reported that the very steadfast ancient
Church of the Corinthians, for the sake of one or two persons, maketh sedition against its presbyters."
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selves, laying aside the arrogant and proud stubbornness of your tongue." 7 The
importance of this command lies in its recognition of the authority of presbyters221
in the church. Although he did not proceed to pronounce ecclesiastical censure,
clearly Clement envisioned that the officers of the church have the authority to
do so if other attempts at reconciliation fail. His warning against undue self-
aggrandizement in the church is an early example of the type of exhortation
prevalent much later as pastors and bishops urged their people to make confession
after committing serious offenses. 229
Another important work from the same time period is The Shepherd of
Hermas.230 In this somewhat mystical piece, Hermas urged pastors in familial
terms to look carefully after the spiritual condition of church members.
.. [T]ake courage, and strengthen the family. For as the smithy hammering his
work conquers the task which he wills, so also doth righteous discourse repeated
daily conquer all evils. Cease not therefore to reprove thy children; for I know
that if they shall repent with all their heart, they shall be written in the books
of life with the saints.2'
Cast in the form of visions, mandates, and parables, The Sheperd of Hermas
emphasized the need for purity and holiness to avoid eternal judgment. Indeed,
there is a trace here of the notion that baptism represents cleansing from sin and
that sins committed subsequent to baptism can have condemnatory conse-
quences. 2 2 To avoid extreme harshness the author provided for a gradation of
21 Id. at 37.
11 The term "presbyter" is apparently used interchangeably with the term "bishop" in the Bible.
G. BARKER, W. LANE & J. MicHAELs, supra note 215, at 243. Important differences in ecclesiology
arose partly out of emphasis upon one of the terms.
"I Watkins thus quotes St. Boniface in the mid-Eighth Century: "And it is better to confess
our sins to one man than to be made manifest in that tremendous judgment before the three families
of heaven and earth and hell, and to be confounded for our sins, not for amendment, but for
punishment perpetual. . . ." 2 0. D. WArxids, A HISTORY OF PENANcE 660 (1962). It should now
be clear that the church has viewed its mission in redemptive terms, seeking to help people avoid
eternal condemnation by continual exhortations to repentance and godly living. Censure and excom-
munication are merely the next procedural steps for dealing with recalcitrant members. N. MARsHALL,
supra note 210, at 61, points out three major reasons for formal disciplinary procedures: (1) The
honour of the church, (2) as an example to others, and (3) for the good of the delinquent.
-' Ancient tradition attributes this work to the Hermas mentioned by Paul in Romans 16:14,
although more modern scholarship raises doubts. N. MARSHALL, supra note 210 at 22; J. B. LIGHTFOOT,
supra note 225, at 161-62. Cf. 1 0. D. Watkins, supra note 229, at 50-52.
J" 3. B. LIGHTFOOT, supra note 225, at 167.
2 If then, when ye hear [the commandments and parables], ye keep them and walk in them,
and do them with a pure heart, ye shall receive from the Lord all things that he promised
you; but if, when you hear them, ye do not repent, but still add to your sins, ye shall receive
from the Lord the opposite.
Id. at 181.
Most tellingly, the Shepherd, figuratively representing Jesus, tells Hernias, "But I say unto you ... if
after this great and holy calling anyone, being tempted to the devil, shall commit sin, he hath only
one [opportunity of] repentance. But if he sin off-hand and repent, repentance is unprofitable for such
a man...." Id. at 185.
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sins. Some placed the offender beyond repentance while others required immediate
repentance for salvation. 233 A striking vision of stones being placed in the con-
struction of a tower represents the work of the church in fulfilling its earthly
tasks by acts of admission and rejection. 23 4
From this point forward one can trace the development of a system of public
penance and absolution. The emphasis on purity evident in The Sheperd of Her-
mas naturally required formal procedures for purposes of discipline and conso-
lation. From the church's standpoint, it was serious work to admit and reject
people from the kingdom of heaven. Divine standards had to be upheld regardless
of how they were understood. Perhaps the central function of the church was to
"shepherd" the faithful through their obligations before God. From the penitent's
perspective, a strict emphasis upon purity could raise serious doubts about one's
salvation. In such a case it was only logical to look to the clergy for assurance. 2"1
By the time of Tertullian,236 public penance was a well known institution. 27
Those whose lifestyle did not reflect their profession of faith were prohibited
from participating in the sacrament of communion. Moreover, there could be no
doubt as to who had committed serious offenses. Penitents were required to undergo
a formal rifual called exomologesis 8 before being ordered from the church at
the time for communion. Perhaps the best early description of exomologesis ap-
peared in Tertullian's De Poenitentia, written towards the end of the Second
I Id. at 234-39. This gradation marks the beginning of a distinction between mortal and venial
sins. Even so, salvation did not come easily:
... [W]ell, thinkest thou that the sins of those who repent are forgiven forthwith? Certainly
not; but the person who repents must torture his own soul, and must be thoroughly humble
in his every action, and be afflicted with all the divers kinds of affliction; and if he endure
the afflictions which came upon him, assuredly he who created all things and endowed
them with power will be moved with compassion and will bestow some remedy.
1" Id. at 239-71. 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 70. The Shepherd of Herinas was so
popular that some considered it to be canonical. J. B. Lightfoot, supra note 225, at 161. In Matthew
16:19, the role of building the Kingdom of God through admission and rejection is referred to as
the "power of the keys." .
233 As the church expanded throughout Europe and northern Africa there came to be a secular
dimension as well. Civil rulers found in the church a ready ally in maintaining social control. According
to Lea, "a passage in St. Augustin would seem to show that the secular courts sometimes would
release convicted criminals at the intercession of bishops, on the understanding that they should be
subjected to penance." 1 H. LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND INDULOENCES IN THE
LATIN CHURCH 18 (1968).
- Born in Carthage between A.D. 150 and 160, Tertullian converted to Christianity around
A.D. 192. 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra 229, at 113. He was an early expositor of the Catholic faith.
"7 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 21, argues that private penance did not appear until approx-
imately the middle of the Fifth Century.
"I The term was translated in Latin as confessio and means confession. Quoting Tertullian,
Watkins points out that exomologesis "is understood besides the confession in words to imply also
the accompanying 'description for man's prostration and humiliation."' 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note
229, at 114-15. Confession of sin, most likely to a priest, preceded the public ritual. J. GUNSTONE,
THE LrruRGY OF PENANCE 28 (1966).
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Century. Although it is a lengthy account, it is so clear as to be of great value
in understanding what the church was trying to accomplish.
This act... is Exomologesis, by which we confess our sins to the Lord, not
because He knoweth it not, but inasmuch as by confession satisfaction is ordered,
from confession repentance springeth, by repentance God is appeased. Wherefore
exomologesis is a discipline for the abasement and humiliation of man, enjoining
such conversation as inviteth mercy; it directeth also even the matter of dress and
food, that [the penitent] should abide in sackcloth and ashes, should disfigure
his body by filthy attire, should cast down his spirit with mourning, should ex-
change the sins which he has committed for severe treatment: for the rest, to use
simple things for meat and drink, to wit, not for the belly's, but for the soul's
sake: for the most part also to cherish prayer by fasts, to groan, to weep, and
to moan day and night unto the Lord his God; to throw himself upon the ground
before the presbyters, and to fall on his knees before the beloved of God; to
enjoin all the brethren to bear the message of his prayer for mercy. All these
things doeth exomologesis that it may commend repentance; that by fearing danger
it may honour God; that itself pronouncing judgment on the sinner, it may act
instead of God's wrath, and that, by means of temporal affliction, it may...
discharge the eternal penalties. When therefore it casteth down a man, it rather
raiseth him up: when it maketh him filthy, it rendereth him the cleaner: when
it condemneth, it absolveth. In the measure in which thou sparest not thyself, in
the same, be assured, will God spare thee. 23
9
The purpose of this ritual was therefore to demonstrate to the offender, sym-
bolically, the seriousness of his or her transgression before God and the inward
disposition required for forgivenness. It also provided an outlet for troubled pen-
itents to bemoan their guilt and to request the intercession of the faithful on their
behalf. As the church restored penitents to the fellowship via the laying on of
hands by the bishop, sinners were to understand that they had been forgiven by
God.24 The public nature of penance served to remind everyone that the church
had before it a very serious, divinely-ordained mission to accomplish, one in which
every member was called to participate.
There were some offenses which Tertullian and other early church fathers
considered irremissible in this life: apostasy, sexual impurity, and bloodshed.
24
'
219 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 115-16.
2 In other words, the church merely pronounced God's absolution after the fact. Much later,
penance rose to sacramental status whereby the mere performance of the ritual was seen to confer
grace (ex opere operato).
242 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 105. This did not mean that such offenders were without
hope of salvation, but only that the church was thought to lack power and authority to remit these
most serious of sins. After the church officially adopted the practice of admitting serious offenders
to penance once during their lifetime, this notion persisted with respect to repeat offenders. Thus,
St. Augustin said:
Therefore, though it be wise and wholesome appointment of the Church to allow but once
the benefits of solemn [i.e., public] penance, lest it should bring contempt upon the medicine,
and so should render it the less beneficial; yet who will venture to say to God, Why dost
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In his later years Tertullian strongly decried the tendency of the church at Rome
to treat sins of impurity leniently. He eventually adopted a very strict position
with respect to penance and severely castigated Pope Callistus in A.D. 220 for
admitting fornicators and adulterers to penance, reconciliation, and commun-
ion.242 After Callistus' pronouncement, the official position of the church was
that those who had committed mortal sin after baptism could be admitted to
penance once during their lifetime. Further transgression left offenders to the
mercy of God in the final judgment.
Not everyone was willing to present themselves for public penance and ab-
solution, and therefore not everyone confessed their transgressions. In such cases
the episcopal tribunals were empowered to receive charges and render decisions.
Lea's description is instructive:
Their sessions were public, they heard accusations, they examined witnesses, they
convicted or acquitted the accused according to the evidence, and they apportioned
the punishment or penance to be endured before he should be admitted to rec-
onciliation. If he came forward voluntarily and confessed before the congregation,
this evidence of repentance gained for him a mitigation of the penalty. 2'
Furthermore, bishops had a duty to investigate charges and rumors of sin prior
to instituting formal proceedings, and to make certain that charges were corrob-
erated by "at least three witnesses of good reputation and not inimical to the
accused." 244
As the church grew and expanded, however, it became virtually impossible
to reach a great number of trangressors. By the end of the Second Century many
sought to avoid public penance altogether, either for reasons of shame or for
fear of repeating offenses. For the former, Tertullian had only biting sarcasm:
I presume, however, that men for the most part either shun, or put off from
day to day, this work, as an open exposure of themsleves, being more mindful
of their shame than of their health; like those who, having contracted some malady
in the more hidden parts of the body, avoid making their physicians privy to it,
and so perish with their bashfulness. It is forsooth intolerable to modesty to make
satisfaction unto their offended Lord! to be restored to the health which they
have wasted away! Brave art thou in thy modesty truly! bearing an open front
in sinning, and a bashful one in praying for pardon. 23
thou yet spare the man who, after having been once admitted to pardon, involves himself
afresh in the guilt of sin?
N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 82. The church obviously did not claim perfection.
22 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note at 229, 118-29. He became a Montanist, a member of a strict
separatist sect which demanded withdrawal from all who failed to uphold the most rigid standards
of purity. Montanism in its various forms greatly influenced the development of penance in the church,
although it never rose to preeminence. The most direct influence of Montanism for purposes of this
paper was in lengthening the periods of penance. N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 50.
' 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
2s 10. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 117. This passage is from De Poenitentia, written before
Tertullian became a Montanist.
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He then asked, rhetorically, "[i]s it better to be damned in secret than absolved
openly?"246 Surely exomologesis was the better option: "If thou art drawing back
from exomologesis, consider in thine heart that hell-fire which exomologesis shall
quench for thee, and first imagine to thyself the greatness of the punishment, that
thou mayest not doubt concerning the adoption of the remedy.) 247
There soon developed in some churches, particularly in the East, the delin-
eation of penitents into distinct "stations." Thus, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Bishop
of Neo-Caesarea in Pontus from A.D. 233 to 270, set forth five stations through
which penitents must ordinarily pass before they were reconciled to the church. 241
Again, there could be no doubt as to who the serious offenders were. Watkins
outlines the five stations as follows:
I. The Mourners, who are in truth outsiders seeking recognition as penitents,
came to be spoken of as the lowest grade of penitents. Their place is outside
the outer portal of the church.
2. The Hearers, who stand in the narthex, outside the door of the nave, during
the missa catechumenorum only.
3. The Fallers, who fall in self-abasement when admitted among the Christian
faithful in the nave. These, too, leave after the missa catechumenorum.
4. The Bystanders, who remain throughout the Liturgy, but do not commu-
nicate.
5. The Faithful, among whom the restored penitent takes his place for com-
munion.2 ,9
It appears that the precise nature of the offense may have been revealed to the
congregation, although local practices varied. In any event, Pope Leo's letter to
the bishops in A.D. 459 demanded an end of "public recitation of the nature of
particular sins. ' 250
2 Id.
"-" Id. at 117-18. The fear of repeated sin must have been very great as many began to postpone
penance until their death-bed. This practice was most significant in the rise of private confession and
sacramental penance, largely because the church could offer no assurance as to the efficacy of death-
bed penance. 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 32.
1,3 See his Canonical Epistle in 6 THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS 18-20 (Alexander and Roberts eds.
1951).
' I O.D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 246. Worship in the early church was taken very seriously.
Catechumens, those who were being instructed in the faith prior to receiving baptism, were not allowed
to stay for prayer and communion. Baptism was thus the means of entering into the fellowship of
the church. Those who had not been baptized, or who, by their actions, denied their baptism (i.e.,
penitents) were required to go through the formal procedures before admission or readmission.
I" Id. at 423. In those churches which employed a clerical penitentiary to hear confessions of
secret sins, it is doubtful that the precise nature of the offense was revealed. When a penitentiary in
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As noted above," ' the church believed that apostasy, impurity, and bloodshed
constituted the most serious offenses. After Callistus established a more lenient
policy with respect to sexual violations, the next great controversy arose over the
status of those who lapsed under the Decian persecution and petitioned for read-
mission once the brutality subsided. Cyprian, elected Bishop of Carthage in A.D.
248, argued that the church should withhold reconciliation from all who lapsed,
except those on their death-bed who (1) held a certificate from someone who had
been victimized by the Romans, (2) had made exomologesis, and (3) who had
been reconciled by the laying on of hands. 25 2 Two councils held at Carthage, A.D.
251 and A.D. 252, settled the matter. Henceforth, all who lapsed that were truly
penitent were admitted once to penance, reconciliation, and absolution a. 2"
It is helpful at this point to examine more closely the behavioral problems
the church sought to correct. In his Canonical Epistle, written between A.D. 258
and 262, Gregory Thaumaturgus outlined several offenses deserving excommun-
ication: covetousness, fornication, acting like one's captors when kidnapped by
barbarians, and keeping property belonging to others which had been inadvertently
left behind by barbarian invadersY 4 The Didascalia Apostolorum, written some-
time during the Third Century, was more comprehensive. Bishops were to take
charge of the process of binding and loosing. Although there was "repeated and
earnest insistence in the policy of compassion to the penitent sinner," the stand-
ards were strict and only one penance was granted.25 5 Among other commands,
men were advised to "not nourish the hair of thy head, but do thou shear it off;
and thou shalt not comb and adorn it, nor anoint it, lest thou bring upon thee
such women as ensnare, or are ensnared, by lust." '216 Similarly, women were warned
to "not adorn thyself that thou mayest please other men; and thou shalt not be
plaited with the tresses of harlotry, nor put on the dress of harlotry .... ,25" Parents
were commanded to "teach [their] children crafts that are agreeable and befitting
to religion, lest through idleness they give themselves to wantonness. For if they
are not corrected by their parents, they will do these things that are evil, like the
heathen. ' 258 Each person was required to "keep himself from vain speech and
from words of levity and profanity. ' 25 9 Bishops, those charged with teaching and
enforcing the standards, were instructed by analogy to the medical profession:
A.D. 397 made public the fact of confessed sin between a woman and a deacon of the church,
Nectarius, the Bishop of Constantinople, abolished the office. N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 199;
1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 349-52.
25, See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
212 1 0. D. Watkins, supra note 229, at 185.
211 Id. at 207. If a lapsed person confessed Christ in the face of a second wave of persecution
and was exiled he was also readmitted to the fellowship of the faithful.
6 THE ANTE-NIcENE FATHERS, supra note 248, at 18-20.
'" 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229 at 249-53.
2, DIDAsCALiA APOSTOLORUM 10. (Clarendon Press ed. 1969). The precise date and authorship
of the Didascalia is unknown, although it claims apostolic authority.
31, Id. at 23.
21 Id. at 193.
29 Id. at 178.
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[A]s a compassionate physician, heal all those who sin; and go about with all
skill, and bring healing to bear for the succour of their lives.... But if thou
see that a man will not repent, but has altogether abandoned himself, then with
grief and sorrow cut him off and cast him out of the Church. 26°
They were also to exhort members to attend worship services and admonish ab-
sentees.22 Although members were commanded to "be peaceable one with an-
other," the Didascalia provided for inquiry and dispute resolution by the bishop,
the "son of light and peace," in the event all other attempts at reconciliation
failed. 26 Finally, to illustrate the fact that local variations in practice existed
among the churches, the Didascalia described only three categories of people in
relation to the Church, 263 whereas the canonical epistle mentioned five.
The canons of the various ecumenical councils264 provide another source of
information regarding early church teaching and practice. In A.D. 325, during
the reign of Emperor Constantine, the church met in council at Nice to refute
Arius' contention that the second person of the Trinity is subordinate to the Father
and thus "inferior to the Father both in nature and dignity." 26 After formulating
the orthodox position on this issue, the Council 'promulgated numerous canons
to resolve practical matters. Certain of these are of interest. Canon VIII referred
to Novatian schismatics who subsequently returned to orthodoxy. They were re-
quired to:
[P]rofess in writing that they will observe and follow the dogmas of the Catholic
and Apostolic Church; in particular that they will communicate with persons who
have been twice married, and with those who having lapsed in persecution have
had a period [of penance] laid upon them, and a time [of restoration] fixed. ... 26
- Id. at 104-05. Bishops were warned against undue severity:.
Do not then use force, and be not violent, and pass not sentence sharply, and be not unmerciful;
and deride not the people that is under thy charge, nor hide from them the word of re-
pentance....For he who drives a man out of the Church without mercy, what does he else
but cruelly slay and shed blood without pity?
Id. at 64-66.
I2 d. at 124-29. Marshall points out that "it was then an undisputed maxim, that no man was
a Christian who was not in the Church..... N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 56. It is clear that the
church did not consider itself a mere voluntary society. The doctrines of election and predestination
precluded a purely voluntary view of the church membership. See supra note 222.
261 DIDASCALIA, supra note 256, at 112-19.
2' These were the Excluded, the Penitents, and the Faithful. 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229,
at 259.
:"' The term "ecumenical" refers to the fact that the councils represented the "whole body of
the Christian Church." There is little agreement among the various denominations as to how many
of these should be accorded offical status. C. BUCK, A THEOLoocAL DICTIONARY 99 (1831).
"I Id. at 24. The Ecumenical Councils were of crucial importance in settling matters of doctrine.
They promulgated canons because discipline is the practical application of doctrine.
2" C. BUCK, supra note 264, at 19-20. The Novatians were another sect who practiced rigid
standards of purity (they called themselves the Cathari, the "pure"), going so far as to deny com-
munion to those whose first spouse had died and who subsequently remarried. According to Buck,
"their doctrine was, that the church had it not in its power to receive sinners into its communion,
as having no way of remitting sins but by baptism; which once received, could not be repeated." C.
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Canon IX ordered presbyters to be deposed if, subsequent to their ordination,
they were found to have committed a crime prior to installation. 267 Canons XI
to XIV indicate that the church had adopted fixed periods of penance: (1) for
those who apostatized "without compulsion," if they repented they faced "three
years among the hearers, and for seven years they shall communicate with the
people in prayers, but without oblation (i.e., the Lord's Supper); 2 68 (2) returning
to military service brought penance of "three years as hearers [and] ten years
[as] prostrators; ' 26 9 (3) those who recovered after receiving reconciliation on their
death-bed were to "remain among those who communicate in prayers only;1 270
and (4) repentant lapsed catechumens were to know that "after they had passed
three years only as hearers, they shall pray with the catechumens [i.e., for the
rest of their lifeJ. 27 1 Canons V and XVI concerned laity and clergy who left their
own congregations and sought to be admitted to another, either upon excom-
munication or out of disdain for the local assembly. Such were not to be admitted
to another congregation; they were to return to their original fellowship or be
excommunicated. 27
2
In the case of one who returned to military service, penance carried with it
certain disabilities. Watkins summarizes the rules as follows: "[njo penitent may
undertake military service. No penitent is to be found at the games of the circus.
No penitant may after penance marry. No married penitents may after penance
resume the cohabitation of marriage." 273 As always, there was an effort to al-
leviate the harshness of these disabilities. In A.D. 385, Pope Siricius decreed that
offenders should be allowed to remain in church during the celebration of the
sacrament but were not allowed to partake until their death-bed.2 74 Moreover,
owing to "the fragility of youth, it was recommended that penance should not
be imposed on those of immature age." ' 27" To complicate matters, the consent of
the innocent spouse was required before the guilty partner could be admitted to
penance.27 6 By the Ninth Century offenders were offered a choice between public
BUCK, supra note 264, at 313. This position would have destroyed the church had it been accepted
as official doctrine.
267 THE SEVEN ECUMENICAL COUNCILS 23 (H. Percival ed. 1900).
' Id. at 24 (Canon 11).
- Id. at 27 (Canon 12).
I' ld. at 29 (Canon 13).
-7i Id. at 31 (Canon 14).
I72 d. at 13, 35. This bears upon modem disciplinary practices. Since the church is not a vol-
untary, contractual society, churches set their own standards for admission, continuation of fellowship,
and excommunication. If churches can look beyond their differences with other denominations, it is
not unthinkable that there could be some degree of cross-denominational cooperation in upholding
disciplinary decisions. It is common today for someone facing discipline in one church to merely leave
and attend another of a different denomination.
27, 10. D. WATKIN S, supra note 229, at 411-12.
214 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 35.
271 Id. at 29.
276 Id. In spite of moderate leniency on some matters, strict separation of spouses was enforced
during and after penance. Thus the Council of Aries, in A.D. 443, "expelled...[both] offender...[and]
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penance, with all its disabilities, and life in a monastery.2 77
Civil rulers were not exempt from penance. One of the most famous early
examples of an official submitting to ecclesiastical authority after committing a
serious offense was the Emperor Theodosius. In A.D. 390, Theodosius brutally
put an end to civil unrest in Thessalonica by summarily executing seven thousand
people.278 "When the emperor returned to Milan, and was about to visit the
church, Ambrose [Bishop of Milan] went out to meet him, and forbade him to
enter the building. 2 79 Eight months later, at Christmas, Theodosius, still denied
access to the church, is said to have "shut himself up in his palace, and shed
floods of tears":
I weep and sigh when I reflect on the calamity in which I am involved. The
church of God is open to servants and to mendicants, and they can freely enter
and pray to the Lord. But to me the church is closed, and so are the doors of
heaven. I bear in mind the utterance of the Lord, which says expressly, What-
soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven.u"
In the Ninth Century, Louis le Debonnaire, a son of Charlemagne, agreed to
relinquish arms for a period of time in submission to ecclesiastical authority after
"undue cruelty in the suppression of the rebellion of his nephew Bernard, King
of Italy." Louis "expressed his profound contrition, asked for penance and rec-
onciliation, and duly accepted the sentence rendered by appearing as a public
penitent."' 281 Emperor Henry III, in the Eleventh Century, apparently "never put
newly-wedded spouse." Id. In addition, no penitent was to eat meat and drink wine if fish and
vegetables were at hand.
2 2 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 716-17. Watkins refers to a letter written in A.D. 794
by "Paulinus, patriarch of Aquileia...to a Lombard named Heistulf, who had killed his wife on
suspicion of unfaithfulness." Because the letter reveals something of the worldview of the day, it is
instructive to include part of it here.
But if thou desire to do public penance while remaining in thine house or in this world,which,
as thou mayest be well assured, is heavier and harder and worse, we give thee exhortation
that thou must act as follows. Every day thou livest thou must do penance: thou mayest
not drink wine or any strong drink, and thou mayest eat no flesh at any time except at
Easter and at Christmas. Do thy penance in bread and water and salt. Persevere continually
in fasts, in vigils, in prayers, and in alms. Never presume to wear weapons or to go to
law in any place. Thou mayest never marry a wife, or have a concubine, or commit adultery.
Thou mayest never presume to wash in the [public ?] bath, or to mix in the convivial
assemblies of those who make merry. In the churches thou must place thyself behind the
doors and the posts in separation from other Christians, and must commend thyself in
supplication to the prayers of those who enter and who pass out. Thou must abstain from
the communion of the sacred Body and Blood of Christ all the days of thy life as regarding
thyself unworthy: but only on the final day of departure from thy life we concede to thee
that thou mayest receive It as a Viaticum, and by way of pardon, if thou art deserving....
Id.
I*7 1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 436.
27v Id.
"" Id. (emphasis in original). It is not clear how long this state of affairs persisted.
" 2 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 74. Charlemagne is said to have found penance "one of the
most useful factors in his policy, to be enforced as rigidly as the penalties of the secular courts."
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on royal insignia without having first confessed and undergone the discipline in
satisfaction of his sins. ' "282 And Henry IV, in his famous confrontation with Pope
Gregory VII over lay investitute of bishops, stood barefoot in the middle of winter
and "in coarse attire" for three days outside the castle at Canossa in penitential
submission.2 83
The clergy, on the other hand, were exempt from performing penance. Clerical
offenders were to be deposed or excommunicated, but imposition of penance was
thought to violate scriptural prohibitions against multiple punishment for the same
offense. 2 4 In general, the standards for the clergy were the same as for the laity,
although the clergy were expected to set a good example and were therefore to
avoid even the appearance of wrongdoing. Thus, Canon III of the Council of
Nice forbade "any bishop, presbyter, deacon, or any one of the clergy whatever,
to have a subintroducta dwelling with him, except only a mother, or sister, or
aunt, or such persons only as are beyond all suspicion. ' ' 285 Clerical marriage was
forbidden by Canon I of the Council of Neo-Caesarea, A.D. 315.286 The Canons
of Athanasius prohibited priests from acting as a "go-between in the putting
asunder of a marriage. If any be found that hath done this, he shall be excluded
until that marriage be brought again together. 12 8 Evidently the word had not
Id. at 110. Furthermore, he decreed that "those secretly guilty of capital crimes, who would confess
them to the priest and accept penance, should escape other punishment on the testimony of the
confessor." 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 189.
1f I H. LEA, supra note 235, at 196.
B. TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1050-1300, 54, 63 (1964). Henry's penitance
was evidently short-lived. Several years later he marched on Rome, forcing the Pope to flee, and
enthroned a man of his own choosing. Lea points out that penance gradually grew to have more
and more temporal consequences:
[Iln 1225, Honorius III issued a decretal pronouncing infamous all concerned in assailing
or injuring cardinals; they forfeit any fiefs held of churches; they are declared incapable
of bequeathing or inheriting property, of bearing witness and of prosecuting or defending
suits; for two generations in the male line their descendants are disabled from holding public
office; they are excommunicated ipso facto, to be reconciled only on presenting themselves
at the principal churches of the vicinage on Sundays and feast days to be scourged on the
bare back, after which they are to serve for three years in Palestine....
2 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 85.
2 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 42. Marshall cites as an example of civil rulers upholding a
disciplinary decision:
the famous case of Paulus Samosatenus, who, being convicted of heresy, and various other
crimes, by the Bishops assembled in Council at Antioch, was deposed from his see... .But
he...being unwilling to quit possession of the church and palace, the Bishops addressed the
then Emperor Aurelian, who gave command that Paul should resign, as the Bishops of the
Christian religion in Italy and Rome should determine upon that affair.
N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 97-98.
"' THE SEVEN ECUMENICAL COUNCILS, supra note 267, at 11.
Id. at 79. Apparently, after a presbyter was excommunicated for a particularly heinous offense,
he could be subjected to penance. Thus, Canon I reads in full: "If a presbyter marry, let him be
removed from his order; but if he commit fornication or adultery, let him be altogether cast out
[i.e., of communion] and put to penance." .
2' THE CANONS OF ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA 35 (W. Reidel & W. Crum eds. 1904).
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spread from Neo-Caesarea concerning clerical marriages, for Athanasius' Canon
75 decreed: "If it be found that the son of a priest hath gone to the theatre, the
priest shall be put forth a week, because that he hath not trained up his son
aright. ' 25 Inter-clergy disputes were to be resolved by the bishop, or by his con-
sent, rather than by secular courts. Those who circumvented this requirement
were "subjected to canonical penalties. ' 289 Monks or clergyman who assumed
military duty or "any secular dignity" were "anathematized. ' 29° The goal was
to keep the offices and functions of the clergy as distinct from the world as
possible.
2. Middle Ages
The trend in the Middle Ages was away from public penance. As the church
expanded throughout Europe, clergymen were simply unable to introduce public
penance among recent converts. 29' This is not surprising. If those in the great
centers of the church were increasingly reluctant to present themselves for exo-
mologesis, even after Theodosius' example, 292 what could one expect from free-
spirited Teutonic tribes? Moreover, Lea argues that:
The size of the dioceses, the insecurity of the roads, and the troubles of those
centuries of transition rendered it impossible for the bishops to listen to penitents
and for penitents to be confined to episcopal reconciliation. Much of this work
necessarily fell into the hands of the parish priests.. .and a change in practice was
inevitable, leading eventually to a change in doctrine. 3
Thus, factors both internal and external to the church contributed to the devel-
opment of a system of private penance. It was out of this development that the
rite of confession arose to a position of great importance in the church.
According to Watkins, the practice of monastic confession under St. Benedict
in the Sixth Century, "when extended in the Christian community generally at
a later date, revolutionized the methods of Penance. ' 294 However, it had to in-
teract with other practices along the way before its full effects could be realized.
For example, confession was ordinarily made to a priest prior to voluntarily un-
Id. at 48.
THE SEVEN ECUMENICAL CoUNclts, supra note 267, at 274 (Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451),
Canon IX).
Id. at 272.
N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 95. Marshall refers to "the untamed natures of the Bar-
barians, whose laws prescribed only pecuniary, non-personal, punishments; with them the Church was
obliged to adapt itself to their characteristics." .
0 St. Augustin decried those who "pretended shame against a practice which the famous Em-
peror Theodosius had then so lately submitted to." N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 102.
1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 121.
2 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 565. To Benedict, it was a sign of humility on the part
of a monk to confess to the abbot "any of the evil thoughts which came to his heart, or the evil
deeds secretly committed by him." .
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dertaking public penance. The first significant development, then, was the abate-
ment of public penance.
Over time, the practice of public penance became restricted to serious offenses
that gave rise to public scandal. 295 Offenses committed in private, no matter how
serious, eventually warranted private penance only. Impetus for this change came
partly from Pope Leo's letter to the bishops of Campania in which he demanded
an end to the practice of "publishing out of a paper the nature of such crimes
as had been privately confessed... because private confession to the priest was...
sufficient to the expiation of guilt." 29 Leo's position, therefore, retreats from
the earlier notion that one of the reasons for formal, public procedures is to edify
the congregation. Indeed, if private confession to the priest is sufficient, there is
no need for any public measures. However, neither Leo nor any of the other
major figures in the Roman Church of that time was ready to go that far.
Watkins describes four major strands of influence leading to the adoption of
private, rather than public, penance on the continent of Europe. 2  For brevity's
sake, only the penitential of Theodore, Archbishop of Canturbury, is discussed
here.29 Written sometime between A.D. 668 and 690, the penitential is essentially
a handbook for pastors to help them deal with both individual offenses and church
governance. 29 It was widely copied and distributed, and local priests often drew
up their own penitentials based upon this model.
One of the fifteen categories of personal offenses is entitled "Of Excess and
Drunkenness." It prescribes various terms of penance for lay and clerical drun-
kenness depending upon the nature and setting of the offense2 °° Another section,
-" 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 48. Watkins argues that as of A.D. 650, public penance was
still predominant in the Roman Church. 2 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 537.
26 N. MARSHALL, supra note 210, at 104. Leo was afraid
of driving many from the advantages of penance, who might either be afraid or ashamed
of letting their enemies into a knowledge of their guilt, and of exposing themselves thereby
to the edge of the laws.... [Glreater numbers would be prevailed with to submit to penance,
if the secrets of their consciences should not be made public.
Id.
-' These are (1) the efforts of St. Columbanus and other Celtic missionaries, (2) the penitential
of Theodore, (3) St. Boniface and other English missionaries, and (4) the influence of Alcuin and
other English scholars upon Charlemagne. 2 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 656-57.
Theodoie was born in Tarsus, the home of the Apostle Paul, in about A.D. 602. He was
appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in A.D. 668. Coming from Tarsus he was undoubtedly familiar
with the traditional forms of public penance, yet Theodore evidently eschewed those practices in favor
of a private system. There is apparently no evidence of public penance ever being adopted in England in
these centuries. Id. at 648-54. The penitential attributed to Theodore is acutally "made up mainly
of answers given by the archbishop to a certain presbyter, Eoda, and edited, after a period of cir-
culation in a confused state, by a scribe...." MEDIEVAL HANDBOOKS OF PENANCE 180 (McNeill &
Ganer eds. 1965).
This is the period of Theodore's tenure as Archbishop of Canterbury.
'o For example, "If any Bishop or deacon or any ordained person has had by custom the vice
of drunkenness, he shall either desist or be deposed"; "If a lay Christian vomits because of drun-
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"Of Fornication," catalogues a variety of sexual offenses and corresponding pe-
nances.3 0' Additional sections cover "Of Thieving Avarice,"30 2 "Of Manslaugh-
ter,"30 3 "Of Perjury" 3°4 and a variety of other problems. Private penance involved
a variety of penalties. Among these were recitation of psalms, fasting, vigils,
flagellation by thong or lash, and temporary exile.a05
The provisions concerning reconciliation recognize the departure from Roman
practice: "Reconciliation is not publicly established in this province, for the reason
that there is no public penance either. ' 306 This raises a question as to the status
of repeat offenders. First, penitents were not excluded from communion for the
full period of penance: "[W]e... out of pity give permission [to partake] after
a year or six months. ' '307 Clearly this involves variation in the doctrine of sin
and forgivenness in English practice from that of the Roman Church. Second,
priests often assigned additional terms of penance for certain offenses committed
by laypersons,3' s a technical violation of the Council of Toledo's prohibition against
the iteration of penance in A.D. 589. 309 If one may add more physical exercises,
why may one not repeat penance? Roman Church leaders recognized the problem
and tried, without complete success, to abolish the penitentials in the Ninth Cen-
tury.310 The Council of Rheims also attempted to reform the practice of confession
by calling upon priests to look further into the misdeeds of their people by dis-
criminating among eight classes of vice. 31' The combined effect of all these changes
and conflicts in theory and practice was to draw offenders closer to their priests
and to promote confession as an essential ecclesiastical function.
"I Thus, "If anyone commits fornication with a virgin he shall do penance for one year";
"Sodomites shall do penance for seven years, and the effeminate man as an adulteress"; "he who
amuses himself with libidinous imagination shall do penance until the imagination is overcome." Id.
at 184-86.
101 E.g., "Money stolen or robbed from churches is to be restored fourfold; from secular persons,
twofold"; "Whoever has stolen consecrated things shall do penance for three years without fat and
then [be allowed to] communicate." Id. at 186-87.
"I' E.g., "If a layman slays another with malice aforethought, if he will not lay aside his arms,
he shall do penance for seven years; without flesh and wine, three years."; "One who slays a man
by command of his lord shall keep away from the church for forty days; and one who slays a man
in public war shall do penance for forty days." Id. at 187.
E.g., "He who commits perjury in a church shall do penance for eleven years"; "He who




Thus, "The first canon determined that he who often commits fornication should do penance
for ten years; a second canon, seven; but on account of the weakness of man, on deliberation they
said he should do penance for three years"; "For masturbation, the first time he shall do penance
for twenty days, on repetition, forty days; for further offenses fasts shall be added." Id. at 186,
192.
Id. at 29.
110 See the accounts of the Councils of Mainz, Rheims, Tours, Chalon, and Aries in 2 0. D.
WATKINS, supra note 229, at 700-06.
"I That is, (1) gluttony, (2) lust, (3) avarice, (4) anger, (5) despondency, (6) moroseness, (7)
vainglory, and (8) pride. Id. at 705.
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The Fourth Lateran Council decreed in A.D. 1215 that henceforth all Chris-
tians were to confess to their local priest at least once per year.3' 2 By this time
complaints against the lax morality of both laity and clergy were commonplace.,"
Public penance had given way to "solemn penance," enforced only in the most
notorious of cases committed in public, and private penance was now prescribed
even for mortal sins.31 4 Priests"' exercised great discretion in assigning penance,32 6
and confession became extremely important. In short, the Fourth Lateran Council
merely codified into the canon law what had already become standard practice
in many churches.31 7
"IZ Id. at 748-19. The decree referred only to those who had reached the "years of discretion."
He who refused to "fulfil the penance imposed upon him to the best of his abilty, reverently receiving
the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter" was to "be repelled from entering the church, and
when dead let him lack Christian burial." Partaking of communion was now more an ecclesiastical
requirement than a privilege. 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 230, refers to this as "perhaps the most
important legislative act in the history of the Church." .
313 As early as the Fifth Century, Salvianus, a priest at Marseilles, had written:
The very Church of God, which ought to be in all the appeaser of God, what is she else
but the provoker of God? or, outside some very few, who flee from evil, what else is almost
every assembly of Christians but a sink of vices? For how many will you find in the Church,
of whom it can be said that he is not either a drunkard, or a glutton, or an adulterer, or
a fornicator, or a ravisher, or dissolute, or a thief, or a homicide? and, what is worse than
any, these various offenses well-nigh endlessly repeated...
1 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 461. Salvianus' observations may be a holdover from Montanist/
Novatianist thought in view of the fact that he and his wife "after the birth of their first child agreed
to adopt an ascetic life." Id.
3" 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 48. 10. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 710-11. Watkins quotes
Rabanus in A.D. 819 to this effect:
Those whose sins are secret and have been revealed by them in spontaneous confession to the
priest or bishop alone; the penance of these ought to be secret in accordance with the
judgment of the priest or bishop to whom they confessed, lest the weak in the church should
be scandalised, seeing their penances, but being entirely ignorant of the grounds of them.
The presence of weaker members in the church is now used as positive justification for
private penance, entirely opposite from the practice of earlier centuries where at least one
function of public procedures was to warn and encourage the congregation.
M" The concept of priesthood was steadily assuming a more sacerdotal, mediatorial character in
place of the intercessory nature of the ministry envisioned earlier. This may have been partly in
response to the privatization of sin noted above, the need to develop some means of control over
more free-spirited converts, and an attempt to maintain, formally, the integrity and purity of the
Church.
"11 Thus the Council of Worms decreed, in A.D. 868:
Penances are discriminated for penitents by the judgment of the priest according to the
difference of sins. The priest ought, therefore, in giving penance to consider the causes of
each one by one, also the origin and measure of the offences and to investigate diligently,
and to obtain clear knowledge of the sentiments and the groans of the offenders: also to
give attention to the qualities of times and persons, of places and ages: in order that, having
regard to places, ages, and times, as also the character of the offenses, and to the contrition
of each offender, he may not turn away his eyes from holy rules.
2 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 714. Such inquiry was greatly expanded after A.D. 1215. See
infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text.
" In the English Church, recurrent confession had obtained the "force of law" much earlier.
In the DIALOGUE oF EGBERT, dated between A.D. 732 and A.D. 766, it states:
[Vol. 89
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Theologians in the Thirteenth Century had come to believe that mortal sins
committed after baptism caused the offender to lose his salvation.', 8 Priestly ab-
solution was, therefore, necessary in order to restore the offender to a state of
grace. Three major theories of absolution arose. Peter Lombard's followers con-
tinued to view absolution as merely confirming God's forgiveness. 3 9 Thomas
Aquinas argued that "no one could know whether his contrition was sufficient,
so that it had to be supplemented by sacramental confession. ' '31, Finally, Duns
Scotus defined sacramental penance as "the absolution of a penitent man, done
by certain words that are pronounced with the proper intention by a priest having
jurisdiction, efficaciously signifying by divine institution the absolution of the
soul from sin. ' 32' The Scotist position was the easiest in terms of what was re-
quired of the penitent; the sacrament, ex opere operato, did all the work.
The later Middle Ages witnessed the emergence of a "variety of literary forms
dicussing the Sacrament of Penance. ' 322 Some of these were guides to practical
piety while others were instruction manuals for parish priests. In virtually every
case, the necessity of confession was understood in terms of "the power of the
keys, a power entrusted to priests by which they could apply the passion of Christ
and the forgiveness He won to the sins of penitent Christians. ' 323 Frequent confes-
sion was encouraged, if not required. 324 Priests were to question penitents as to
the precise time, place, nature, and manner of sins committed, and to make certain
Since the times of pope Vitalian and Theodore, archbishop of Canturbury, a custom has
obtained (inolevit) in the church of the English, and has come to be held as having the
force of law (quasi legitlma tenebatur), that not only the clergy in monasteries, but also
the laymen with their wives and families should betake themselves to their confessors, and
should in these twelve days [i.e., before Christmas] cleanse themselves by weepings with
the bestowal of alms from the association of carnal concupiscense, so that they may the
purer partake of the communion....
2 0. D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 654.
I19 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 237, points out that, in the the view of the Franciscan, Alexander
Hales, the "object of confession is not remission of culpa and poena, but obedience to the Church,
and that neglect or contempt of the sacrament is a new mortal sin which destroys the justification
[of the offender in the eyes of God]." Lea also argues that the
great obstacle to the development of the power of the keys and the necessity of confession
lay in the belief, to which the Church was fully committed, that the sinner could be justified
by contrition and faith. So long as man could deal directly with God the interposition of
the priest was not essential....
Id. at 211. Of course, Lea is writing from a Protestant perspective.
319 T. TENTLER, SIN AND CONFESSION ON THE EvE OF THE REFORMATION, 22 (1977). Peter Lombard
was born in A.D. 1100 and died in A.D. 1160. His most famous work, SENTENTIAE, included this
understanding of absolution: "...the penitent ought to confess his sins if he have time: and yet, before
the confession is in his mouth, if the intention be in his heart, forgivenness is accorded him." 2 0.
D. WATKINS, supra note 229, at 745. According to Lea, 1 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 473, Lombard
was the first to enunciate the seven sacraments (baptism, confirmation, the eucharist, penitence, ex-
treme unction, orders, and matrimony).
IM 2 H. LEA, supra note 235, at 4.
. T. TENTLER, supra note 319, at 27.
Id. at 28.
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the penitent revealed all. a25 At first priests heard confessions "in a [sic] open or
public place in the sight of all (presumably in the church, even though it is not
always explicitly stated)." 32 6 To avoid embarassment to the penitent, priests were
instructed "not to show amazement; exhibit a contorted face; show revulsion (no
matter what enormities are confessed); rebuke the penitent; or exclaim 'Oh, what
vile sins!"' 3 27 Priests were not to allow penitents to leave confession in despair. 28
Some offenses were considered so heinous as to require absolution by the
Pope or a bishop. Among those reserved to the Pope were offenses "against the
person of clergy and the property and authority of the church ... ."19 Crimes
against ecclesiastical authority or holy objects, some sexual offenses, and certain
forms of violence were reserved to the bishops.330 Excommunication was still prac-
ticed, though probably only for various manifestations of contempt for eccle-
siastical authority. 331
3. Reformation Era
The era of the Protestant Reformation marks the end of "one-church" Chris-
tianity. From this time forward Christianity began to splinter into multiple sects
and denominations, each differing in ecclesiology, doctrine, and practice. Al-
though one cannot hope to present a comprehensive view of the nature and causes
of the Reformation,33 2 it is instructive to see once more how variations in doctrine
lead to different ecclesiastical practices.
When Martin Luther began to challenge the Roman Church he did so in part
because the sacrament of penance had failed to assuage his guilty conscience. 33
In spite of the fact that he was more scrupulous than most in documenting and
confessing sins, Luther never felt satisfied that he had confessed everything. Noth-
ing seemed to help. Finally he hit upon a solution: the doctrine of justification
by faith alone. 34 The effect of Luther's discovery was to undercut the whole
121 Id. at 88. See also I H. LEA, note supra note 235, at 370-76. As one might imagine, the
questions could at times probe intimate matters. See T. TENTLER, supra note 319, at 91-93, 162-232.
Tentler devotes seventy pages to a discussion of "Sex and the Married Penitent" in order to dem-
onstrate how detailed such confessions could be. Above all else, confessions were to be complete.
Id. at 109.
126 Id. at 82. "The Confessional box with a partition between priest and penitent was not used
until the second half of the sixteenth century...." Id. at 109.




See id. at 302-04.
"- See, e.g., THE REFORMATION: BASIC INTERPRETATIONS (L. Spitz ed. 1972); R. BAINTON, THE
REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1952); A. DICKENS, THE ENGLISH REFORMATION (1964);
A. DICKENS, THE COUNTER REFORMATION (1969); H. EVENNETT, THE SPIRIT OF THE COUNTER REF-
ORMATION (1968); G. WILLIS, THE RADICAL REFORMATION (1962).
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theory of penance in the Roman Church. "The contrite man need do only one
thing: believe the promise of forgiveness, for that belief constitutes forgiveness
itself." 3" Mankind can do nothing to place himself in a favorable position before
God, thought Luther; only the recognition that God has already punished sin in
the crucifixion can soothe the troubled soul. Thus, in Luther's view, sacramental
confession and penance are more an impediment than a means of consolation.
"Sinners remain sinners-with all their corruption and weakness. But their sins
are not counted against them because they have believed. ' 336 Luther retained the
practice of personal confession, but only as a means of consolation.3 7
John Calvin, the Genevan Reformer, was even more thorough in his repu-
diation of sacramental confession, arguing that "[b]y this ruinous procedure, the
souls of those who were affected with some sense of God have been most cruelly
racked." 3 ' Furthermore, he renounced the sacerdotal notion of the priesthood.33 9
The church should therefore require only a general, public confession of sin and
two forms of private confession, "[B]y disclosing our infirmities to each other,
we are to obtain the aid of mutual counsel and consolation. The other is to be
made for the sake of our neighbour, to appease and reconcile him if by our fault
he has been in any respect injured." 314 All other confession is between the in-
dividual and God.
One of the most distinctive features of Calvin's theology is his emphasis upon
church discipline. Indeed, "the whole jurisdiction of the church relates to dis-
cipline .... To this end, there were established in the Church from the first,
tribunals which might take cognisance of morals, animadvert on vices, and exercise
the office of the keys. '3 4' The power of the keys, of binding and loosing, refers
in Calvin's thought to the ministry of the gospel, i.e., preaching, and the "dis-
cipline of excommunication which has been committed to the Church. ' 342 Calvin
saw three goals in admonishing and excommunicating offenders: (1) "that God
may not be insulted by the name of Christians being given to those who lead
shameful and flagitious lives, as if his holy Church were a combination of the
wicked and abandoned"; (2) "that the good may not, as usually happens, be
corrupted by constant communication with the wicked"; and (3) "that the sinner
"I T. TENTLER, supra note 319, at 354.
'7 Id. at 361.
"I Id. at 356-58.
" J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, Book III, Ch. IV, sec. 17.
"I Id. at sec. 4.
Id. at sec. 12.
I' d. at Book IV, Ch. XI, sec. I.
Id. at secs. 1, 2:
Now, the Church binds him whom she excommunicates, not by plunging him into eternal
ruin and despair, but condemning his life and manners, and admonishing him, that, unless
he repent, he is condemned. She looses him whom she receives into communion, because
she makes him, as it were, a partaker of the unity which she has in Christ Jesus.
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may be ashamed, and begin to repent of his turpitude." '343 Those who pronounce
the sentence of excommunication, i.e., the elders, are to inform the congregation
of the measures taken, "so that the body of the people, without regulating the
procedure, may, as witnesses and guardians, observe it, and prevent the few from
doing anything capriciously."'44 Nor are civil rulers exempt from ecclesiastical
censure.3 4S -The steps to be taken in the disciplinary process depend upon whether
the offense is committed in public or in private:
The former class requires not the different steps which Christ enumerates [i.e.,
in Matthew 18:15-171; but whenever anything of the kind occurs, the Church
ought to do her duty by summoning the offender, and correcting him according
to his fault. In the second class, the matter comes not before the Church, unless
there is contumancy .... 3
After Luther and Calvin, a third major strand of the Reformation involved
the Anabaptist movement. The Anabaptists were dissatisfied with the direction
of the Reformers and sought a more intense experience of faith prior to baptism.
The term Anabaptist was given to them by their critics. They re-baptized new
adherents who had been baptized as infants.147 Generally separatistic, the con-
tinental Anabaptists opposed any involvement by the state in spiritual matters,
including the suppression of heresy.314
Most Anabaptist groups were communal in orientation; some were actually
communistic. Michael Stadler is an example of the latter. His letter, "Cherished
Instructions on Sin, Excommunication, and the Community of Goods," written
around 1537, outlines a more radical practice than that of Calvin or Luther. In
essence, each person was to give himself to the group: "in this community every-
thing must proceed equally, all things be one and communal, alike in the bodily
Id. at Ch. XII, sec. 5.
Id. at sec. 7.
14 After citing the example of Theodosius, Calvin argues:
Great kings should not think it a disgrace to them to prostrate themselves suppliantly before
Christ, the King of kings; nor ought they be displeased at being judged by the Church.
For seeing they seldom hear anything in their courts but mere flattery, the more necessary
is it that the Lord should correct them by the mouth of his priests. Nay, they ought rather
to wish the priests not to spare them, in order that the Lord may spare.
Id.
Id. at sec. 6. Furthermore, Calvin describes a distinction between delinquencies and flagrant
iniquities. "In ligher offenses there is not so much occasion for severity, but verbal chastisement is
sufficient, and that gentle and fatherly, so as not to exasperate or confound the offender, but to
bring him back to himself, so that he may rather rejoice than be grieved at the correction. Flagrant
iniquities require a sharper remedy. It is not sufficient verbally to rebuke him who, by some open
act of evil example, has grievously offended the Church; but he ought for a time to be denied the
communion of the Supper, until he gives proof of repentance." Id.
"' W. EsTEP, THE ANABAPTIST STORY 10-11 (1963), dates the beginning of Anabaptism from
1525. The goal of what they called "believer's baptism" was to insure a regenerate, pure membership.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 195, 197.
[Vol. 89
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gifts of their Father in heaven, which he daily gives to be used by his own ac-
cording to his will." 49 Moreover, "if, then, each member withholds assistance
from the other, the whole thing goes to pieces .... Where, however, each member
extends assistance equally to the whole body, it is built up and grows and there
is piece and unity .... "I0 In terms of church discipline, although deacons were
to pronounce sentence, the "people, however, as zealous for the Lord should
unanimously concur with him and he with them. . . .,,3" Unanimity, therefore,
played an important role in certain Anabaptist circles.
Menno Simons, 1496-1561, was Anabaptistic, but not communistic. His trea-
tise entitled "A Clear Account of Excommunication" describes the Anabaptist
practice of "shunning." In brief, those who are excommunicated are to be avoided
completely, not merely treated as strangers.3 5 2 The aim was to prevent contam-
ination of the faithful and to increase the shame of the offender, all with an eye
to repentance and restoration. 33 It extended to. heresy as well as other moral
offenses.3 5 4 Moreover, family members were not exempt:
[Olur view is that the husband should shun his wife, and the wife her husband,
parents their children, and the children their parents, when they become apostate.
For the rule of the ban is general. We must consent with the church to their
sentence, we must seek their Scriptural shame unto improvement of life, and take
care lest they be leavened by them .... "I
Once again, the communal emphasis is evident.
Brief attention should also be drawn to the Counter Reformation, the Roman
Catholic efforts to reform the church in the face of Protestant criticism. In par-
ticular, the Council of Trent looms very large. It was Trent that "laid the foun-
dations of an even more complete liturgical and disciplinary, as well as dogmatic,
uniformity in the western Churches under its rule. 3 5 6
If Luther's challenge to Rome was based upon the restoration of the assurance
of salvation, Trent served to restore uncertainty. Chapter IX of the Sixth Session,
for example, states flatly that "no one can know with the certainty of faith,
which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God. ' 357 It
9 SPIRITUAL AND ANABAPTIST WRITERS 277 (G. Williams & A. Mergal eds. 1957).
7" Id. at 278.
'" Id. at 276.
"2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF MENNO SIMONS 469 (J. Wenger ed. 1956).
" Id. at 470-71.
" Id. at 472.
I' d. at 479.
" H. EVENNETT, THE SPIRIT OF THE COUNTER REFORMATION 96 (1968).
THE CANONS AND DECREES OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT, 35 (H. Schroeder ed. 1941) [hereinafter
cited as CANONS]. Again:
No one, moreover, so long as he lives this mortal life, ought in regard to the sacred mystern
of divine predestination, so far presume as to state with absolute certainty that he is among
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is not surprising, therefore, that the theologians at Trent "maintained that the
grace of justification once received is lost not only by infidelity, whereby also
faith itself is lost, but also by every other mortal sin, though in this case faith
is not lost."' a '
The Fourteenth Session gave considerable attention to the sacrament of pen-
ance and confession, in part to refute the views of those who, like Calvin,
"wrongly contort those words [i.e., John 20:22] to refer to the power of preaching
the word of God and of making known the Gospel of Christ." 5 9 Maintaining
the sacerdotal view of the priesthood, Trent decreed "that the form of the sac-
rament of penance, in which its efficacy chiefly consists, are those words of the
minister: I absolve thee. . . ."60 In order for contrite penitants to be forgiven,
they must have previously confessed their mortal sins.3 6' Those who denied the
church's position were anathematized.
Finally, there is the matter of the confessional. Lea believes this was a post-
Tridentine innovation designed to correct certain abuses and was particularly ap-
propriate for hearing the confessions of women. 62 In confession "the priest sits
as a judge in the tribunal of conscience, '3 63 and must inquire into all the details
concerning the nature and circumstances of sin.3 " In addition to the pragmatic
concern for secrecy, perhaps there was a symbolic justification as well. As con-
science lies deep within human nature, the darkened confessional represents that
inner "tribunal" and lends credence to the priest's authority to judge. This fully
comports with the sacerdotal character of the priesthood.
the number of the predestined. ... For except by special revelation, it cannot be known whom
God has chosen to himself.
Id. at 38. This is a not-so-subtle jab at Protestantism, the byword of which was Sold Scriptura
(scripture alone).
I" d. at 40.
11 Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 93.
it is clear that all mortal sins of which they have knowledge after a diligent self-exam-
ination, must be enumerated by the penitants in confession, even though they are most
secret and have been committed only against the last two precepts of the Decalogue; which
sins sometimes injure the soul more grievously and are more dangerous than those that are
committed openly. Venial sins, on the other hand, by which we are not excluded from the
grace of God and into which we fall more frequently . . . may . . . be omitted without
guilt and can be expiated by many other remedies. In addition, "for the full and perfect
remission of sins three acts are required on the part of the penitent.. .namely, contrition,
confession and satisfaction...."
Id. at canon IV at 102.
" H. LEA, supra note 235, at 395, dates use of the confessional from 1565.
Id. at 367.
See supra note 325 and accompanying text. Trent made this essential to the faith. The Canons
supra note 357, at 103.
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B. Current Practices of Representative Denominations
1. Roman Catholic
The Roman Catholic Church is hierarchial in structure, with authority flowing
downward from the Pope to bishops, parish priests and other officials. According
to canon law, the Pope, "in virtue of his office ... enjoys supreme, full, im-
mediate and universal ordinary power in the Church, which he can always freely
exercise. ' '1 61 In terms of juridical authority in the church, canon law specifically
states that "[tihere is neither appeal nor recourse against a decision or decree of
the Roman Pontiff."' 3 6 This authority is pastoral as well: "In virtue of his office
the Pope holds primacy not only over the universal church but also as pastor of
the pastors over them and over the particular churches committed to their care.
367
Bishops, as successors of the apostles, are designated "teachers of doctrine,
priests of sacred worship and ministers of governance." 36 They are demograph-
ically assigned to a diocese, "a portion of the people of God which is entrusted
for pastoral care to a bishop with the cooperation of the presbyterate. ' ' 369 To
avoid schism and challenges to authority, the episcopal "functions of teaching
and of ruling ... can be exercised only when they [i.e., bishops] are in hierarchial
communion with the head of the college [i.e., the Pope] and its members. 3 7 0
Under canon law, bishops must "present and explain to the faithful the truths
of the faith which are to be believed and applied to moral issues. '" 3 7' Although
appealable to the Pope, episcopal judgments are authoritative owing to the au-
thority inherent in the episcopal office: "The diocesan bishop is to rule the par-
ticular church committed to him with legislative, executive and judicial power in
accord with the norm of [canon] law." 3 72 Even though the Pope is the visible
'- THE CODE OF CANON LAW (1983), canon 331, 266. The comments describe these attributes
of power:
Supreme power (suprema) means there is no power in the church above this power... .Full
(plena) indicates supreme power is not parceled out, as if the pope had only a piece of
supreme power.... Immediate (immediata) power is one that is not subject to any inter-
mediaries or mediation. There is no middle party in the exercise of this power, and the
pope can relate directly to any member of the church whether bishop or religious, cleric
or lay-without being constrained to specific channels of civil authorities or ecclesiastical
structures... .Ordinary power (ordinari potestate) comes with the office...it pertains to the
office of the See of Peter as such.
Id. at 268-69.
Im Id. canon 333, at 271. The source of papal authority is said to lie in the preeminence of St.
Peter among the apostles. See id. canon 330, at 265, where the Pope is deemed the successor of
Peter, and the bishops are considered the successors of the apostles.
M7' Id.
' Id. canon 375, § 1 at 319.
'a Id. canon 369, at 316.
Id. canon 375, § 2, at 319.
Id. canon 386, § 1, at 327.
Id. canon 391, § 1, at 329.
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symbol of Catholic unity, as a practical matter, it is the bishops who are charged
with holding the church together: "Since he must protect the unity of the church,
the bishop is bound to promote the common discipline of the whole church and
therefore to urge the observation of all ecclesiastical laws." 3
At the local level, the parish priest serves under the authority of the bishop,
"in whose ministry of Christ he has been called to share." 74 The priest "is the
proper shepherd of the parish entrusted to him"; he is called upon to guide his
parishioners, "correcting them prudently if they are wanting in certain areas." '37
The Code of Canon Law retains the traditional connection between confession
and penance. Confession of a serious offense is mandatory, at least once per
year, for all who have "attained the age of discretion. 3 76 Normally, only serious
sin-either in quality or in number-warrants the performance of penance. The
priest assigns "suitable penances in keeping with the quality and number of the
sins but with attention to the condition of the penitent. ' 3 77 Because public penance
is never assigned for secret offenses 378 (i.e., those which are not notorious or give
rise to extreme scandal), private "confession and absolution constitute the only
ordinary way by which the faithful person who is aware of serious sin is reconciled
with God and with the Church. 379
The Roman Catholic Church claims "an innate and proper right to coerce
offending members of the Christian faithful by means of penal sanctions."3 0 It
would appear that these are generally imposed in order to protect ecclesiastical
integrity. They may be either "medicinal" 38' or "expiatory. '382 Other penalties
may be imposed "which deprive a believer of some spiritual or temporal good
and are consistent with the supernatural end of the church." ' 8 3 Fines, alms, and
restitution would apparently fall into this latter category. Significantly, penal sanc-
"I Id. canon 392, § 1, at 331.
", Id. canon 519 at 419.
Id. canon 529, at 426.
376 Id. canon 989, at 695.
I" d. canon 981, at 689. "A penance, which can be imposed in the external forum, is some
work of religion, piety or charity to be performed." Id. Canon 1340, § 1, at 910. The church dis-
tinguishes between the internal forum, i.e., the realm of conscience, and the external forum, i.e.,
outward manifestations of piety.
"I Id. canon 1340, § 2 at 910.
",. Id. canon 960, at 676.
In the sacrament of penance the faithful, confessing their sins to a legitimate minister, being
sorry for them, and at the same time proposing to reform, obtain from God forgiveness
of sins committed after baptism through the absolution imparted by the same minister; and
they likewise are reconciled with the Church which they have wounded by sinning. Id. canon
959.
Id. canon 1311, at 897. This would include excommunication.
"' That is, for "correction of the offending party and reintegration within the life of the [church]
community." Id. canon 1312.
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tions are only to be used as a last resort when it appears "that justice cannot
be sufficiently restored and that the accused cannot sufficiently be reformed by
fraternal correction, rebuke, and other ways of pastoral care."3 84 Moreover, the
Code provided safeguards to insure that penal sanctions are not imposed unjustly
or capriciously. 8
Several offenses warrant penalties under the Code of Canon Law. Only a few
of these will be cited here. Automatic excommunication is the most extreme pen-
alty. It applies, inter alia, to "an apostate from the faith, a heretic or a schis-
matic, 38 6 to a priest who "directly violates the seal of confession, '3 87 and to a
person who "procures a completed abortion. ' 388 Discretionary "just penalties"
are imposed for "teaching doctrine condemned by the Roman Pontiff, ' 8 9 for
"physical violations of persons, '" 390 and for "publicly either stir[ring] up hostilities
or hatred among subjects against the Apostolic See or against an ordinary on
account of some act of ecclesiastical power or ministry, or incit[ing] subjects to
disobey them."3 9
The Code of Canon Law authorizes an ecclesiastical trial for "a controversy
in a matter in which the church enjoys competence. 3 92 Certain matters are, by
"proper and exclusive right," subject to ecclesiastical adjudication: "cases con-
cerning spiritual matters or connected with the spiritual" and "the violation of
ecclesiastical laws and all those cases in which there is a question of sin in respect
to the determination of culpability and the imposition of ecclesiastical penal-
ties." 3 93 Such trials are generally heard by the diocesan bishop 394 and are not
"' Id. canon 1341, at 911.
' Thus, "No one is punished unless the external violation of a law or a precept committed by
the person is seriously imputable to that person by reason of malice or culpability." Id. canon 1321,
§ 1, at 901. Also, "A censure cannot be imposed validly unless the accused has been warned at least
once in advance that he or she should withdraw from contumacy and be given suitable time for
repentance." Id. canon 1347, § 1, at 913.
Im Id. canon 1364, at 920.
1" Id. canon 1388, § 1, at 926. Furthermore, "One who is placed in authority can in no way
use for external governance knowledge about sins which he has received in confession at any time."
Id. canon 894, § 2, at 691.
Id. canon 1398, at 930.
' Id. canon 1371, at 922. Similarly,
a person who uses a public show or speech, published writings, or other media of social
communication to blaspheme, seriously damage good morals, express wrongs against religion
or against the church or stir up hatred or contempt against religion or the church is to be
punished with a just penalty.
Id. canon 1369, at 921.
Id. canon 1397, at 930.
Id. canon 1373, at 922-923.
" See the definitional section, id. at 948.
Id. canon 1401, at 950.
" Id. canon 1419, at 954.
19861
65
Esbeck: Tort Claims against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The Fir
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
usually open to the public.195 All members of the tribunal are strictly bound to
secrecy.396
Penal procedure may be initiated either by petition or clerical investigation.3 97
Unless it would be a waste of time or dangerous to someone's good reputation,
bishops are to "inquire personally or through another suitable person about the
facts and circumstances and about imputability."3 98 One who undertakes such an
investigation may not subsequently serve as judge in a trial.39 The bishop may
proceed by decree rather than by trial provided that he "inform[s] the accused
about the accusation and the proofs, giving the person the opportunity of self-
defense unless the accused neglects to be in court after having been duly sum-
marized."4 0 Penal cases proceeding to trial require the appointment of an ad-
vocate for the accused and a "promoter of justice" for the church. 4 ' Canon law
further provides for admission of evidence, judicial interrogation, and right of
appeal. 40 2
Lastly, parish priests are subject to penalties for several offenses in addition
to that of violating the seal of the confessional. Solicitation of sex in confession
warrants "suspension, prohibitions, or deprivations," or "dismissal if more se-
rious." 3 Canon 1741 outlines in general terms the conditions under which a priest
may be removed from his parish:
(1) a way of acting which is gravely detrimental or disturbing to the ecclesial
communty;
(2) incompetence or a permanent infirmity of mind or body which renders
a pastor incapable [of performing his ministry];
(3) loss of good reputation among the upright and good parishioners or
aversion to the pastor which are foreseen as not ceasing in a short time;
(4) grave neglect or violation of parochial duties which persist after a warn-
ing;
(5) poor administration of temporal affairs with grave damage to the church
whenever this problem cannot be remedied in any other way.404
19, "Unless a particular law provides otherwise, while cases are being tried before a tribunal only
those persons are to be present in court whom the law or the judge decides are necessary to expedite
the process." Id. canon 1470, § 1, at 964.
1 Id. canon 1455, § 1, at 961.
10 Id. canon 1501, at 971; canon 1717, at 1024.
" Id.
3W Id.
Id. canon 1720, at 1025.
" Id. canon 1481, § 2, at 967; canon 1430, at 957.
' Id. canon 1527, § 1, at 977; canon 1548 § 1, at 981; canon 1628, at 1000. There is no appeal
from papal decisions: "The First See is judged by no one." Id. canon 1404, at 951.
Id. canon 1397, at 926.
Id. canon 1741, at 1037.
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2. Episcopalian
Although there were a number of factors at work in the English Reformation,
as a practical matter the Episcopal Church evolved from King Henry VIII's strug-
gle with Rome for a divorce from Katharine of Aragon.4°5 When the schism finally
appeared, the result was a church not quite Protestant, at least in a Lutheran
sense, and not quite Catholic. The Episcopal Church therefore marks the tran-
sition from Roman Catholicism to Methodism, Presbyterianism, and congrega-
tionalism.
The rules of church polity and guidelines for church discipline are found in
The Constitution and Canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church. In addition,
each diocese formulates its own constitution and canons subordinate to that of
the national denomination.
4 06
The constitutional government of the Episcopal Church is centered upon the
General Convention, a bicameral legislative body comprised of the House of Bish-
ops and a House of Deputies. °7 "Either House may originate and propose leg-
islation, and all acts of the Convention shall be adopted and be authenticated by
both Houses." 401 The House of Bishops elects a Presiding Bishop to serve as
"Chief Pastor and Primate" of the church.0 9
Diocesan Bishops are limited in the exercise of the episcopal office to their
own diosceses. 41 0 Each bishop, indeed every clerical official, must profess and
' ' See A. DICKENS, THE ENGLISH REFORMATION passim (1964), for an excellent account of the
subject.
• Reference here will be to THE CONSTITUTION AND CANONS OF THE DIOCESE OF MISSOURI (1979),
[hereinafter cited as DIOCESE OF MISsouI].
10 THE CONSTITUTION AND CANONS OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH art. I, § 1, at 1
(1982) [hereinafter cited as CONSTTUTIONS AND CANONS]. The House of Deputies is made up of
presbyteral, diaconal, and lay representatives. The General Convention is to meet at least once every
three years; special meetings may be called by the bishops. Id. title I, canon I, § 3(a), at 17.
41 Id. art. 1, § 1, at 1.
- The Presiding Bishop has the following duties:
(I) ...Responsibility for leadership in initiating and developing the policy and strategy of
the Church and, as Chairman of the Executive Council of General Convention, with ultimate
responsibility for the implementation of such policy and strategy....
(2) ...Speak[ing] God's words to the Church and to the world, as the representative of this
church and its episcopate in its corporate capacity;
(3) ... [C]onsulting with the Ecclesiastical Authority to insure that adequate interim Episcopal
Services are provided;
(4) Tak[ing] order for the consecration of Bishops ...and, from time to time, assembl[ing]
the Bishops of this Church to meet with him....
(5) Presid[ing] over meetings of the House of Bishops.. .and.. .presiding over [Joint] Sessions
[of the General Convention]....
(6) Visit[ing] every Diocese of this Church for the purpose of:
(i) Holding pastoral consultations with the Bishop...and, with [his] advice, with the Lay
and Clerical leaders of the jurisdiction;
(ii) Preaching the Word; and
(iii) Celebrating the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.
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subscribe his or her belief in "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments
to be the Word of God, and to contain all things necessary to salvation; and
[to] solemnly engage to conform to the Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship of the
Episcopal Church." ' 4" Bishops are to visit each local church in the diocese at
least once every three years "for the purposes of examining their condition, in-
specting the behavior of the clergy, administering confirmation, preaching the
Word, and at his discretion celebrating the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. ' 412
The parish rector has "control of worship and spiritual jurisdiciton ... sub-
ject to the Rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer, the Canons of the church,
and the godly counsel of the Bishop." ' 4 3 He must "be diligent in instructing the
children in the Cathechism, and from time to time examine them in the same
publicly before the Congregation. 4 4 Rectors preside at vestry meetings.4 '5 They
are also bound to work for reconciliation between member spouses in the event
of marital discord.416
Most of the provisions respecting ecclesiastical discipline concern clerical of-
ficials. There are eight categories of offenses for which bishops and rectors may
be tried by an ecclesiastical court:
(1) crime or immorality;
(2) holding and teaching publicly or privately, and advisedly, any doctrine
contrary to that held by the church;
(3) violation of the Rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer;
(4) violations of the Constitution of Canons of the General Convention;
(5) violations of the Constitution or Canons of his diocese;
(6) any act involving a violation of Ordination vows;
(7) habitual neglect of the exercise of the Ministerial Office without cause
[or] habitual neglect of Public Worship and Holy Communion;
(iii) Celebrating the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.
4" Id. art. 11, § 3, at 3.
I" d. art 8, at 7.
"I Id. title IV, canon 18, § 2(a), at 89. He is also to examine the records (i.e., baptisms, con-
firmations, marriages, burials, and the names of all communicant members).
4,, Id. canon 21, § l(a), at 95.
- Id. § 2(a). This includes instruction in "the Holy Scriptures and the Doctrines, Polity, History,
and Liturgy of the Church." Id. at 96.
41, The vestry is a lay body charged with acting as "agents and legal representatives of the Parish
in all matters concerning its corporate property and the relations of the Parish to its Clergy." Id.
title I, canon 13 §§ 2-3, at 42.
,,6 Id. canon 18, § I, at 48. There are three categories of membership: (1) member-defined by
reception of water Baptism in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, (2) member in good
standing-all Baptized persons who, for one year, have fulfilled the requirements of the Canon, "Of
the Due Celebration of Sundays," and (3) communicants in good standing confirmed by the bishop
and have received communion at least three times during the year. Id. canon 16, §§ 1-3, at 45-46.
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(8) conduct unbecoming a member of the Clergy."'
Lay members are subject to admonition and, ultimately, suspension from com-
munion if they are "habitually neglectful of the duty of public worship and of
other obligations.1 41 1 The church is evidently more concerned with maintaining
high moral standards for the clergy than with keeping close watch on the behavior
of lay members.
Ecclesiastical trial is available to resolve issues involving clerical offenses.
There does not appear to be provision in either the national or Missouri diocesan
standards for trials of lay members. Bishops are to appear before courts of bish-
ops, while rectors appear before diocesan courts.4 1 9 The Constitution and Canons
provides for presentment, personal service of process, discovery, personal hearing
with counsel present (provided that counsel is a communicant of the church), and
right of appeal. 420 Diocesan regulations govern, subject to the Constitutions and
Canons, trials of rectors, whereas episcopal trials are covered solely by the national
provisions.4 2' If ecclesiastical officials are either convicted by a trial court or file
a waiver, they may be suspended, removed, or deposed from office depending
upon the gravity of the offense. 42
2
3. United Methodist
The United Methodist Church traces its origin to John Wesley in England
during the early Eighteenth Century. Wesley, dissatisfied with the lack of "ex-
periental religion" in the church of England, formed the first Methodist "society"
in London in 1739.43 He emphasized lay preaching and open-air meetings in order
to reach the "lost" with his message. Although this brought upon Wesley the
wrath of the Church of England, Methodism spread throughout Great Britain
and eventually played an important role in the later stages of the First Great
Awakening (1720's to 1790's) in colonial America. 424 After American independ-
ence, Methodists formally organized as a church apart from the Church of Eng-
land. 421
United Methodism is governed through several "conferences." The General
Conference, comprised of anywhere between six hundred and one thousand del-
I1, d. title IV, canon 1, § 1, at 111.
418 DIOCESE OF MISSOURI, supra note 406, canon 33, § 1, at 38.
4'1 CONSTITUTION AND CANONS, supra note 407, title IV, canons 2-3, at 112-13.
420 Id. canon 4, at 120-121; canon 33, § 22, at 119; canon 3, § 1, at 113; canon 6, at 125.
Presentments are analogous to petitions or informations in civil and criminal trials.
Id. canon 13, at 113.
Id. canon 12, § 1, at 130.
N. HARMON, UNDERSTANDING THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 10 (1974). Wesley was an
ordained clergyman in the Church of England. At first Methodism remained within the Church of
England. As additional Methodist "societies" sprang up, however, the "connections" among them
eventually proved sufficient to support a new denomination. Id. at 11.
42, Id. at 13. See also W. GEWEHR, THE GREAT AWAKENING IN VIRGINIA, 1740-1790 167 (1930).
'4' N. HARMON, supra note 423, at 16. This took place in 1784.
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egates, one-half lay and one-half clerical, exercises "full legislative power over
all matters distinctively connectional. ' 426 It is constitutionally prohibited from
revoking or altering the Articles of Religion or the Confession of Faith, from
eliminating episcopacy, and from abolishing the right to an ecclesiastical trial. 427
Jurisdictional conferences are responsible for electing bishops and formulating
rules for church administration. 42 The Annual Conference, "the basic body in
the Church," votes on all constitutional amendments and on such matters as
"ordination, character, and conference relations of ministers. '429
Bishops appoint local ministers and exercise "general oversight and promotion
of the temporal and spiritual interests of the entire Church.1 4 0 They also im-
plement "the rules, regulations and responsibilities prescribed and enjoined by
the General Conference. ' 43' When presiding over Annual or Jurisdictional con-
ferences, bishops possess the authority to decide questions of ecclesiastical law.4 3 2
Ordained ministers serve subject to episcopal guidance. They are responsible
for preaching, performing liturgical functions, and for maintaining order in the
local church. 433 Deacons serve in the areas of "administration, education, evan-
gelism, music, health ministries, and community development."143
The United Methodist Church appears uncertain as to how it should enforce
the doctrinal and disciplinary standards bequeathed to it by its founders. 431 It is
certain, however, that "the Articles and the Confession are not to be regarded
as positive, juridical norms of doctrine, demanding unqualified assent on pain of
' THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH para. 12, art I, at 22 and para.
15, art. IV, at 23-24. (1980) [hereinafter THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE). This power involves authority in
several areas:.
1. To define and fix the conditions, privileges, and
duties of church membership....
2. To define and fix the powers and duties of elders,
deacons, supply preachers, local preachers,.
exhorters, and deaconesses....
5. To define and fix the powers, duties, and privileges
of the episcopacy....
7. To provide a judicial system and method of judicial
procedure....
Id. para. 16, art. I, at 25; art. II, para. 17, art. III; para. 18, art. IV.
Id. para. 26, art. V., §§ 2, 5, at 26-27.
4' Id. para. 37, art. II, at 30. Lay representatives are prohibited from voting on the latter three
issues.
"1 Id. para. 59, art. X, at 37; para. 52, art. IV, at 35.
13, Id.
"I Id. para. 56, art. VII, at 36.
11 Id. para. 109, at 107.
" Id. para. 108.
4 Although "there has been no significant project in formal doctrinal re-formulation in Meth-
odism since 1808," by this century "Methodist theology had become decidedly eclectic, with less and
less specific attention paid to its Weslyan sources as such." Id. para. 67, at 45.
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excommunication. ' 43 6 Perhaps the United Methodist Church is undergoing a pe-
riod of self-examination and redefinition. If so, it is difficult to predict how, or
whether, the enunciated standards will be applied.4 7 For example, a section on
the duties of bishops is typically vague:
1. Leaders need to be able to read consensus and integrate it into a living
tradition, to be open to the prophetic word, to be skilled in team building,
and to be effective in negotiation.
2. Beyond formal systems of accountability, leaders need to open themselves
to forms of accountability that they cultivate for themselves through a
support group.438
Nevertheless, the traditional standards remain in The Book of Dicipline and
those involved in tort claims against the church should be aware of them. Clerical
officials may be charged for the following offenses:
(a) immorality
(b) practices declared by the United Methodist Church to be incompatible
with Christian teachings
(c) crime




(e) disobedience to the Order and Discipline of the United Methodist Church
(f) dissemination of doctrines contrary to the established standards of doc-
trine of the church
(g) relationships and/or behavior which undermines the ministry of another
pastor.439
4-6 Id. at 49-50. Some of the church's ambivalence is apparent in the following statement: "The
last paragraph of the General Rules-providing for the expulsion of delinquent members of the Meth-
odist Societies-poses the agonizing problem of how discipline is to be administered in a community
of compassion in extreme cases...." Id. at 53.
-" The church admits that they "do not possess infallible rules to follow, or reflex habits that
suffice, or precedents for single imitation." Id. para. 69, at 72. On the other hand, they point to
two interacting general principles: "accountability to the community of the church is an inherent
obligation on those who claim that community's support." Id. para. 67, at 53.
41 Id. para. 502, at 236.
419 Id. para. 2621, at 616.
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Lay members may be charged with offenses (a), (c), (e) and (f) above."' For
example, clerical officials may be tried for homosexuality, a "practice incom-
patible with Christian teaching,""2 1 while lay members may not.
Ecclesiastical trials are considered "an expedient of last resort.""42 Only after
all other attempts at resolution have failed is there to be a written presentation
of charges and investigation. Once undertaken, such trials involve inter alia notice,
the right of an accused to counsel, a written record, and the right of appeal."3
4. Presbyterian
Presbyterianism owes much to the ecclesiastical system John Calvin erected
in Geneva, Switzerland during the mid-Sixteenth Century. Calvin's infuence spread
throughout Europe but it was primarily in Great Britain and, more particularly,
in Scotland, that Presbyterianism took root and flourished.'" From there it crossed
the Atlantic in part with the New England Puritans in the Sixteenth Century and
more completely with the Scotch-Irish immigrants of the early Eighteenth Cen-
tury. "
5
The Presbyterian Church of the United States of America (PCUSA) is the
largest presbyterian denomination in this country. There are also several smaller
denominations of Presbyterians, among which are the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church (OPC), the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA), and the Reformed
Presbyterian Church in North America (RPNA). The smaller denominations
tend to be more conservative than the PCUSA, but they all share a commitment
to Presbyterian polity and each professes at least formal adherence to the West-
minister Confession of Faith.
The standards for the PCUSA are in The Plan for Reunion approved in 1982.
Several principles of presbyterian government are notable:
b. This church shall be governed by presbyters (elders and ministers of the
Word);
c. These presbyters shall come together in governing bodies (traditionally
called judicatories or courts) in regular gradation;
d. Presbyters are not simply to reflect the will of the people, but rather
to seek together to find and represent the will of Christ;
" Id.
Id. para. 71F, at 90.
Id. para. 2624, at 619.
"' Id. at 620, 622-23.
See A. Dickens, supra note 405, at 198-201, 313-21.
' Id. at 336-40.
One should also be aware of the Association of Reformation Churches, consisting of only
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e. Decisions shall be reached in governing bodies by vote, following op-
portunity for discussion, and a majority shall govern;
f. A higher governing body shall have the right of review and control over
a lower one and shall have power to determine matters of controversy
upon reference, complaint or appeal;
g. Presbyters are ordained only by the authority of a governing body;
h. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction is a shared power, to be exercised jointly by
presbyters gathered in governing bodies.
44 7
This summary of ecclesiology emphasizes the fact that presbyterianism is rep-
resentative in nature and thus distinguishable from both hierarchial and congre-
gational forms of church government.
Appointment to office is by election, and one so chosen must adhere to the
traditional doctrines and polity of the church.448 Members must voluntarily submit
to presbyterian church government. 449 Owing to its Calvinistic heritage, presby-
terianism places considerable emphasis on the moral character of its members.
Thus, the elders are called upon "to strengthen and nuture the faith and life of
the congregation committed to their charge .... They should inform the pastor
and Session of those persons and structures which may need special attention.
450
The governing body in each local church is the "Session." Made up of "the
pastor or co-pastors, the associate pastors and the elders in active service," the
Session is responsible for admitting members into the church, leading the church
in all of its ministries, and serving as a judicial tribunal in disciplinary matters. 41'
Beyond the Session, the Presbytery is the governing body for geographically as-
sociated local churches. The Presbytery is responsible for examining, ordaining,
receiving, installing, dismissing, and otherwise disciplining ministers, serving as
a court of appeal in judicial matters, and asserting "original jurisdiction in any
case in which it determines that a Session cannot exercise its authority. ' '452 Higher
courts include the Synod and, finally, the General Assembly.
The Plan for Reunion defines church discipline as
the orderly exercise of authority resulting from the application of principles and
laws which this Church as derived from the Scriptures for the instruction, train-
ing, and correction of its members, officers, congregations, and governing bodies.
Church discipline is exercised within the context of pastoral care and oversight
by means of administrative review or judicial process. 45'
" The Plan for Reunion, § G-4.0301, at 50.
Id. §§ G-6.0107, .0104278, at 58.
Id. § G-5.0202, at 54.
Id. § G-6.0304, at 61.
41 Id. §§ G-10.0101, .0102, at 87.
411 Id. § G-11.0103, at 98.
4,1 Id. § D-1.0100, at 185.
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Judicial process is available in disciplinary cases for various offenses, defined as
"any act or omission by a member or officer of the Church that is contrary to
the Scriptures or the Constitution of the PCUSA. ' 454 Original jurisdiction for
offenses committed by lay members lies in the Session, whereas the Presbytery
has original jurisdiciton for ministers' offenses. 45
Initiation of a disciplinary case begins either by accusation, investigation by
a governing body, or self-accusation. 456 Investigation is by "a very special dis-
ciplinary committee designated by the governing body. ' 4 7 If there is enough evi-
dence to prosecute, charges are to be filed.458 Provisions for trial include personal
service, right to counsel by a PCUSA member, and citations for witnesses to
appear (they must also be PCUSA members). In a disciplinary case, each side
presents its evidence, the church proceeding first, and each side may object to
evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 4 9 "If the accused is found guilty, or after
the guilty plea, the Session or permanent judicial commission may hear evidence
as to mitigation, rehabilitation and redemption and shall then determine the degree
of censure to be imposed."' ' After trial, "the moderator shall in open meeting
announce the verdict for each specification and charge separately. If the accused
has been found guilty, the moderator shall announce the degree of censure to be
imposed by the governing body.'4'6 Censures include, from least to most extreme,
rebuke, temporary exclusion from the exercise of ordained office or membership,
and removal from office or membership. 462 The public nature of the proceedings
reflects Calvin's view that church members provide a check on potential arbi-
trariness. No sentence is enforced "pending an appeal or until after the time for
appeal has expired." 3
5. Congregational/Baptist
Congregational government is in some respects the easiest, and in others, the
most difficult form of ecclesiastical polity to describe. It is the easiest because
there is no connectional or hierarchial structure involved. On the other hand, it
is the most difficult because there are so many varieties of congregationalism that
generalization is virtually impossible. For example, some traditional congrega-
414 Id. § D-1.0800, at 187.
4, Id. § D-5.0100, at 194. Only the Presbytery may dissolve the relationship between a pastor
and the church. Id. G-14.0601, at 158.
41 Id. § D-7.0200, at 201.
157 Id.
"1 Id. There is a statute of limitations; charges must be filed within three years of the offense
or within one year of the beginning of preliminary procedure, "whichever appears first." Id. § D-
7.1100, at 204.
Id. § D-8.1200, at 211.
" Id.
Id. § D-8.1500, at 212.
-2 Id. §§ D-10.0200, .0300, .0500, at 223-24.
Id. § D-8.1700, at 213.
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tional churches are virtually presbyterian in internal practice, while Baptist churches,
also congregational in polity, tend to be more democratic.
In his influential Baptist Church Manual, J. M. Pendleton set forth three
important elements of Baptist polity: "1. That the governmental power is in the
hands of the people. 2. The right of a majority of the members of a church to
rule, in accordance with the law of Christ. 3. That the power of a church cannot
be transferred or alienated, and that church action is final." Pastors and lay
religious officers rule in Baptist churches first by example and secondarily through
formal procedures adopted as a constitution and by-laws of the local church. 461
When necessary, Baptists do not hesitate to resort to disciplinary measures. 466
Personal offenses, those committed by one individual against another, require
only one-to-one reconciliation. General offenses, those "committed against a church
in its collective capacity," particularly if they are of "an infamous or scandalous
character," require swift disciplinary action. 467 The latter include "rejection of
any of the fundamental doctrines of the gospel"; any activity which "seriously
disturbs the union and peace of a church"; and "[d]isorderly and immoral conduct
in all its forms. '"4 6 Some offenses warrant immediate excommunication: "If a
church-member is guilty of adultery, or murder, or pejury, or theft, or forgery,
or drunkenness, or any kindred crime, he deserves exclusion without trial. ' 469
Any offender who "give[s] clear evidence, and satisfactory proofs of a true, sin-
cere, evangelical repentance ' 470 will not be excommunicated. Where excommun-
ication is possible, the proceedings are generally public. 47' Because Baptists
traditionally have jealously guarded the independence of the local church, there
is no authoritative declaration of how ecclesiastical trials are to be conducted. 472
- J. PENDLETON, BAPTIST CHURCH MANUAL 101-02 (1966). H. Dana argues that "the direct
access of every soul to Christ requires democracy in organization." H. DANA, A MANUAL OF Ec-
CLESIOLOGY 110 (1941).
"1 "There must be, in the exercise of pastoral authority, nothing like priestly lordship of clerical
desperation; but the influence of pastors must grow out of the fact that they faithfully obey the will
of Christ, the great Shepherd, and thus set an example worthy of imitation." J. PENDLETON, supra
note 464, at 29.
According to Pendleton, the three goals of church discipline are to protect and promote the
glory of God, the purity of the churches, and the spiritual good of the disciplined. Id. at 143-45.
Id. at 125-40.
"' Id. at 132-37.
Id. at 141.
J. GARRETT, JR., BAPTIST CHURCH DISCIPLINE 46 (1962) (quoting from an eighteenth century
Baptist disciplinary manual).
411 "To proceed regularly in this solemn business, the church must cite an accused member to
appear, either at a stated church meeting of business, or at an occasional meeting for that purpose
in order that he may have a fair trial and an opportunity of making his defense, if he has any to
make." Id. at 47.
4 Of course, Baptists argue that "the only resort we have to find out what is true church law,
is the Bible itself as the great fountain of all law.... The Bible alone furnishes that immutable law
which must be recognized by the churches as binding at all times and under all circumstances." E.
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Interest in church discipline has increased markedly in the past several years.
A number of new books dealing with the subject have been published, particulary
from an evangelical, Prostestant perspective. 47 1
IV. Ti TORT CLAMS
This part of the article. examines the extent to which the concepts of non-
involvement in intrafaith disputes and the nonentanglement required by church-state
separation have been applied in claims brought before state and lower federal courts
in a manner consistent with the principle of institutional autonomy for churches. The
focus is on actions sounding in tort that arguably implicate religious liberty.4 4 Ac-
cordingly, tort claims against churches for premises liability and the now commonplace
negligence action arising out of the use of church-owned motor vehicles, matters for
which churches are rightly accountable since the virtual abandonment of immmunity
for charitable organizations, are of no concern here.7 5 Moreover, there can be little
question that religious officers and organizations are liable in tort for assault, battery,4 6
MARSHALL, A TREATISE UPON BAmST CHURCH JURISPRUDENCE 44 (1896). Marshall was an attorney
in the nineteenth century. As a further example of Baptist pride in their independence, Marshall argues
that "we [i.e., Baptists] belong to that church which alone has religious freedom and self-government,
in the true gospel meaning of these terms." Id. at 25.
41 See, e.g., D. BAKER, BEYOND FORGIVENESS (1984); J. LANEY, A GUIDE TO CHURCH DISCIPLINE
(1985); J. WHITE & K. BLUE, HEALING THE WOUNDED (1985); D. WRAY, BIBLICAL CHURCH DISCIPLINE
(1978); F. YEALEY, IN DEFENSE OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE (1984).
41, Legal doctrines of vicarious liability, most notably respondeat superior, apply in the law of
torts and make the employer or master liable for the torts of the employee or servant. In general,
respondeat superior applies where the master has a right to control the physical activities of the servant,
and the tortious act occurred while undertaking duties for the benefit of the master. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). In their search for a "deep pocket," plaintiffs sue not only the
religious officer who acted tortiously and the local church, but may also bring in religious bodies at
higher levels within the denomination. Depending upon the polity of the denomination, imposing
vicarious liability "up the line" when the church polity dictates local control, may impinge upon first
amendment rights. Although this issue is outside the scope of this article, see E. GAFFNEY & P.
SORENSEN, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS AND OTHER NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1984); R. HAM-
MER, PASTOR, CHURCH & LAW Ch.10, § F and Ch. 12, § C (1983 & Supp. 1986).
4" See supra notes 16-18. Religious organizations in many respects are dissimiliar from charities, of
course; most notably the religion clauses of the first amendment protect only the former. Also beyond
the scope of this article are tort claims arising out of accidents that occur during improper supervision
of children and injuries attributable to hazardous social activities such as swimming, boating, and
hay rides.
41 See Conway v. Carpenter, 80 Hun. (N.Y.) 428, 30 N.Y.S. 315 (1894), where a pastor had
been dismissed by his congregation. When he nonetheless entered the church, occupied the pulpit,
and refused to leave when requested, he was forceably ejected. Claim for assault and battery were
brought for injuries suffered by the violent ejection. See also, Michigan v. Lewis, No. 83-S-0450
(Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegan Co. Oct. 18, 1983); Michigan v. McGee, No. 83-S-0452 (Mich. Dist. Ct.,
Allegan Co. Oct. 18, 1983); and Michigan v. Jones, No. 83-S-0451 (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegan Co.
Oct. 18, 1983). These cases are prosecutions for criminal assault. Gwendolyn Harris, a member of
the House of Judah sect, was struck by the three defendants on at least two occasions from which
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false imprisonment, 4" and the like, all claims which involve coercive and often violent
activity. 478
she sustained serious injury. A written consent signed by her purporting to authorize punishment for
wrongdoing, including beating, burning, stoning, and hanging-sanctions said to be based on Old
Testament scriptures-were held not to be valid as against public policy. The court also denied the
defense that striking Harris was an exercise of religious discipline protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
" The tort of false imprisonment is described in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965),
as follows:.
(I) An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed
by the actor, and
(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make
the actor liable to the other for a merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement,
although the act involves an unreasonable risk of imposing it and therefore would be neg-
ligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
See generally, id. at §§ 36-45; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 11 (5th
ed. 1984).
A claim of false imprisonment was dismissed in Molko v. Holy Spirit Association for the Uni-
fication of World Christianity, 179 Cal. App. 3d 450, 224 Cal. Rept. 817, rev. granted, 228 Cal. Rptr.
159 (Cal. 1986) for the reason that civil courts are barred by the first amendment from inquiring into
the allegedly "mind-control" recruiting techniques of sects, so long as force or the threat of force
was not used. There was no evidence that the former members now suing their church had been forced
to stay against their will other than the sect's "spiritual hold on its members." Compare George, No.
27-75-65 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Co.), (suit by ex-Krishna member alleging false imprisonment, civil
conspiracy to hide her from parents, libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress; appeal from judgment of $9.7 million) and Gallon v. House of Good Shepard, 158 Mich.
361, 122 N.W. 631 (1909) (false imprisonment claim lies against parachurch society for reform of wayward
girls) with O'Moore v. Driscoll, 135 Cal. 770, 28 P.2d 438 (1933) (false imprisonment claim dismissed
as against religious order).
,7. Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, broadly outlines the limits of first amendment liberties when dealing
with activities that are violent or threaten an immediate breach of the peace. In Cantwell, the Court
overturned a criminal conviction for breach of the peace of an itinerant preacher. Although the minister
had approched members of the public with verbal and written information offensive to many, no
violence took place or was likely. In dicta, explaining speech-related conduct that a state could le-
gitimately regulate, the Court said:
The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying
or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and
words likely to produce violence in others. No one would have the hardihood to suggest
that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that religious liberty
connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to another
sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the
public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the
power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious....
One may.. .be guilty of the offense [breach of peace] if he commits acts or makes statements
likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be in-
tended....
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no
intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse....
The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the delusion of racial
or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive
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A. Pastoral Counseling and Spiritual Guidance
In times of illness, depression, the death of a family member, marital dif-
ficulty, economic distress, and other personal crises, one's rabbi, priest, or pastor
is often sought for consolation and guidance. This assistance is offered without
compensation or other obligation, and no contractual relationship arises there-
from. The nature and variety of the counsel given surely must differ as widely
as the many religious faiths that flourish in America. The formal training of
ministers to give such counsel, as well as the length and quality of experience in
doing so, is equally diverse. Futhermore, clerics typically open their doors not
only to members of their faith but to anyone who seeks their assistance.
There is, of course, no attempted quality assurance by government testing
and licensing of America's clergy, nor could there be consistent with the first
amendment. When a counselee believes that he or she received improper or in-
adequate advice, or some other offense is suffered as a result of the counselor-
counselee relationship, should damages be recoverable in tort? That is the topic
of this section. The cases easily arrange themselves into four types: clergy mal-
practice, breach of confidential communication, sexual seduction and molestation,
and the increasingly antiquated action for alienation of affections.
1. Clergy Malpractice
Malpractice has reference to a particular standard of conduct which is un-
dertaken by a given profession or trade. As a specialized type of negligence, the
act of committing malpractice is defined as follows:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who
undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required
to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profes-
sion or trade in good standing in similar communities."19
others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar
to all. These and other transgressions of those limits the States appropriately may punish.
Id. at 308, 309, 310. Although Cantwell involved criminal prosecution, the same constitutional limits
on the scope of religious liberty would apply to state-created or sanctioned tort actions.
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 299A (1965). In the ordinary case the required undertaking
is contractual, but such is not a prerequisite to liability. Id. at comment c. The normal skill and
knowledge the law requires will vary if there are differing "schools of thought" within the profession.
Id. at comment f.
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Notwithstanding the considerable attention given the tort of clergy malpractice
in both popular4 and scholarly journals,481 only Nally v. Grace Community Church
of the Valley412 has invoked an adjudication on the merits of what might be called
"ordinary" malpractice. 48 3 "Ordinary" malpractice refers to a claim by the in-
jured party that a cleric gave advice that fell below that fairly expected of the
profession, or neglected to refer the counselee to someone who by training or
experience was more apt to assist with the problem.
In March 1980, suit was filed in Los Angeles County, California, by the
parents of Kenneth Nally, a 24-year-old seminary student who committed suicide
the prior year.484 In this wrongful death action, the Nallys sued Grace Community
Church, a large nondenominational Protestant congregation, its pastor, the Rev.
John MacArthur, and three additional members of the pastoral staff. The com-
plaint stated three separate counts which alleged clergyman malpractice, negli-
gence, and outrageous conduct. 4
85
- See H. MALONY, T. NEEDHAM & S. SOUTHARD, CLERGY MALPRACTICE (1986) (guidance for
ministers by three ordained ministers and specialists in pastoral counseling); J. CLEARY, Clergy Mal-
practice-The Insurance Carrier's Perspective (1985) (unpublished paper); THE CHURCH AND THE LEGAL
EXPLOSION (Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. ed. 1985); Postel, Clergy Malpractice: An Emerging Field
of Law, 21 TRtAL 91 (Dec. 1985); Wise, supra note 19; McMenamin, supra note 20; Hauled Into
Court: The New Trials of Ministry, LEADERSHIP 127 (Winter 1985); Girdner, The Clergy Malpractice
Case: Did Pastors Spur Suicide? 7 NAT'L L.J. 6 (May 13, 1985); Ranii, A Concept Gets More Respect:
Clergy Malpractice-The Prayer for Relief, 7 NAT'L L.J. 1 (Mar. 4, 1985); Galante, Calif. Court
Allows 'Clergy Malpractice' Trial, 6 NAT'L L.J. 9 (July 16, 1984); Quade, Holy Terror: Clergy Buying
Insurance, 60 A.B.A.J. 1206 (1983); Carey, Churches Are Taken To Court More Often In Internal
Disputes: Denominations Are Worried By Suits Over Discipline And Pastoral Counseling, But Setbacks
Are Few, WALL STREET J., Apr. 9, 1985 at 1, 21; Thomsen, Clergy Malpractice Goes to Court-Is
Religious Freedom on the Line? 80 LIBERTY 13 (Nov./Dec. 1985).
411 S. ERICSSON, CLERGY MALPRACTICE: AN ILLEGAL LEGAL THEORY (1986); J. EIDSMOE, THE
CHRISTIAN LEGAL ADVISOR 513-22 (1984); R. HAMAR, supra note 474, Chap. 4, § E: Funston, Made
Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W.L.
REV. 507 (1983); Hotz, Diocesan Liability for Negligence of a Priest, 26 CATH. LAW. 228 (1981);
BERGMAN, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN. FERN. V. L. REV.
47 (1981); ERICSSON, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV.
163 (1981); McMenamin, Civil Interference and Clerical Liability, 45 Cath. Law 275 (1985); Note, Nally
v. Grace Community Church, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 1 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213 (1985); Note, Religious
Torts: Applying the Consent Doctrine as Definitional Balancing, 19 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 949 (1986).
No. NCC 18668 B (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co.) .
" Other than Nally, apparently the only other "ordinary" clergy malpractice claim is Neufang
v. Cahn, No. 79-8143 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward Co. filed May 2, 1979). In Neufang a claim of mal-
practice was brought against a psychiatrist and a hospital by the widow of a former patient. The
surviving spouse alleged that defendants negligently discharged her husband from their care, and as
a result the decedent shot her and then killed himself. The defendant-psychiatrist filed a third party
complaint against Vest Side Baptist Church and its pastor, the Rev. George E. Dunn. The third-party
action alleged that Dunn counseled with the decedent and knew or should have known of any dan-
gerous propensities. Further, Dunn is alleged to have a duty to take action to protect others from
any such dangerous tendencies of his counselees, and that he was negligent in that he failed to take
any action by informing the plaintiff of the danger.
Nally, No. NCC 18668-B. (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co.).
"' Ericsson, supra note 481, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. at 164.
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In count one for clergy malpractice, the Nallys alleged that the four pastoral
defendants had advised their son to read the Bible, pray, listen to taped sermons,
and seek counsel from the church staff. They stated that the defendants were
aware that Kenneth Nally was suffering from depression, had suicidal tendencies,
and thus was in need of care from a licensed psychiatrist or clinical psychologist.
The Nallys further alleged that notwithstanding this knowledge of these special
needs, the defendants discouraged and effectively prevented their son from seeking
professional help outside the church.4 86
In count two, the parents alleged that the church was negligent in the training,
selection, and employment of its spiritual counselors. Further, this count maintains
that Kenneth Nally sought these pastoral counselors shortly before his suicide,
but despite his search, they were not reasonably available to him. 487
The third count, for outrageous conduct, alleged that the defendants ridiculed,
disparaged, and denigrated the Roman Catholic faith in which the Nallys had
raised their son, and that this contributed to his feelings of guilt, anxiety, and
depression. Finally, it was alleged that the defendants created an environment
which caused Kenneth Nally to spend most of his time at the church or with its
members, thereby effectively isolating him from contact and communication with
persons outside the church who could have helped him. 488
Citing several first amendment concerns, the defendants initially entered a
demurrer. The trial court denied this plea because the allegation that Kenneth
Nally was deterred from obtaining professional psychiatric or psychological help
did state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 489 Extensive discovery fol-
lowed. Deposition testimony revealed that in the few months before his suicide,
Kenneth Nally was seen by several professionals outside the church, including
psychiatrists and psychologists. Indeed, the defendants and others at the church
had encouraged the Nally's son to seek professional care and personally assisted
in these referrals. One physician recommended to Kenneth's father that Ken be
admitted to a psychiatric hospital, if necessary against Ken's will, but the parents
declined to do so. After the trial court considered this testimony and heard
argument concerning the many first amendment difficulties with the complaint,
summary judgment was granted in favor of all defendants on all counts. 41°
The plaintiffs appealed, and in a 2-1 decision the California Court of Appeals
reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. 49 The panel
' Id.
Id. at 164-65.
4- Id. at 165.
Id.
4- Id.
49 Nally, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 204 Cal Rptr. 303. The Supreme Court of California ordered
Nally to be deleted from 157 Cal. App. 3d on August 30, 1984. Therefore all citations to Nally will
be limited to 204 Cal. Rptr.
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majority found that the available evidence left open a reasonable inference that
the church and its staff taught that suicide was an acceptable or desirable alter-
native to "living in sin." Another possible inference, the court said, was that the
pastoral staff at the church "recklessly cause[ed]... [suicidal] persons extreme
emotional distress through their counseling methods if those persons did not meas-
ure up to the pastors' religious ideals." '49 2 The court acknowledged that California
law had previously permitted recovery in suicide cases only when a defendant's
actions toward the victim were both intentional and done with the specific intent
of causing injury. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that since "reckless disregard
of the probability of causing emotional distress" had been held by the state su-
preme court to satisfy the "intent" requirement for the tort of "intentional infl-
iction of emotional distress," the plaintiffs stated a cause of action for the wrongful
death of their son.4 93
We hold that a cause of action for wrongful death arising out of intentional
infliction of emotional distress was adequately pled by the allegations that the
individual defendants, as agents of the church, knowing that Kenneth Nally was
depressive and had suicidal tendencies, exacerbated his feelings of guilt, anxiety,
and depression with reckless disregard that their conduct would increase the li-
kelihood that Kenneth Nally would commit suicide and that, as a result of this
conduct, Kenneth Nally's depression increased, causing him to commit suicide.
4
-
Having determined that a cause of action exists for reckless disregard of a
person's suicidal tendencies, the majority rejected arguments that a spiritual coun-
selor is protected by the religion clauses of the first amendment.
We hold that, while defendants' religious beliefs are absolutely protected by the
First Amendment, the free exercise clause of the First Amendment does not license
intentional infliction of emotional distress in the name of religion and cannot
shield defendants from liability for wrongful death for a suicide caused by such
conduct. 411
Upon determining that genuine issues existed as to whether Kenneth Nally's
suicide stemmed from the defendants' intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the court declined to decide other issues in the case such as whether the pastoral
staff had a duty to refer Kenneth to a licensed mental health counselor or whether
the church had a duty to adequately train its pastors in counseling techniques.496
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Hanson argued for upholding the summary judg-
ment. He noted that neither the complaint nor the affidavits in the record pled
the factual basis for reckless infliction of emotional distress as discussed by the
majority. The dissenting justice found no reasonable basis in the record for in-
412 Nally, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
' Id. at 307.
Id.
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ferring that Grace Church and its staff either condoned or approved of suicide
or that they prevented Kenneth Nally from seeking outside help.4 97 The overall
effect of the majority opinion, he argued, was to create a higher duty for an
unpaid spiritual counselor than existed in California law for a paid psychiatrist.
Moreover, such a duty would seriously threaten guarantees of free speech and
the free exercise of religion.4 98
Upon remand, and after three weeks into a jury trial, the court in May 1985
granted defendants' motion for nonsuit on all three counts in the complaint.4 99
In so ruling the trial judge squarely placed his holding on considerations of re-
ligious liberty and the separation of church and state:
Ken Nally sought the counsel of various members and pastors of Grace Com-
munity Church, and he did this of his own free will. Men should have the liberty
to seek counsel from the pastor whose teaching they choose to follow, and the
state should not interfere in their choice of pastor or the teachings they wish to
accept from that pastor. There is no compelling state interest for this court to
interfere in the pastoral counseling activities of Grace Community Church. Such
interference would result in excessive entanglement of the state in church and
religious beliefs and teachings. The court would by necessity, if it so interfered,
have to set standards of competence and standards of training of counselors,
determine who may or may not be counseled, determine if the problems counseled
were moral or mental and monitor the counseling for all time to come. There is
no compelling state interest to climb the wall of separation of church and state
and plunge into the pit on the other side that certainly has no bottom.
Therefore, the court finds the defendants had no legally recognizable duty in law
to (1) investigate Ken Nally's alleged suicidal manifestations, (2) inform other
professionals and his family of his suicidal manifestations, (3) refer Ken Nally
to a psychologist or psychiatrist or other professional, (4) train and employ com-
petent counselors to secular standards, and (5) make counselors available to Ken
Nally.1
The trial judge further held that there was inadequate evidence that the "out-
rageous conduct" alleged in the third count breached any legal duty owed to
Kenneth Nally, or if it did, there was inadequate evidence that the conduct was
the proximate cause of his suicide. °' The Nallys have again appealed. 0 2
The trial court's nonsuit appears entirely correct and would seem to be re-
quired by the first amendment. In a claim for negligence, the civil law must define
a standard of care or conduct required of one in the position of defendant. In
the law of torts this is generally accomplished by reference to some objectively
, Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 318.
Nally, No. NCC 18668-B (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co.)
i" Id.
"" Id.
This appeal was docketed in the Second District of California on March 20, 1986.
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determinable obligation or duty for the protection of others. Yet, the civil courts
cannot determine the "standards of the profession" when the profession is as dif-
ferentiated as that of rabbi, priest, or pastor. Moreover, even if a "state of the
art" could be intelligibly defined, the civil law could not impose such uniformity
on all religious officers without impinging upon the free exercise rights of some
who understand the dictates of their faith to be different from this universal,
court-imposed duty. 03 Counsel for the Nallys sought to overcome this definitional
quandary by borrowing the professional standards of psychological and psychiatric
counseling, and "bootlegging" them into the world of clergy and church. This
entails having to untangle guidance directed at "spiritual health" from that ad-
dressing "mental health," and then applying the standards of the mental health
professions only to the latter. Both in theory and practice, however, the "cure
of minds" and the "healing of souls" does not segment so neatly.5 °4
A second matter that is problematic with the claim of clergy malpractice is
establishing the point at which a counselor-counselee relationship arises. Because
no fee is typically charged and no contract arises, this is doubly hard. Moreover,
spiritual guidance utilizes a variety of settings and means, including formal confes-
sion (a sacrament in some churches but not others), one-on-one situations in a
cleric's office behind closed doors, telephone calls, small and intimate group set-
tings, classrooms, and even pulpit sermon teachings about how to live one's life. 505
The possibilities are endless should the courts begin to examine audio-cassettes,
video-cassettes, tracts, books, radio, and even television programs. Clergy typically
have no pecuniary interest in the counseling relationship. So, unlike other profes-
sionals, clerics cannot be expected to "select and screen their counselees, deter-
mining the availability of their services on such factors as ability to pay, office
hours, or scheduling."0 6 Further, Nally raises the interesting proposition that
clerics have a legal duty to be reasonably accessible when sought by a desperate
counselee. Civil judges or juries can hardly be at ease in imposing a duty of
availability on all churches regardless of size, resources, and other variables. 0 7
A third difficulty with malpractice is whether the standard of the profession
varies with the ecclesiastical office. Is a rabbi, priest, pastor, and lay elder to be
held to the same standard regardless of training and wide variances from church
to church in the authority and obligation of religious offices? °8 On the other
hand, if the legal duty varies with the nature of the church office, the scope of
101 ERICSSON, supra note 481 at 165-66, 171-72.
1 Id. at 166. To be sure, the courts deal with many technical and scientific matters beyond the
expertise of judge and jury, but spiritual guidance malpractice is of a different character. Science is
"empirical in nature. The issues raised in clergyman counseling cases are not empirical, but religious.
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training, and the expectations of church members or the counselee, then the civil
courts cannot help but find themselves probing deeply into the forbidden terrain
concerning the spiritual duties of an ecclesiastical office and interpretation of
religious dogma. Further, if diverse standards of care are to be applied, then the
law of torts will vary from church to church. The equal protection difficulty with
such an approach is obvious.
Finally, if there is a legal duty to refer counselees to licensed professionals
in the disciplines of medicine and psychology, this will clash with the religious
beliefs of some faiths. It is well known that there is mistrust between some re-
ligious communities and the social science of psychology and the medical science
of psychiatry. Each holds radically differing views of the nature of humankind5'
and the cause and treatment of many ailments such as depression and alcoholism.
When clerics regard mental health professions with suspicion, free exercise prob-
lems will result should the law require cross-disciplinary referralA' 0 The issue is
made apparent by turning the situation around and contemplating a legal re-
quirement for referrals to clergy by mental health professionals should the problem
be "spiritual" rather than "mental."
2. Breach of Confidential Communication
Either by common law, statute, or rule of court, the vast majority of juris-
dictions in the United States recognize an evidentiary privilege for communications
between clergy and counselee. "I Although the statutes and rules of evidence vary
in wording, they typically provide that a cleric shall not, without the consent of
the person making the confession, be examined as to any private communication
made to him or her while acting in the role of spiritual adviser.s1z Professor
Wigmore reasoned that the privilege has adequate grounds for recognition by the
law of evidence since it satisfied the four fundamental conditions to the estab-
lishment of a privilege against judicially-compelled disclosure:
(1) that the communications originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed;
(2) that the element of confidentiality must be essential to the maintenance
of the relation between the parties;
(3) that the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and,
See P. VITZ, PSYCHOLOGY AS RELIGION: THE CULT OF SELF-WORSHIP (1977).
J.0 j. EIDSMOE, supra note 481, at 516-18.
See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1555-62 (1985); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3D 794 (1976); Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3D 1205 (1973); Annot.,
22 A.L.R. 2D. 1152 (1952).
,,2 See W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, THE RIGHT To SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION
AND THE LAW (2D ED. 1983). With the exception of West Virginia, the appendix reprints rules and
statutes of all the states. Id. at 207-32.
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(4) that any injury which would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communication would be greater than the benefit which would be
gained by requiring it to be revealed." 3
Suppose that a rabbi, priest, or pastor did disclose a confidential commu-
nication without the counselee's authorization. Apparently there are no generally
reported opinions where a counselee or communicant has sought to hold a re-
ligious officer liable in tort for such an improper disclosure, nor do the statutes
and rules of court address this eventuality.
51 4
In a much publicized suit, Ms. Sheridan Edwards recently filed such a claim
against her priest, the St. Stephens Episcopal Church, and others alleging that
the confidential relationship that resides with her as a communicant was breached
causing her considerable damage. In separate counts, the case of Edwards v. St.
Stephens Episcopal Church"5 alleges emotional distress, fraud, negligent misre-
presentation, concealment, invasion of privacy, negligence, and breach of fidu-
ciary duty. Edwards' complaint states that in August 1984 she made a sacramental
confession to her priest, Father William Rankin. She further alleges that she
requested Rankin to keep the matters revealed during the confession in confi-
dence.2 6 Edwards then told Rankin that as treasurer for the church's women's
guild she had stolen about $28,000 of the guild's funds. Rankin promptly informed
church authorities and soon the matter was reported to the police. Subsequently
Edwards was charged with embezzlement. Over the objection of Edwards' at-
torney, Rankin was permitted to testify at the criminal trial concerning his con-
versation with Edwards. She was convicted and faces a sentence of seven months
in jail. An appeal from this conviction is pending. One of the issues raised on
appeal is whether it was error to admit into evidence the priest's testimony.
Church officials deny that the meeting between Edwards and Rankin was a
formal confession, a well-defined rite in the Episcopal Church that is normally
attended by certain ecclesiastical formalities. Episcopal churches offer the sac-
rament of confession and priestly absolution.2 7 Privacy is assured by canon law
" 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2396 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
"' See authorities supra notes 511-512. A very different situation from that posed in the text
was held to be cause for liability of a church in Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113,
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 546 (1985). In Alberts the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the first
amendment does not preclude the imposition of liability on officials in the United Methodist Church
for inducing a minister's psychiatrist to violate the duty of confidentiality to his patient. Officials in
the church were found to have forced the minister into early retirement as a result of having obtained
information from his psychiatrist without authorization. The court said that the cause of action for
wrongful inducement did not interfere with church discipline nor did it involve a dispute over religious
doctrine or practice.
"I Edwards v. St. Stephens Episcopal Church, No. 844020 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco Co.,
filed Aug. 5, 1985).
Id. p. 3 of the Complaint.
"' Confession in the Episcopal Church, when practiced, is much less formal than that of the
Roman Catholic Church. See J. GUNSTONE, supra note 238, at 75.
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and a priest can be disciplined if the vow of confidentiality is broken, The
defendants in Edwards maintain that the trial court properly admitted into evi-
dence Rankin's testimony because the communication did not take place during
a confessional rite. Accordingly, they argue, Wigmore's four fundamental con-
ditions for establishing an evidentiary privilege were not present.
Whether Wigmore's four elements were present is a question that must be
answered by the trier of fact. Disposition of that question in the criminal case
may well be binding by virtue of collateral estoppel in Edwards v. St. Stephens
Episcopal Church. Assuming arguendo that the four conditions were met, Rankin
should be liable in tort for breach of confidential communication. This is only
logical. If churches and their clerics are to have the benefits which attend the
evidentiary privilege for clergy-counselee communications, conversely they must
bear the consequences when they disclose such conversations without permission
to do so. Fairness dictates that reasonable responsibilities follow along with the
benefits. Likewise, if the communication was not privileged (as ruled by the trial
judge in Edwards' criminal prosecution), then the defendants should not be liable
in tort for disclosing Edwards' statements implicating her in felonious activity.
Although the physician-patient and clergy-counselee relationships are in many
respects dissimilar, there are numerous cases recognizing that the disclosure by
a physician of confidential information about a patient constitutes actionable in-
vasion of privacy.5 1 9 And when confidences have been broken there is always the
possibility of claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In all such matters, however, it must be remembered that even unauthorized
disclosures of confidential communications are immune from tort liability in cer-
tain instances. For example, liability will not follow from disclosing a counselee's
plans to commit a future crime . 20 Nor would an action lie where the canonical
procedures of the church provide for the use of private communications in the
course of ecclesiastical discipline of a church member or one holding a religious
office .1 2 So long as the communication is utilized only within the disciplinary
context and the scope of authority conferred on the church judicatory body is
5, See CONSTITUTION AND CANONS, supra note 407, at 117.
" See Annot., 20 A.L.R. 3D 1109 (1968).
' Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (attorney's responsibility when advised by client of
intent to give perjured tesimony). Indeed, the dealing with a habitual child molester, there may be
a legal duty to give warning to those in danger. See infra note 524.
"-' See Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Iowa 1963). This case concerned a slander
claim brought by a husband against his wife and two other individuals. The alleged slander involved
statements made by the defendants to Roman Catholic priests. The statements to the priests were
made in the course of attempts by the wife to have disciplinary sanctions imposed by the church
against her husband. The other two defendants came as witnesses to offer corroborating evidence to
the priests. When the plaintiff deposed the priests, they refused to answer questions citing the secrecy
required by canon law. The district court upheld the defense of qualified privilege in the tort action,
both as to the wife and the other defendants when their allegedly slanderous statements were made
in the course of church disciplinary proceedings.
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not exceeded or abused, the disclosure would be immune from tort liability as
a matter of religious liberty.522
3. Seduction and Child Molestation
Few would have the hardihood to claim first amendment immunity in defense
of a suit charging a rabbi, priest, or pastor with sexual improprieties involving
others connected with the church. These cases fall into one of two patterns: either
a minister is alleged to have taken sexual advantage of a woman he is counseling,
5 23
or a cleric is said to have sodomized young children placed under his charge.5 24
Because no crebible argument can be made that such conduct is even "arguably
religious," or caused by the promptings of spiritual duty, these torts are not
shielded by protestations of religious liberty.
In Destefano v. Grabrian,525 the plaintiff initiated a complaint against a Ro-
man Catholic priest, the Diocese of Colorado Springs, and the plaintiff's estranged
wife. He alleged that the priest engaged in a sexual relationship with his wife
after she went to him for marital counseling. The complaint stated counts for
breach of fiduciary duty, negligent counseling, and outrageous conduct. The
defendant-wife in turn cross-claimed against the diocese for negligent supervision
and training of the priest. Surprisingly, the trial court dismissed. The judge found
'- See infra notes 589-624 and accompanying text. Breach of confidential communication is
frequently alleged as one of the tortious claims arising from suits over church discipline. See, e.g.,
Roberson v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, No. 91129 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Cruz Co. filed Oct.
15, 1984) (case over discipline of pastor alleging, inter alia, disclosure of confidential communication
as invasion of privacy); Kelly v. Christian Community Church, No. 545117 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa
Clara Co. filed Mar. 21, 1984) (case by church member alleging, inter alla, confidential communication
to licensed family counselor disclosed to church and wrongfully used in course of discipline).
' See, e.g., Lund v. Caple, 100 Wash. 2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 (1984) (husband's suit against
church and pastor alleging pastor's sexual relations with wife during counseling sessions); Milla v.
Tamayo, No. C 485488 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co. filed Sept. 20, 1984) (suit by woman against
seven priests and Roman Catholic archdiocese alleging priests induced her to have sexual relations
with them over a two year period, and that one of the priests fathered her child; on Nov. 11, 1984
the complaint was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations and plaintiff has appealed); Smo-
trich v. Silverman, No. C 352330 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co. filed Jan. 22, 1981), writ of
prohibition denied sub nom. Sinai Temple v. Superior Court, No. 64348 (Cal. App. 2d Mar. 12,
1982) (unpublished opinion), stay denied, No. 64348 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 20, 1983), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 861 (1982) (suit by husband alleging rabbi had sexual relations with his wife in the course of
marital counseling; discovery permitted into synagogue's termination decision of Rabbi Silverman).
524 See, e.g., Anderson v. Diocese of Duluth, No. 159581 (Minn. D. Ct., St. Louis Co. filed
Mar. 30, 1983) (reported in 5 Nat'l L.J. 3 (May 16, 1983)) (suit against Roman Catholic diocese for
tortious injury resulting from priest's homosexual acts with minor; church officials alleged to be liable
because they failed to act on knowledge of priest's homosexuality obtained during confessional); Gastal
v. Gauthe, No. 84-48175-A (La. Dist. Ct., Vermillion Parish Feb. 7, 1986) (suit by parents and child
against priest and Roman Catholic diocese for homosex'ual molestation of minor; jury verdict of $1
million for child and $250,000 for parents).
"I Destefano v. Grabrian, No. 84-CV0773 (Colo. D. Ct., El Paso Co. July 26, 1984) (unreported
opinion), aff'd, No. 84-CA 0973 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1986).
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that all of the counts would require the application of ecclesiastical standards to
the performance of duties by the priest as dictated by religious authority, and
noted the high concern expressed in Supreme Court decisions with entanglement
in the internal affairs of a church.
The disposition in Destefano seems misguided. The case does indeed involve
a priest's standard of behavior toward a woman who comes to him for spiritual
counseling. But in cases of sexual seduction or child molestation, the standard
of care in the law of torts need not depend upon or look to the duties of priests
as defined by the diocese. Regardless of what the church claims are its canonical
standards for the proper behavior of priests, the civil law can say that sexual
seduction of a counselee is not even "arguably religious," that it is wrongful and
thus punishable in tort. By allowing such claims, there is no judicial entanglement
whatsoever in the relationship between diocese and priest or in other spiritual
matters, and the church can hardly be expected to maintain that its priests are
supposed to conduct themselves in this manner toward parishioners as a matter
of religious doctrine and practice. For reasons of public policy, a state may elect
to abolish tort claims for seduction, criminal conversation (adultery), and the like,
and several states have done so. 26 But such is not required by the religion clauses
of the first amendment. 527
4. Alienation of Affections
A surprising number of tort actions have been brought for alienation of
affections5 2 said to have been either the result of religious teaching or the con-
sequence of the spiritual influence of others.5 29 Tort claims that protect the marital
relationship such as alienation of affections still survive in a minority of juris-
dictions.5 30 Occasionally a claim of alienation of affections is raised secondarily
2 See Lund, 100 Wash. 2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 (action by husband dismissed because facts state
a claim for alienation of affections now abolished in Washington); Destefano, No. 84-CV0773 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., El Paso Co.) (complaint by husband dismissed on the alternative ground that matter es-
sentially was action for alienation of affections, seduction, and criminal conversation (adultry), claims
now abolished in Colorado). See also infra note 544.
527 Cf. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (dictum suggesting that religious liberty will not prevent state
from punishing acts of "assault or threatening of bodily harm," "intentional discourtesy," and "per-
sonal abuse").
' The tort of alienation of a spouse's affections is defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 683 (1977), as follows:
One who purposely alienates one spouse's affections from the other spouse is subject to
liability for the harm thus caused to any of the other spouse's legally protected marital
interests.
The section should be read together with Id. §§ 684-92.
'- See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R. 115 (1924).
,30 See cases supra note 526. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 683-92 (1977);
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 477, §§ 124.
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in actions over church discipline 3 ' or in matters of sexual seduction of a spouse.53 2
Of interest in this subsection, however, is the situation where the preaching or
other religious teaching of a church is believed and obeyed by one spouse. These
ideas are then said to have led to a separation in the marriage. Should the courts
entertain a cause by the abandoned spouse against the church and religious teach-
ers for having influenced his or her partner to leave the marriage?
Although the older cases often do not discuss the first amendment dimensions
to these torts,"' the recent cases generally do so.s34 In Bradeska v. Antion,s5 s the
plaintiff brought an action for alienation of affections against the Radio Church
of God, its founder and broadcaster, its school of theology, and the minister of
one of the denomination's local congregations. The plaintiff maintained that
defendants' teachings to his wife that marriage to a previously divorced man is
adulterous resulted in the breakup of the marriage. Verdicts were returned by a
jury against all four defendants. 5 6 Judgments on the verdicts were reversed on
appeal because of insufficient evidence and because of the first amendment's
guarantees of religious liberty, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. 537
The evidence showed that three of the defendants communicated with plaintiff's
wife only by way of a daily radio program, form letters, a magazine, and a
pamphlet. The local minister communicated with plaintiff's spouse only when she
attended his church services at which he preached, and in a letter to her stating
the church's doctrine concerning divorce and remarriage. 538 The defendants did
indeed teach that a divorced man should not remarry, and to do so is adulterous.
But, said the court, sectarian organizations have the "right to advocate and to
disseminate any religious faith, no matter how offensive and ridiculous to others
"I See, e.g., Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975). See infra
notes 622-624 and accompanying text; Roberson v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, No. 91129 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Santa Cruz Co. filed Oct. 15, 1984). See infra note 588.
": See cases supra notes 523-527 and accompanying text. See also, Strock v. Pressnell, No. 96739
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas, Lorain Co., Sept. 15, 1986) (dismissing for first amendment reasons, suit against
church and minister alleging clergy malpractice filed by husband whose wife engaged in sexual
relationship with minister during counseling).
" See, e.g., Hughes v. Holman, 110 Or. 415, 223 P730 (1924) (husband may sue religious sect
for alienation only if malicious intent is shown); Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d 132
(1966) (claim by husband against religious sect held actionable).
114 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Barnum v. Rajneesh Foundation Interna-
tional, No. 120035 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Johnson Co. Nov. 1, 1983) (unpublished order-defendants' motion
to dismiss granted; suit by former wife against guru and religious sect for causing marriage to fail);
Waites v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of Pennsylvania, No. CV 80-24401 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Jackson
Co. filed Nov. 6, 1980) (suit by husband for alienation of affection brought against national de-
nomination, local church, and named church members).
"4 Bradeska v. Antion, 21 Ohio App. 2d 67, 255 N.E.2d 265 (1969).
Id. at 68, 255 N.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 73, 255 N.E.2d at 269.
Id. at 69-74, 255 N.E.2d at 267-69.
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[and such] is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and is binding
on the states. ' 539
Bradeska was followed in Radecki v. Schuckardt, 40 where two men jointly
sued a Roman Catholic splinter group, the Tridentines, and its leader, Bishop
Schuckardt. The Tridentines teach that their followers must adhere to a particular
doctrinaire approach to the Catholic faith, and if necessary, followers should leave
their spouse should he or she interfere with the practices of the movement.14' The
plaintiffs' wives, had enrolled the minor children in the Tridentine School in a
distant state. This was opposed by the plaintiffs, and when they sought to return
the children to the home, the wives with assistance from the defendants hid the
children from them. Divorce proceedings were pending in both marriages.142 Jury
verdicts in favor of plaintiffs were reversed by the appeals court, citing several
free exercise cases of the Supreme Court. These facts did not, said the court,
"present situations where a strong or compelling state interest to protect societal
peace, safety, order and morals," ' 54' justifying exceptions to defendants' religious
rights. 544
Finally, consider Washington v. Hill,141 where the plaintiff brought suit against
the Rev. Dewitt Hill, minister of the Greater Trinity Church of God in Christ,
seeking damages for alienation of affections. The complaint alleged that Hill
interpreted the Bible so as to cause plaintiff's wife to view him as a "sinful
creature," knowing that such would cause a dissolution of the marriage. Ironi-
cally, the trial court allowed the action to go forward. Nevertheless, the jury
returned a verdict for Hill. For reasons of church-state separation, the action
should have been dismissed when first initiated. Because of the requirement that
the state not interfere in church teaching and practice, "[tihe law knows no
heresy. ' 54 Injury said to be attributable to religious speech, print, or broadcasting
cannot be regarded as actionable in tort short of "some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order. '547
11 Id. at 73, 255 N.E.2d at 269.
11 Radecki v. Schuckardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 92, 361 N.E.2d 543 (1976).
Id. at 94, 361 N.E.2d at 544.
Id. at 93, 361 N.E.2d at 544.
14 Id. at 96, 361 N.E.2d at 546.
'" A similar action against the Tridentines is found at O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 55 U.S.L.W. 2107
(Idaho 1986) (setting aside $1 million jury verdict in claim by former husband and his five children against
Tridentine movement for alienation of affections).
14, Washington v. Hill, No. 80-423 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1981) (unpublished opinion) (judgment
for defendant affirmed; first amendment defenses not discussed).
- Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728.
14 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing as examples, Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)
(criminal prosecution of Mormon for transporting a woman across state lines for polygamous practices);
Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (criminal prosecution for violation of child-labor laws); Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (criminal prosecution for refusal to obtain smallpox vaccination); Reynolds
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B. Church Discipline
1. Selection, Discipline, and Removal of Religious Officers
Even before the Supreme Court held that the strictures of the first amendment
were binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment,54 the common
law evidenced a general unwillingness to get involved in the discipline or removal
of religious officers, whether it be for alleged departures from correct doctrine
or some other act of misconduct in the eyes of the church. It has long been
axiomatic that courts in America would not entertain suits asserting a right to
attain or hold eccelesiastical office. 49 Such matters were characterized as "purely
ecclesiastical," and as such it was agreed that civil authorities had no jurisdiction
to interfere in this way with internal church governance.5 0 Upon brief reflection
it can be seen that the same undesirable interference takes place-albeit somewhat
more indirectly-should civil courts entertain large damage actions in tort filed
against churches by clerics either disgruntled over the loss of an ecclesiastical office
or being the recipient of a religious sanction. It was often said that unless a
lawsuit affected title or possession of property, rights of contract, or a person's
civil rights, the courts would not adjudicate disputes over ecclesiastical offices. 5
The reservation as to "civil rights," however, left the matter of tort claims, such
as for defamation, in uncertainity. The problem was one of determining just when
a church's internecine matter has so spilled over into the secular realm as to make
injury to reputation or other wrong a matter of interest to all of society and
consequently a "civil right" redressible in a tort action for damages.
Although the older cases understandably do not discuss the first amendment,
they are nonetheless solicitous of religious liberty. 52 Communications concerning
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (criminal prosecution of a Mormon for polygamy)). The Sherbert
Court stated:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest
would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "lo]nly the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitations."
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (regulation of labor
union activities struck down in face of free speech and assembly challenge)). The regulatory means
utilized by the state must be the least restrictive to First Amendment rights and still achieve its goals.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
" See supra note 30.
.,, See, e.g., Chavis v. Rowe, 93 N.J. 103, 459 A.2d 674 (1983), involving a claim for damages
by a deacon and his wife for having been removed from his post, or "defrocked," apparently over
a dispute with the pastor. After expressing doubt as to whether one's status as a deacon even entails
a judicially-protected interest, the court affirmed a dismissal citing First Amendment concerns.
'" Eliman, Driven From the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL.
L. REv., 1378, 1388 (1981).
"I' See C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 95-
96 (1965); W. TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIous RIGHTS IN AMERICA 118-47 (1948).
"' See C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 349-53 (1917); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 2D 453,
471-75 (1963); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2D 421, 471-480, 499-500 (1951); 63 A.L.R. 649 (1929).
1986]
91
Esbeck: Tort Claims against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The Fir
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
a pastor or priest made in the course of church discipline are qualifiedly privi-
leged. 53 Thus, statements or writings said to be defamatory are not actionable,
even if later determined to be untrue, unless it can be shown that the defendant
was motivated by actual malice 5 4 Moreover, the plaintiff must present to the
trier of fact "clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant's motive was
malicious. 5" When truth is raised as a defense, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the statements or writings were false.556
The scope of the qualified privilege is quite generous. It not only applies to
charges and defenses made before church disciplinary tribunals, 57 but also protects
communications to religious officers having authority within the church.5 8 Entries
in church minutes and other records concerning disciplinary proceedings,15 9 pub-
lications in church newspapers concerning the final disposition of disciplinary
actions,w60 and letters to individuals with reason to know of a cleric's qualifi-
cations, are qualifiedly privileged .1 6 Moreover, the testimonial privilege before a
church's disciplinary hearing panel applies not only to statements of accusers and
replies in defense of the one charged with misconduct, but also protects allegedly
defamatory communications to the panel concerning individuals not members of
the church.562
' See, e.g., Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144 A. 787, 63 A.L.R. 643 (1929); Van Vliet
v. Vander Naald, 290 Mich. 365, 287 N.W. 564 (1939); Stewart v. Ging, 64 N.M. 270, 327 P.2d 333
(1958); Murphy v. Harty, 238 Ore. 228, 393 P.2d 206 (1964); Browning v. Gomez, 332 S.W.2d 588
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Church of Scientology of California v. Green, 354 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Annot. 63 A.L.R. at 650)65.
5 The Supreme Court now requires a showing of actual malice when the defamation is of a
public figure. See supra note 198. Cf. Creekmore v. Runnels, 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949)
(charging a pastor with heresy in course of discipline not libelous per se).
" Joiner v. Weeks, 383 So.2d 101, 107 (La. Ct. App. 1980). The Supreme Court now requires
clear and convincing evidence if the defamation is of a public figure. See supra note 199.
5' Van Vliet v. Vander Naald, 290 Mich. 365, 370, 287 N.W. 564, 567 (1939). The Supreme
Court now requires this if the defamation is of a public figure. See also supra note 198.
' Annot., 87 A.L.R.2D 453, 469-75 (1963); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2D 421, 471-80, 499-500 (1951)
Annot., supra note 553, at 651-53, 655-56. Cf. Hellstern v. Katzer, 103 Wis. 391, 79 N.W. 429
(archbishop's remarks about priest not privileged when made from pulpit during worship service).
"I Annot., supra note 553, at 653.
1,9 Patmont v. Int'l Christian Missionary Ass'n, 142 Minn. 147, 171 N.W. 302 (1919) (entry on
the minutes of corporation holding Bible college and church regarding college dean); Cranfill v.
Hayden, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 656, 55 S.W. 805 (1900) (entry on church minutes regarding church
delegate).
, Redgate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 480, 59 P. 1050 (1900) (notice in church paper regarding preacher);
Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879) (publication in denominational newspaper
regarding minister); Cranfill, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 656, 55 S.W. 805 (publication in church newspaper
regarding church delegate); Van Vlet, 290 Mich. 365, 287 N.W. 564 (official church newspaper);
Stewart v. Ging, 64 N.M. 270, 327 P.2d 333 (1958) (church newspaper).
-"' Church of Scientology v. Green, 354 F. Supp. 800 (1973) (internal church document); Murphy
v. Harty, 238 Or. 228 393 P.2d 206 (1964) (letters between church officials); Annot. supra note 553,
at 657; but cf, State v. Bienvance, 36 La. Ann. 378 (1884) (circulation of libelous pamphlet outside
of church concerning fitness of priest does not enjoy qualified privilege).
' See Annot., supra note 553, at 657-58.
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The case of Joiner v. Weeks5 63 is illustrative of how the state courts presently
deal with these tort actions by clerics. The Rev. Wayne Joiner, a minister in
the United Pentecostal Church, was removed from "ministerial fellowship" for
fiscal improprieties involving a member of his church and attendant misbehavior
when questioned about the affair. The action of disfellowship was by vote of the
Louisiana District Board of the Denomination, its official tribunal and governing
body. 64 Joiner sued the board members alleging three claims: defamation, wrong-
ful disfellowship because of procedural irregularities by the board, and that his
dismissal from the ministry wrongfully deprived him of his livelihood.165
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Joiner's complaint on all counts.
As to the defamation claim, the appeals court held that all statements made at
the board's disciplinary hearing, as well as publication of the resolution of dis-
fellowship announcing the board's decision, were privileged.5 66 Thus truth or fals-
ity of the communications was irrelevant. Further, the evidence failed to "show
that a reasonable trier of fact would find by clear and convincing evidence that
the Board or its members acted or spoke with malice. ' 5 67 Noting the first amend-
ment's well known bar to civil court review of ecclesiastical disciplinary pro-
ceedings, the court of appeals expressed a suspicion that Joiner's motive in bringing
this tort claim was to accomplish indirectly what he could not do directly:
Plaintiff's complaint against the defendant Board members is, in reality, an at-
tempt by plaintiff to appeal the decision of the Board that he is spiritually unfit
to continue as a minister in the United Pentecostal Church....
It would be ludicrous to believe that the constitutional principles upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Milivojevich [426 U.S. 696] could be satisfied
by allowing this intrusion into the disciplinary proceedings of an ecclesiastical
board. To allow defamation suits to be litigated to the fullest extent against mem-
bers of a religious board who are merely discharging the duty which has been
entrusted to them by their church could have a potentially chilling effect on the
performance of these duties and could very well inhibit the free communication
of important ideas and candid opinions.-
As to plaintiff's tort claim protecting business-related interests, the appeals court
held that Joiner's "loss of ministerial income must be accepted as a necessary
consequence of his dismissal from the ministry. 5 69
The extent to which Serbian Eastern Orthodox v. Milivojevich °70 has con-
stricted tort claims such as defamation, or abrogated them altogether, cannot be
$63 Joiner, 383 So.2d 101.





' Id. at 107.
1O Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
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determined with clarity. What may be said with assurance is that common law
torts concerning discipline of clergy must henceforth survive in the shadow of
the first amendment. In matters arising out of ecclesiastical office and discipline,
the Supreme Court in Serbian E. left only the smallest of openings for civil court
review:
We have concluded that whether or not there is room for "marginal civil court
review" under the narrow rubrics of "fraud" or "collusion" when church tri-
bunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no "arbitrariness" exception-in the
sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of
a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations-is consistent
with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decision
of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law .1'
If church officials may be sued only for "fraud or collusion," and then only
if their "bad faith" motives were fueled by "secular purposes" as opposed to
sectarian ambitions-such as covering up embezzlement of church funds or ap-
propriation of church real estate so it can be sold and the proceeds divided for
personal use 7 2-then it is not certain that malicious defamation is actionable at
all in most instances. Consider, for example, a situation in which one priest lodges
false charges against another priest in his diocese. Further assume that the charges
are knowingly false, slanderous per se, and are brought by the priest because he
desires to be selected for a particular advancement and fears that the one he
accuses will receive the desired position unless the competition is eliminated. To
be sure, the hypothetical actions of our priest are defamatory and brought in
"bad faith," yet his purpose was not "secular" gain as Serbian E. requires, but
to secure a higher sectarian office. Although our priest had achieved ecclesiatical
advancement by fraud, and his methods are to be morally condemned, the civil
courts most likely would refuse jurisdiction should the whole sordid affair be
exposed and the victimized priest seek to recover damages (resulting from not
being selected for the advancement) in an action for malicious defamation.
In the recent case of Hutchison v. Thomas57" a federal court of appeals refused
to review the circumstances of the forced retirement of a Methodist minister. The
minister filed his action against four of his superiors alleging that he was expelled
by fraudulent, arbitrary, or collusive application of church disciplinary rules, and
he set forth claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and breach of contract.5 74 Defendants gave as cause for the minister's retirement
an inability to work with congregations to which he was assigned and an inability
to get along with church members.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
"- See infra notes 644-54 and accompanying text.
17 Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3251 (1986).
17 Id. at 393.
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Citing first amendment cases, the appeals court held that the district court
had properly dismissed the complaint. The court rejected the minister's claim that
he fell within the exceptions allowing judicial review of ecclesiastical decisions for
fraud or collusion . 75 Assuming there were such exceptions allowing civil court
jurisdiction, the court of appeals said that review "is still only allowed for fraud
or collusion of the most serious nature undermining the very authority of the
decision-making body. 5 76 The court also rejected the minister's contention that
it could resolve the dispute by application of neutral principles of law. The court
noted that the neutral-principles rule had been applied by the Supreme Court only
to property disputes, and it should not be "extended to religious controversies
in the areas of church government, order and discipline. '577
While Hutchison concerned the retirement of religious officials, the interesting
case of Monahan v. Sims5 78 involved the initial selection and ordination of clerics.
Ms. Evelyn Monahan filed suit against various officials in the Atlanta Diocese
of the Episcopal Church and one of the witnesses appearing before an inquiry
board, alleging defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach
of contract or interference with employment. Monahan had achieved the status
of postulancy, a probationary office preceeding ordination. She was refused or-
dination to the priesthood because of reports showing involvement with the occult,
an alleged homosexual affair, difficulty in adhering to Anglican dogma, and dif-
ficulty in cooperating with male church authority. 79
The state court of appeals upheld the summary judgment granted by the trial
court. First, the church had conducted its inquiry and meetings in a confidential
manner, so there was no publication of the allegedly defamatory information.8 0
Second, the granting or denial of ordination is an ecclesiastical matter. The appeals
court concluded that "[I]n the absence of improper publication or evidence point-
ing to fraud or collusion ... (a factor not supported by any evidence of record),
this record presents a pure ecclesiastical matter." ''
"' Id. at 395.
"' Id.
" Id. at 396. Similar to Hutchison is the case of Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.
1983). In Kaufman, a Roman Catholic priest brought on action against officials in his archdiocese
for defamtion, conspiracy, and denial of procedural due process. The tort claims were timed barred,
and the claim of procedural irregularities could not be reviewed consistent with the first amendment.
Occasionally, religious officials have brought actions in federal court against their church and
others alleging constitutional claims and employment discrimination. These actions have also been
dismissed citing the first amendment and other reasons barring the claims. See, e.g., Simpson v.
Wells Lamont Corporation, 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974) (removal of pastor from his position and
eviction from parsonage); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333 (1986) (sex and race discrimination); McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (sex discrimination).
" Monahan v. Sims, 163 Ga. App. 354, 294 S.E.2d 548 (1982).
Id. at 355, 294 S.E.2d at 549-50.
Id. at 358-359, 294 S.E.2d at 551.
Id. at 360, 294 S.E.2d at 552.
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The minister in Hutchison cited Alberts v. Devine'8 2 as authority for civil
court review of retirement decisions by church officials. Without stating that it
agreed with the result in Alberts, the court in Hutchison declined to follow Alberts
because of the significantly different facts.183 In Alberts, a Methodist minister was
under the care of a psychiatrist. The minister's immediate superiors in the church
sought information from the psychiatrist regarding the minister's fitness to con-
tinue in his pastoral responsibilities. Without authorization, the psychiatrist di-
vulged the information. The minister was forced into retirement, allegedly for
reasons based in substantial part on the psychiatrist's records. The minister then
sued his psychiatrist for breach of confidentiality and his two former superiors
in the church for inducing the breach.5
8 4
When church officials raised religious liberty defenses to the claim against
them, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment did not
preclude imposition of liability for wrongfully inducing the breach of confiden-
tiality held between physician and patient.5 8 Nor did the religion clauses preclude
the court from compelling discovery into details of the church proceeding that
eventually resulted in the retirement decision.186
The state supreme court pointed out that neither the plaintiff's qualifications
as a minister nor the propriety of the church's decision to relieve him of his duties
were being directly questioned. However, insofar as the defendants claimed that
church law required them to seek the confidential information on the plaintiff,
the court held that a patient's right of confidentiality as to mental health records
outweighed any incidental impact on the church's interest in selecting and su-
pervising its ministers. 8 7
Alberts v. Devine is a difficult case, but the Massachusetts Supreme Court
probably struck the right balance. The strong societal interest in protecting the
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship is largely collateral to the
church's interest in being free of governmental interference in supervising its min-
isters. If it was desirable, even essential, that the church have psychiatric infor-
mation on its ministers, it should simply secure the consent of the minister to
obtain the psychiatric information. If consent is refused, then clearly the church
can impose discipline for his lack of cooperation-even compel retirement on that
basis alone. What the church cannot do is leave its usual sphere of operations
and violate the rights of others that are largely incidental to its autonomy. Rea-
sonable discovery to explore the causal relationship between the unauthorized
.. Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 546 (1985).
Hutchison, 789 F.2d at 396.
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disclosure and the forced retirement is required to protect the right of physician-
patient confidentiality. However, care must be used to prevent wide ranging dis-
covery into all church records and personnel decisions. The first amendment bar
to excessive entanglement by government in church affairs precludes plaintiff's
counsel from rummaging through church files with impunity.
588
2. Discipline of Church Members
The first amendment considerations pertaining to the discipline of church
members 89 are in most respects the same as when clerics or other religious officers
are reprimanded for misconduct. Because of the absence of the employer-employee
relationship, however, the factual content from which these tort claims arise some-
times gives the appearance that these suits are of a different character. The actions
presently being filed typically involve a church member (or former member by
the time the case is filed) who has been sanctioned by the church.519 The causes
'- Presently pending are two major lawsuits involving multiple tort claims by pastors disciplined
by church superiors. In Metzgar v. Hendersonville First Assembly of God Church, No. 2285-C (Tenn.
Cir. Ct., Sumner Co. filed Dec. 10, 1984), a pastor and his family has sued church board members,
the local church, and various denominational employees and organizations alleging claims of breach
of contract, outrageous conduct, defamation, invasion of privacy, and possibly false imprisonment.
The lawsuit arises out of charges of fiscal improprieties by the pastor, subsequent criminal charges
against him, and a schism within the local congregation.
Roberson, No. 91129 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Cruz Co.) involves a claim by a former bishop
against church officials and the denomination. He alleges claims for invasion of privacy, breach of
fiduciary duty, injurious falsehood, slander, false imprisonment, emotional distress, negligence, neg-
ligent infliction of physical harm, interference with prospective business advantage, trespass, con-
version, and conspiracy. The matter arises out of a disciplinary action for sexual impropriety of the
pastor (a matter he admits) and subsequent incidents after proceedings were instituted leading to
excommunication.
5.9 See generally, L. BUZZARD & T. BRANDON, CHURCH DISCIPLINE AND THE COURTS (1986);
Southard, Church Discipline: Handle with Care, CLERGY MALPRACTICE 74 (Malony ed. 1986); R.
HAMMAR, supra note 474, Chap. 4, D; C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 349-50, 392-94
(1917); Flowers, Can Churches Discipline Members and Win in Court, 27 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 483
(1985).
' In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the following lawsuite are pending. In Brown
v. Fairview Church of Christ, No. 42 77 64 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Co. filed Apr. 20, 1984), the
plaintiff sued the church, its preacher, and the elders, setting forth counts for libel per se, slander
per se, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint stems from
the church's action in "disfellowshipping" the plaintiff for instituting divorce proceedings against her
husband and for not attending church. The defendants read a letter to the congregation announcing
the expulsion. Plaintiff alleges the letter mislead people into thinking she had committed adultery.
The case of Kelly, No. 545117 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Co.), was brought against the church,
its elders, and the pastor, in a multi-count complaint for professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty, emotional distress, negligence, invasion of privacy, interference with contract, and interference
with prospective business advantage. Plaintiff had sought help with his marriage and with his acts
of adultery from Dr. Donald Phillips, a practicing family counselor. Phillips was also an elder in
the church where plaintiff was a member. Plaintiff disclosed confidential and embarrassing details
regarding these areas of his life to Dr. Phillips, who allegedly released the information to the church
without plaintiff's consent. Subsequently, the church released the information before the congregation
in the course of excommunication. The malpractice claim is solely against Dr. Phillips. The trial court
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of action are usually for defamation, invasion of privacy, and either intentional
or negligent infliction of emotional distress.5 9'
Before the first amendment was held to be binding on the states, a minority
of jurisdictions held that the relationship between an individual church member
and the religious society was governed by the law of contracts. 9 2 This conception
was problematic and widely criticized. 593 The predominant judicial view was
[A] person who assumes the position of... a member of a church organization
voluntarily agreed, impliedly if not expressly, to conform to the canons and rules
and to submit to the authority of the church. By becoming a member an individual
approves the rules provided by the government of the society and agrees to be
governed by its usages and customs. He becomes a member on the condition of
continuing or not, as he or his church may determine.""
Given the Supreme Court's line of cases from Watson to Kedroff, Presbyterian
Church, and finally Serbian E.,5 9s there can be little question that this predominant
view is now binding by force of the first amendment on all the states.
Although considerable attention by the popular media has been given to pend-
ing cases, s9 it is instructive to look first at some of the older cases. The facts
has denied defendants' motion to dismiss.
An entire family disciplined before the congregation has sued in Shive v. Adkisson, No. 84
CV8646 (Colo. Dist. Ct., City & County of Denver filed Sept. 6, 1984). The plaintiffs, husband,
wife, and two daughters, sued the pastor and deacons of the First Baptist Church of Pagosa Springs
stating counts for slander, libel, invasion of privacy, and outrageous conduct. The complaint alleges
that they were denounced before the church as heretics, deceivers, fornicators, and drunkards, and
that certain private facts were released. Plaintiffs were all recently killed in an airplane accident. Only
the claims for invasion of privacy and outrageous conduct survive their death.
A journal article reports on the case of Devere Ganges v. New Central Baptist Church, filed in
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Buie, The Scarlet Letter Revisited, 37 CHURCH & STATE
126, 128 (June 1984). Ganges claims that while excommunicating him the pastor and other church
officials defamed him by calling him a heathen and comparing him to the devil. Ganges also seeks
reinstatement as a member of the church.
Finally, in an unusual disposition of a case whereby plaintiff agreed to dismissal of the matter
by paying defendants $4,500, a settlement was reached in the case of Murry v. The Church of Christ,
Northside, No. 15,420 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Val Verde Co. filed Sept. 6, 1984). Plaintiff sued the church
and several of its officers stating claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The defendants had read a letter to the congregation stating that plaintiff was being dis-
fellowshipped for adultery. Defendants filed counterclaims. The settlement is reported in The Lufkin
(Texas) Daily News, Sept. 5, 1985, at 5A.
"' In one case dissident members expelled from a church sought to bring claims of federal
constitutional and civil rights violations against their former church. The complaint was dismissed
for first amendment and other reasons. Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va.), aff'd memo.,
661 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982).
:V W. ToRPEY, supra note 551, at 125.
" Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
'" See supra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
996 See Cleary, An Affair For the Church? 6 NAT'L L.J. 6 (1984); Buie, supra note 590.
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in these century-old opinions are remarkably similar to actions pending today. In
actions for libel or slander arising out of disciplinary actions by religious orga-
nizations, the universal rule of the common law was to treat all such commu-
nications as qualifiedly privileged."' Libel was alleged by the female plaintiff in
Farnsworth v. Storrs59t against the minister who read from the pulpit during a
worship service a resolution of excommunication. In pertinent part, the document
recited that the plaintiff "clearly violated the seventh commandment," and sub-
sequently declared that the "church does now as always bear its solemn testimony
against the sin of fornication and uncleaness, as an unfruitful work of darkness,
eminently dishonorable to the God of purity and love; polluting to the soul of
men and fearfully prejudicial to the welfare of society and the world. ' ' 599 The
state supreme court held that the public reading of the resolution was privileged
and thus the claim was dismissed. Maintenance of church order and discipline,
said the court, were amongst its long recognized powers, including hearing com-
plaints of misconduct and administering punishment if found to be true. Con-
cerning the basis for authority of the church over members, the court was of the
view that by voluntarily entering into the church covenant, the member is bound
by consent.6 As a final ground for reversal, plaintiff pointed to the fact that
her excommunication had taken place at a meeting prior to the worship service.
Thus, she argued, when the resolution was subsequently read to the congregation,
she was no longer a member, and thus not under its jurisdiction. The libel having
taken place after her separation from the church, plaintiff submitted that the
statement could not be privileged for it was outside the scope of discipline. This
too, the court held, misapprehended the purpose and scope of discipline. The
entire congregation, not just the church leaders, had cause to hear the fact of
excommunication and the reason for it. "One great purpose of an act of church
discipline is, that it may have a salutary influence upon the whole religious body,
51 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Church of Scientology of California, 354
F. Supp. 800 (church document concerning expulsion of member is privileged); Cimijotti, 219 F.
Supp. 621 (communications made to priest by church members seeking sanction against another mem-
ber is qualifiedly privileged); Gaillot v. Sauvageau, 154 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (statements
by priest to his congregation about heretical teachings of excommunicated member is qualifiedly
privileged); Crosby v. Lee, 88 Ga. App. 589, 76 S.E.2d 856 (1953) (defamation claim arising out of
letter concerning plaintiff circulated by church leaders in course of expulsion proceedings is privileged);
Carter v. Papineau, 222 Mass. 404, 111 N.E. 358 (1916) (defamation action does not lie for priest's
refusal to serve communion to member under church discipline); but cf. Brewer v. Second Baptist Church,
32 Cal.2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948) (although communications pursuant to disciplinary action by church
were qualifiedly privileged, sufficient evidence was presented such that jury could find actual malice;
the case does not discuss the First Amendment questions); Loeb v. Geronemas, 66 So. 2d 241 (Fla.
1953) (defamation action against officers of Jewish community center and lodge, statements concerning
plaintiff were qualifiedly privileged but not remarks made to general circulation newspapers); Call v.
Larabee, 60 Iowa 212, 14 N.W. 237 (1882) (same).
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of which the offender is a member. ' 601 Since discipline is for the congregation
as well as the offender, public reading of the resolution was within the scope of
ecclesiastic discipline and thus privileged.
In Landis v. Campbell,6°2 a member of a Presbyterian Church was excom-
municated for allegedly having made false and malicious remarks about the pastor.
This act of the church judicatory was then read to the local congregation, and
copies were recorded in the church's minute book and shown to the ruling elders.
The plaintiff sued the pastor and two elders, who together composed the judi-
catory, alleging that the charges brought against him before the judicatory were
untrue and their publication was libelous.603 In line with earlier precedent, how-
ever, the state supreme court held that the basis for church membership was
voluntary consent, which entails submission to the acts of its tribunals, that com-
munications in the course of discipline were privileged if not motivated by malice,
and that announcement of the excommunication to the congregation and recor-
dation in the book of minutes were within the scope of church discipline. Ac-
cordingly, judgment was ordered for the church.6 4
To the same effect is the libel action in Lucas v. Case,60s where the reasons
for a member's expulsion announced to the congregation "were using improper
and unchaste language" and other "improper conduct" toward a woman in the
church.P Being no evidence of malicious conduct, statements by the pastor and
elders were found to be privileged.6
In the face of well established precedent like Farnsworth, Landis, and Lucas,
the dispositions in two pending cases are surely mistaken - particularly so now
60, Id. at 414. Accord, C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 394 (1917).
" Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433, 49 Am. Rep. 239 (1883).
Id. at 434-36.
Id. at 439-41. The court suggested that any other rule would have adverse results not only
for the church, but for the courts:
Actions for libel and slander would crowd the docket of the civil courts, which would, on
that theory, be open to the complaint of every man expelled from a church... .Every such
expulsion involves, to some extent, a charge of moral turpitude or conduct unbecoming a
gentleman or lady. Id. at 439.
Io Lucas v. Case, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 297 (1872).
Id. at 298-99.
' Id. at 302-03. Yet another case from the Nineteenth Century, apparently not generally re-
ported, is noted at A. SToKEs & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 534 (1964).
In 1822 a Roman Catholic priest in the Diocese of Detroit excommunicated one of his parishioners
for divorcing his wife and then remarrying. In the trial court, the man obtained a judgment of $1,116
against the priest for damages to reputation and business. The judgment was reversed on appeal.
Finally, consider Servatius v. Pichel, 34 Wis. 292 (1874), where a prosperous landlord excommunicated
from the Roman Catholic Church for having used physical force against a priest brought an action
for slander. Plaintifrs damages were that other Catholics refused to lease his buildings or engage in
other trade with him. The trial court's dismissal on the pleadings was reversed because although
qualifiedly privileged the complaint alleged the discipline was malicious and "with intent to injure
and scandalize the plaintiff."
[Vol. 89
100
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss1/4
TORT CLAIMS AGAINST CHURCHES
that the strictures of the first amendment are binding on the states. In Bates v.
Kingdom Hall of the Congregation,60" a state court of appeals has affirmed in
part and reversed in part a trial court's dismissal of a complaint brought by a
"disfellowshipped" Jehovah's Witness. The plaintiff's petition against the church
and elders alleged that in expelling him from the church, the elders had acted
beyond the scope of their ecclesiastical authority and that they had also defamed
him. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint holding it lacked
jurisdiction for first amendment reasons.6 The appeals court, citing Serbian E.,
agreed that the claim requesting review of the elders' scope of disciplinary au-
thority within the church should be dismissed. 610 It reversed on the defamation
claim, however, on a rationale that misapplies the Supreme Court's admonition
to the civil courts not to get involved in the resolution of ecclesiastical questions.
The plaintiff alleged that the charges against him brought before the board of
elders were inaccurate and slanderous. Given this allegation, which must be taken
as admitted in a motion to dismiss, the court of appeals reasoned that:
Although at first appearance the resolution of this matter appears on its face to
be subject to the very dangers set forth in Serbian, we find that that might not
necessarily be the case. Appellant has clearly set forth a legally recognized claim
for relief. The claims of privilege as a defense are limited to those privileges which
are recognized at law. These plus the other defenses may be determinable without
having to resolve ecclesiastical questions. This will require some elements of evi-
dence. Not knowing what, if anything was said, the context in which it was
spoken, or the degree of any ecclesiastical aspects thereof, dismissal of the slander
claim was premature."
The first amendment does indeed enjoin civil court resolution of doctrinal dis-
putes. But it commands much more. In disputes over church real estate, the
Supreme Court has permitted the application of neutral-principles-of-law to re-
solve the conflict, while cautioning against becoming embroiled in the interpre-
tation of religious matters. 6 2 But disputes over control of property are very different
from the terms and conditions of church membership and ecclesiastical discipline
attendant thereto. Questions over who may join and remain in a religious society
go to the very heart of the church's self-understanding and control of its integrity
and mission.
Guinn v. Church of Christ6 3 is the other recent case where it appears the
court has departed from well established principles of both tort and constitutional




'- See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
613 Guinn v. Church of Christ, No. Ct-81-929 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Tulsa Cty. filed Oct. 26, 1981;
amended petition filed Nov. 23, 1981). The case has the following complex procedural history: Guinn
v. Church of Christ, No. CT-81-929 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Jan. 7, 1983) (unpublished order) (state
trial court refused to dismiss action by church member for invasion of privacy suit arising out of
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law. In an amended petition, Marian Guinn filed suit against her former church
and its leaders alleging claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
two counts for invasion of privacy (public disclosure of private facts and intrusion
upon seclusion).6 1 4 Guinn was expelled from the church for the offenses of for-
nication, dishonesty, and drunkenness. The defendants announced the excom-
munication before the church congregation and sent copies of the action to other
nearby churches of the same denomination.
When privately confronted by the elders concerning the charges, Guinn ad-
mitted the fornication but refused to refrain from such acts in the future. When
she was informed of the leaders' intent to announce the expulsion to the assembled
church, Guinn sought to resign her membership hoping to prevent further em-
barassment. The leaders proceeded with the disciplinary process, including in-
forming the congregation of their action. 611
In a much publicized trial, the jury awarded Guinn $827,000 in actual and
punitive damages. This amount was reduced by the trial court, and judgment was
entered in the amount of $390,000. Defendants have appealed, and the case is
pending before the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
As with Bates, the Guinn case should have been summarily dismissed. If
religious liberty means anything, it must allow for a church to expel its members
for reasons that others regard as arbitrary, foolish, prudish, or "no business of
the church." The autonomy of religious societies as to matters of membership
requires that actions such as Bates and Guinn be qualifiedly privileged in the law
of torts. This privilege can be overcome only upon clear and convincing proof
of either fraud motivated by a wholly secular purpose61 6 or malicious acts that
cause injury beyond the reasonable bounds of any religious interest of the church
in its relationship to its members. 6 7 Thus, in Guinn, the church had a religious
interest in announcing the reasons for the explusion to its congregation, even after
Guinn unilaterally resigned. As stated in Farnsworth, "[o]ne great purpose of an
act of church discipline is, that it may have a salutary influence upon the whole
religious body. ' 61 8 Of course, Guinn has a free exercise right to resign from a
church disciplinary proceeding), appeal denied, No. 59,623 (Okla. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 1983) (unpublished
order), cert. denied sub norn., Church of Christ v. Graham, 104 S. Ct. 85 (1983), on remand, No.
CT-81-929 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Tulsa, Mar. 15, 1984) ($390,000 actual and punitive damages awarded),
appeal docketed, No. 62,154 (Okla. Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 1984). For detailed discussion of the case, see
Note, When Fundamental Rights Collide: Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ, 21 TULSA L. REv.
157 (1985).
6 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (1977).
," Note, supra note 613, at 158-61.
616 See infra text accompanying notes 570-72. Accord, First Baptist Church v. Ohio, 591 F.
Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
617 See infra text accompanying notes 626-39.
615 See supra text accompanying notes 598-601. See, e.g., Brady v. Reiner, 198 S.E.2d 812, 845
(W. Va. 1973) (member may separate from church at anytime but may not take with him property
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church at any time and for any reason. But the church also has rights, including
the right to proceed with its discipline.
One can easily contemplate hypothetical situations that would overcome the
limited privilege. For example, should the elders of a church discipline a member
who is also the mayor of the city, publically giving as the reasons therefore scan-
dalous matter, all with the purpose of spoiling the mayor's chance for re-election
to public office, the privilege would not provide a defense. Such allegations, if
proved to the trier of fact in our hypothetical, have as their object a purpose
outside the church's interest in its institutional integrity. But nothing alleged in
Bates or Guinn remotely qualify for such an exception.
"Shunning" is a type of discipline practiced by some Anabaptists that entails
having nothing to do with an expelled member, not religiously, socially, or in
commerical affairs. Perhaps most egregious, even spouse and children are to have
no familial relations with the one disciplined under pain that they too will be
shunned. Kauffman v. Plank6t9 concerned an act of shunning by the Amish Men-
nonite Church, but because the prayer for relief was not for damages but rein-
statement to membership in the church, the court said it could not provide the
remedy requested.6 20 Most recently in Paul v. Watchtower Bible Society,62' a fed-
eral district court refused relief to a former Jehovah's Witness who complained
that she was being shunned and called a fornicator by members of the church.
Solicitous of the need for church-state separation, the court said that civil tri-
bunals cannot interfere in church matters that pose no threat to public safety or
welfare. Finally, in Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church,62 a state supreme court
reversed a trial court's dismissal and ordered a trial in a shunning case. Insofar
as the complaint sought damages, the court held that shunning may be an excessive
interference with matters of compelling state interest, such as maintenance of
marital and family relationships. 62 On remand, claims of alienation of affections
previously given to the church); Katz v. Singerman, 241 La. 103, 134, 127 So. 2d 515, 516 (1961)
(personal liberty of individual members of synagogue not affected by change in religious practice for
they may carry their membership elsewhere); Fuchs v. Meisel, 102 Mich. 357, 373, 60 N.W. 773, 778
(1894) (dissidents possess right to withdraw from church with or without reason, but cannot take
with them church property).
"1 Kaufman v. Plank, 214 Il1. App. 306 (1919).
le* Id. at 310.
6' Paul v. Watchtower Bible Soc'y, No. 84-826 (E.D. Wash. June 18, 1985), appeal docketed,
No. 85-4012 (9th Cir. 1985). See Seattle Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at B12.
62 Bear, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105.
6' Id. at 107. See Lide v. Miller, 573 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), involving a defamation
action by a dentist who was publically disciplined by a church. The appeals court sustained a summary
dismissal of the defamation claim against church elders, but reversed and remanded for trial a claim
for tortious interference with business relations. Similar to Lide is Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass.
567, 25 N.E. 74 (1890), where a priest, in excommunicating a member for remarriage following divorce,
also said the offense should disqualify the member from employment as a physician. As the priest's
words were found to be spoken with the purpose of injuring plaintiff as a physician, a jury verdict
for plaintiff was sustained.
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and tortious interference with business relations would be allowed. The result in
Bear is not only at odds with several cases elsewhere, but is also in direct conflict
with Anabaptist teaching and practice dating back to the Sixteenth Century. 624
C. Tort Claims Arising Outside the Course of Counseling and Discipline
Communications said to be defamatory take place outside the scope of church
discipline and occasionally have resulted in claims against a church or the clergy.
The allegedly slanderous statements or libelous publications fit one of two pat-
terns: either the communication was directed against a church member or religious
officer,625 or the injured party is wholly unconnected with the church. 626
' See supra text accompanying notes 352-355. A related case by the same plaintiff, Robert L.
Bear, demonstrates the futility of civil courts involving themselves in church discipline. In a civil rights
claim filed in federal district court by Bear against the same parties, the judge dismissed his complaint
citing the first amendment. Bear v. Shugart, No. 85-1886 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1986).
-" In addition to the cases discussed in the text, consider the following decisions. Because they
were decided well before the first amendment was held binding on the states, they do not discuss
the religion clauses. In Hellstern v. Katzer, 103 Wis. 391, 79 N.W. 429 (1899), a priest was permitted
to bring a slander action against an archbishop in his church for remarks made about him from the
pulpit during a worship service. The slanderous remarks were found not privileged because the arch-
bishop had no power to remove the priest from office and thus the utterances were not in the course
of church discipline. Ritchie v. Widdemer, 59 N.J.L. 290, 35 A. 825 (1896), involved an action for
slander by one minister against another minister of the same denomination. The remarks of defendant
were not qualifiedly privileged when made before a congregation of the church that had no authority
over a canonical offense pending against the plaintiff. In Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293 (1881),
a former minister wrote a libelous letter to an association of ministers to which he did not belong,
about the plaintiff who was an active minister and association member. The publication was held
not privileged because a former minister stood in the same position as the general public concerning
the plaintiff's qualifications as a minister.
Finally, a news story reports on a recent slander action brought by Ms. Rita Gilbert against the pastor
of the Mountainview Baptist Church. Gilbert began attending services at the church with a younger
man. In her suit she alleged that derogatory references were made from the pulpit to her and her
younger male attendant during worship services. The case was settled for $250. Spartenberg (S.C.)
Herald-J., Feb. 4, 1986, at 4.
6 6 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, consider the following. Church of Scientology
v. Blackman, 446 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), involves a psychiatrist's claim of liability
against church members said to arise from placards used in a demonstration outside of his office.
The signs contained deragatory remarks about Dr. Blackman and his use of electric shock treatments
in therapy. On interlocutory appeal, the court held that the church was not vicariously liable for the
alleged defamatory activities of a co-defendant who had organized the demonstration. Thus the church
was dismissed.
Consent judgments were entered concurrently in the cases of Harris v. Tomczak, No. CIV-S-
80-206-LKK (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1983), and Harris v. Olympia Broadcasters, Inc., No. 287743 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co. Aug. 30, 1983), awarding $150,000 in damages to Mr. Thomas A. Harris
on his claims for defamation. The judgments are against several parachurch ministeries and their
officers who made remarks over the radio that Harris' book I'm OK-YOU'RE OK was an example
of declining morality and that Harris had committed suicide.
In Gallagher v. Grossman, No. 214331 (Minn. Dist. Ct., St. Louis Co. filed Mar. 16, 1984),
two local women brought a libel suit against a pastor and his church. The complaint alleges that in
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In claims by parties outside the church, the religion clauses do not give the
church as defendant any special standing beyond that enjoyed by everyone else
pursuant to the free speech and free press clauses. Thus, if the communication
alleged to be defamatory was directed at a public figure and addressed a matter
of public concern, the Supreme Court has varied the standard of care, shifted
the burden of proof, and increased the burden of persuasion in ways that favor
defendants.6 27 Chodos v. Rader62s is demonstrative of the manner in which courts
approach these cases. Hillel Chodos was a special deputy attorney general for
California in the case of California v. Worldwide Church of God.6 29 He brought
this action for libel, slander, and defamation of character against the Worldwide
Church of God and various church officers. In the course of earlier litigation
involving a state takeover of the Worldwide Church of God, church officials
placed an advertisement in the Los Angeles Times criticizing Chodos' behavior
and appeared in a television script in which Chodos was mentioned unfavorably.
Chodos claimed these expressions were defamatory.
The trial court dismissed Chodos' complaint and denied leave to amend his
pleadings. As a special deputy attorney general in a widely publicized case, Chodos
was both a public official and public figure subject to critical observation and
comment. The court held that Chodos did not, and could not allege clear and
convincing evidence that the church officers had published the statements with
knowledge of their falsely or in reckless disregard for the truth.
Although the older cases do not, of course, discuss the first amendment, they
do regard as quasi-privileged all communications within the church critiquing the
qualifications of clergy and church members. Accordingly, in Pendleton v. Hawk-
a letter to the editor of a local newspaper the pastor questioned the women's Christian character,
reputation, and mental stability. The pastor's letter was responding to one written by the women who
had criticized a school board policy for determining suitability of books for the school library.
'-' See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text. See also Note, First Amendment Limits on
Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 CoLum, L. REV. 1749
(1985).
62 Chodos v. Rader, No. C. 353329 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co. Jan. 5, 1982).
1-1 World Wide Church of God Inc. v. Superior Court, No. C 267 607 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Jan. 2, 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980). The case concerned
an incident where the California Attorney General took over the entire operations of the Worldwide
Church of God based on allegations of fiscal irregularities lodged by disgruntled church officials. The
Attorney General asserted authority based upon the state's interest in charitable trusts, which the
Attorney General maintained was the legal status of a church, thus permitting the use of the provisional
remedy of receivership to investigate internal fraud. Eventually, the legislature passed a law denying
the authority to institute such actions against religious bodies. Cal. Corp. Code § 230 (West 1983).
See Whelan, "Who Owns the Churches?," Government Intervention in Religious Affairs 57 (Kelley
ed. 1982); Jackson, Socialized Religion: California's Public Trust Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REv. 185
(1981); Worthing, The State Takes Over A Church, 446 THE ANNALS 136 (1979); Note, Government
Protection of Church Assets From Fiscal Abuse: The Constitutionality of Attorney General Enforce-
ment Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1277 (1980); Note,
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ins,630 a church deacon had made inquiries of a clerk within the denomination
concerning the qualifications of a pastor. Upon receipt of the clerk's letter, the
deacon showed it to other deacons and members of the church. The pastor sued
the deacon alleging publication of the letter the contents of which were libelous. 63'
The appeals court granted defendant a new trial on the basis that the jury should
have been instructed that the publication was qualifiedly privileged. If defendant's
actions were not malicious, that is if not done to harm his pastor, but in fur-
therance of the deacon's responsibilities for management and oversight of the
church, he cannot be liable. 63 2
Religious organizations that are not a church, but nonetheless are such an
integral part of a church as to be indistinguishable from it, are also protected
by the first amendment. In the unusual case of Madsen v. Erwin,633 a news re-
porter discharged from the Christian Science Monitor for homosexuality filed suit
in a multi-count complaint for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual preference, and the torts of defamation,
interference with advantageous relations, interference with employment contract,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 6 4 Although
it may come as a surprise to some of its subscribers, it is well established in
Massachusetts law that the Monitor is a religious organ of the First Church of
Christ, Scientist. Thus, Madsen was an employee of the church. 635 Homosexuality
is against church doctrine, and Madsen was fired when she admitted she was a
lesbian and refused to seek "healing" as to that status. The trial court had denied
the Monitor's motion for summary judgment, but permitted an interlocutory ap-
peal. 636
The state supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded
the cause for further proceedings. The appeals court said that the relationship
between Madsen and the Monitor "can only be construed as a religious one. ' 637
Moreover, because homosexuality was admittedly contrary to church doctrine, the
first amendment required that there be no judicial interference in the church-
employee relationship. Accordingly, those claims which would regulate the church-
employee relationship were ordered dismissed. 638 However, on remand Madsen
would be permitted to replead her several tort theories. Although the Monitor
1 Pendleton v. Hawkins, I1 App. Div. 602, 42 N.Y.S. 626 (1896).
61 Id. at 604, 42 N.Y.S. at 627.
613 Id. at 607, 42 N.Y.S. at 629-30. Cf. Edmondson v. Church of God, No. 85-151-l1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. May 16, 1986) (upholding $110,000 defamation award in claim by member against church
and its general overseer).
61 Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985).
634 Id. at 1161.
633 Id. at 1163-64.
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may lawfully discharge Madsen, the court suggests that a religious organization
may not fire Madsen in a manner that commits tortious harm such as public
disclosure of private facts about her.
Under the banner of the First Amendment provisions on religion, a clergyman
may not with impunity defame a person, intentionally inflict serious emotional
harm on a parishioner, or commit other torts .... We recognize that the defend-
ant may be able to interpose defenses or qualified privileges, but these are gen-
erally not raised by motion to dismiss .... 639
The lesson of Madsen v. Erwin fairly balances the competing interests. The
employee-employer relationship of religious organizations is not to be interfered
with by the state, thus permitting employees to be selected, disciplined, or dis-
charged for reasons the church deems proper. On the other hand, in the course
of supervising employees, the church is well advised to act with circumspection
so as to confine the impact of its discipline to satisfying those purposes within
the scope of its religious interests. Injury to disciplined employees that unrea-
sonably goes beyond the ambit of the church's interest in doctrinal integrity and
controlling its own internal operations, may cause tortious harm for which the
church is answerable.
D. Religious Fraud
Fraud is a criminal offense, and the concept is found throughout the common
law having its place in the jurisprudence of contracts, property, agency, trusts
and estates. The law of torts defines fraudulent misrepresentation (sometimes
called deceit) as follows:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
In a criminal prosecution for mail fraud, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Ballard64' established the first amendment parameters for the permissible reg-
ulation and punishment of religious fraud. A person can never be put on trial
for holding particular religious tenets, nor can an individual be required to prove
in a court of law the objective truth of those same beliefs. Though one's sincerity
in professing certain religious propositions may be tested by the trier of fact, the
truth of what one believes may not be scrutinized in civil court.6 2 Ballard con-
cerned a mail fraud conviction of Guy and Edna Ballard and their son. The
Ballards founded a religious movement they called the "I Am." By supernatural
I d. at 1167.
' RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). This section is to be read in conjunction with
§§ 526-49.
--Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
m2 Id. at 84-88.
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powers, the Ballards claimed that they could heal persons afflicted with serious
diseases. The United States mails were utilized to convey these representations
and to solicit and collect funds.
Apart from lawsuits against new religious movements,643 apparently there are
no generally reported cases of tort claims alleging fraudulent misrepresentation
filed against churches or their religious officers. There are, however, a few cases
charging fraud in the acquisition of control over church funds or real estate. 6 "
For example, where certain members of a church society secretly altered the legal
title of church property with the intention of acquiring ownership, the civil courts
have intervened to prevent perpetration of a fraud.65 Although the question of
church membership and expulsion therefrom are not matters over which courts
will take jurisdiction, a fraudulent scheme to excommunicate several members of
a church so as to gain control of church assets and divert them to personal use,
will not preclude equitable jurisdiction to prevent the fraud . 6
Hendryx v. Peoples United Church647 is illustrative of this type of case where
the courts refuse to let the first amendment be used as a cloak for concealing
fraud that is not even arguably in furtherance of a religious purpose. Action was
brought by a few individuals on behalf of themselves and other members of a
church to cancel a deed, for the appointment of a receiver of the church's prop-
erty, and for an accounting. Plaintiffs' petition charged the pastor and other
members with a fraudulent scheme to gain possession of church property and to
convert it to their own use and benefit. At the beginning of trial, the defendents
challenged the plaintiffs' standing to sue because they were no longer members
of the church, and were not members when the petition was first filed. Uncon-
troverted evidence was introduced showing that plaintiffs had been expelled from
membership. The plaintiffs denied receiving notice or a hearing on their expulsion,
nor had any misconduct occurred that would be grounds for their ouster. The
rules of the church were examined and they permitted expulsion from membership
without notice or hearing, and without proof of misconduct or other cause."4
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed because plaintiffs lacked capacity to sue.
The state supreme court reversed and remanded the cause for trial. The ap-
peals court conceded the many cases holding that church membership and ex-
' See infra note 655-675.
See generally Taylor, Diversion of Church Funds to Personal Use: State, Federal and Private
Sanctions, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1204 (1982); Oaks, Trust Doctrines in Church Controversies,
1981 B.Y.U.L. Rnv. 805.
"' See Bomar v. Mt. Olive Missionary Baptist Church, 92 Cal. App. 618, 268 P. 665 (1928)
(suit by trustees of unincorporated religions association to compel reconveyance of property obtained
after secret incorporation by minority members).
646 See Bouldin, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text; but cf. Thomas,
224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W.2d 255 (1928) (if congregation has irregularly removed officers, excluded members,
or diverted funds, correction of such abuses rests solely with the church membership).
Hendryx v. People's United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 84 P. 1123 (1906).
'I" /d. at 337-39, 84 P. at 1124.
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pulsion were ecclesiastical matters, and that the civil courts must not reexamine
or inquire into the motives that actuated the decisions of the highest tribunal of
a religious body. 6 9 But the cases requiring due deference to the adjudications of
church bodies, did not prevent equitable jurisdiction in instances of alleged fraud
where "there is no ecclesiastical question involved. '60
[T]he bald question here is, can a man or set of men, or a majority of the church
organization, by chicanery, deceit and fraud, divert the property of a church
organization to a purpose entirely foreign to the purposes of the organization,
for their own selfish benefit, whether by the expulsion of members or in any
other fraudulent manner? Neither the law nor public policy will sustain such a
rule.11
The facts pled in Hendryx of expelling members who opposed the fraudulent
scheme, if true, undermined the entire authority structure of the church. 652 Thus,
the state supreme court was wholly justified in assuming jurisdiction. This is the
very type of "fraud or collusion" motivated by "secular purposes" that the Su-
preme Court in Serbian E. held open for civil court review. 6 3 Care must be taken,
however, that bald accusations of "fraud or collusion" not become a ready excuse
for breaking down the church doors. Frauds which go to matters that are "ar-
guably religious," are protected by the rule in Ballard. As Justice Jackson said
in Ballard, courts should not refrain from punishing fraud except when it comes
to matters of religious "faith or experience. ' 654
E. Alleged "Mind Control" and New Religious Movements
The difficulty of honoring the institutional integrity of religious organizations
and at the same time recognizing the socially destructive consequence to other
cherished values such as parent-child relationships, is posed by the proliferation
of recent tort litigation involving new religious movements. 655 Some of these
emerging groups are said to have intertwined obstensibly religious teaching with
sophisticated but wholly fraudulent techniques of recruitment, indoctrination, and
ultimately "brain washing." New adherents are employed in the solicitation of
money for religious leaders in return for communal-like living arrangements and
Id. at 344-45, 84 P. at 1127.
Id. at 345, 84 P. at 1127.
Id. at 346, 84 P. at 1127.
652 Accord, Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Assuming, without de-
ciding, that review is allowed for fraud or collusion, it is still only allowed for fraud or collusion
of the most serious nature undermining the very authority of the decision-making body.").
"I See supra notes 570-572.
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (discussed supra notes 175-180).
See generally Delgado, When Religious Exercise Is Not Free: Deprogramming and the Con-
stitutional Status of Coercively Induced Belief, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (1984); Heins, 'Other People's
Faith:' The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HAS'nsGS CoNsr. L.
Q. 153 (1981); Robbins & Anthony, Cults, Brainwashing and Counter-Subversion, 446 THE ANNALs
78 (1979); Note, Religious Deprogramming: A Solution Through Judicially Approved Guardians, 7
NOVA L.J. 383 (1983).
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total immersion into the new order. It is often young people, moreover, who are
most attracted to these groups, and their parents have in turn aligned themselves
in opposition to the sect.656 Litigation most typically comes when a former mem-
ber, having left the new religious movement, files suit alleging fraud, emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, or other injury. 6"7
Although the authorities are still divided as to how they should balance re-
ligious liberty with other societal concerns, the rule that is emerging from the
cases permits these tort claims only in three limited instances: when there has
been force or the threat of force, intentional outrageous conduct, or fraud as to
purely secular representations. The following discussion is organized around these
points. 658
Violence, force, or threats of physical force by religious groups receive no
protection by the first amendment. Thus, one court has said that conduct by
agents of a church under a doctrinal directive called "Fair Game" were ac-
tionable.6 5 9 Pursuant to this doctrine a former member of the church received
"slanderous telephone calls from her neighbors and employer, physical threats,
and [was] assault[ed] with an automobile," all with the purpose of preventing
her from pursuing legal rights.6 ° The same plaintiff alleged that at one time "she
'6' In cases in which the church is not a party, young people who have joined new religious
movements have sued their parents and others who have taken drastic action to "deprogram" them.
See e.g., Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub. nom, Mandelkorn v. Ward,
455 U.S. 907 (1982); Peterson v. Sorlein, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981). In order to discourage suits against "deprogrammers," one individual has in turn sued a
church for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Alexander v. Unification Church, 634 F.2d
673 (2d Cir. 1980).
"I In addition to cases discussed in this section, the following unreported matters are pending.
Bredberg v. Long, No. 4-82-962 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1983), involves a tort claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation and violation of federal wage and hour laws brought by two former members of
a sect called Realife Ranch. In this interim ruling, the court denied Realife's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.
In the case of Oleson v. Faith Assembly, No. F-8355 (N.D. Ind. filed Feb. 8, 1983), plaintiffs, a
husband, wife and minor child, have filed a multi-count complaint against Faith Assembly and its
leaders. The controversial sect received considerable media attention because it teaches avoidance of
medical and other health care professionals. Plaintiffs allege mental, physical, and emotional injuries
as a result of wrongful counseling and neglect to seek treatment of medical ailments.
6's The law of gifts, estates and trusts has long policed the relationship between clergy and
parishioner, permitting the revocation of property transfers brought about by undue influence or
fraudulent misrepresentation. The long history of such causes of action, demonstrates that they can
exist alongside concerns of religious liberty without serious first amendment problems. See, e.g.,
Ambassador College v. Geotzke, 244 Ga. 322, 260 S.E.2d 27 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079
(1980); Ambassador College v. Geotzke, 675 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1982) (related case), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 862 (1982); Ambassador College v. McElroy, 100 Wis. 2d 750, 308 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1980);
Nelson v. Dodge, 76 R.I. 1, 68 A.2d 51 (1949); Brown v. Father Divine, 163 Misc. 796, 298 N.Y.S.
642 (1937), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 671, 4 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1938).
Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. 1125 at 1142.
Id. Cf. Allard v. Church of Scientology of California, 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 129 Cal. Rptr.
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was locked in a furnitureless room for a period of two weeks against her will at
the offices" of the church,6' which if true would constitute false imprisonment.
A federal district court said that the first amendment does not immunize a re-
ligious society from claims of involuntary servitude or forced peonage. 6 2 How-
ever, the pleading failed to state facts sufficient to sustain these claims of tortious
activity. In order to state a claim for false imprisonment, the confinement must
be accomplished by physical restraint, force, or fear of force on the part of the
victim. Thus, allegations that a religious organization employed "mind control"
techniques and threats of divine retribution to overcome one's free will were
insufficient to state a cause of action.
663
The elements comprising the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(also called "outrageous conduct") are extreme or outrageous conduct, an in-
tention to cause emotional distress or reckless disregard of the probability of doing
so, that the plaintiff actually suffered severe emotional distress, and a showing
that defendant's conduct was the cause of the injury.664 "Liability has been found
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 665
A former member of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness sued
its leaders alleging that they acted outrageously toward her. As a 15-year old
runaway, plaintiff was recruited to join the Hare Krishna movement. Although
her parents were desperately searching for her, and this was allegedly known to
the sect's leaders, defendants kept that knowledge from plaintiff and moved her
about the country so she would remain hidden from her parents and thus could
not consider returning to them. The jury apparently agreed that the allegations
were true and that the conduct was outrageous, as a verdict was returned for
$32.6 million on the tort and related claims."
The former adult member of another sect was only partially successful on
her claim of outrageous action. A court said that church exhortations to sever
ties with her family, secure a divorce, and to depend solely on the church for
emotional support was not outrageous conduct. "They are similar to the demands
for single-minded loyalty and purpose that have characterized numerous religions,
Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1131-32.
'- Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371-72 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458
(1st Cir. 1979). The court also dismissed claims under federal civil rights acts, the thirteenth amend-
ment, various federal criminal statutes, and a claim for quantum meruit.
" Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity, 179 Cal. App. 3rd 450,
224 Cal. Rptr. 817, 831-32, rev. granted 228 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. 1986).
"" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 477,
§ 12.
".' RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965).
666 George, No. 27-75-65 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Co.) Plaintiff also claimed for libel, false im-
prisonment, and invasion of privacy. Damages were later reduced to $9.7 million. Part of the trial
is reported in Weir, An Ex-Krishna Sues the Sect, 5 NAT'L L.J. 6 (June 6, 1983).
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political, military and social movements over the ages." 7 However, allegations
that the church conducted a policy or practice of harassing members who sought
to leave the sect, and that in accordance with such a directive they made slanderous
telephone calls to her neighbors and employer, made threats of bodily harm, and
assaulted her with an automobile were sufficient to plead intentional infliction of
emotional distress.6 8
In a similar case, the administrator of the estate of his son (the boy having
committed suicide), filed an action against the Unification Church in which his
son was a member. The court refused to dismiss the complaint prior to trial,
holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for intentional emotional distress on behalf
of his son. Plaintiff alleged that his son was emotionally or mentally disturbed
before he joined the church, and that this became known to its members. None-
theless, the church subjected his son to "brainwashing" through "heavy and
protracted exercises, intense fasting from food and beverages, a program of chant-
ing and related activities," all resulting in an emotional breakdown. Because de-
cedent was alleged to be "gravely disabled" due to mental illness, and that this
was known to the church, the pleading stated a claim of outrageous conduct. 669
By contrast a state court of appeals dismissed claims of emotional distress
brought by three former members of the Unification Church. The plaintiffs charged
that recruiters for the church told plaintiffs that they were part of the Creative
Community Project, an organization with no religious affiliation. They learned
of the tie between the project and the church after two weeks at a rural retreat.
Although the three admitted they still joined the church after learning of the
project's true identity, plaintiffs said they fell under the sway of mind-control
techniques such that they could no longer exercise free will. The appeals court
ruled that threats of divine retribution and social ostracism if one leaves a church
were "neither so indecent nor so beyond the limits of social toleration" as to be
outrageous conduct sufficient in law. 670
Finally, concerning tort claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, the courts
have been mindful of United States v. Ballard which requires that the judicial
system never place in issue the truth or falsity of one's bona fide religious beliefs.
Since fraud requires proof that defendant made a statement knowing it to be
false, where the statement is religious in nature, Ballard prohibits placing its false-
ness in issue. The former members of new religious movements have sought to
Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1139.
Id. at 1141-42.
Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480
N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), rev'd, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1986).
610 Molko, 224 Cal. Rptr. 817, 830-31. For additional opinions dismissing claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, see Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity,
589 F.Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983); Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 590-93; Orlando v. Alamo Foundation,
646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981); cf. Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt.), aff'd,
573 F.2d 1295 (2nd Cir. 1977) (claim of alienation of child's affections for parents).
[Vol. 89
112
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss1/4
TORT CLAIMS AGAINST CHURCHES
work around the holding in Ballard by sifting out the representations that are
"wholly secular" from those that are "arguably religious," and founding their
claim of fraud on only the secular. 67' Thus, a former member of a sect was
permitted to sue for alleged misrepresentations that she "would receive benefits,
including training, room and board, and various work and research opportunities"
from the church. 672
Another court held that all claims of fraud and deceit by former members
should be dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that recruiters for the church had
invited them to a rural retreat by falsely representing that the organization had
purposes other than religious. Because the ex-members remained with the move-
ment once they learned of its religious purpose, however, the evidence of fraud
was insufficient. 673 As to the plaintiffs' contentions that they lost their free will
to leave the church because of "brainwashing" techniques, the court responded
that so long as force or threat of force was not used it could not put on trial
the church's means of indoctrination. 674 The "beguiling and very intensive re-
cruiting methods... which appear primarily directed at those young people who
are emotionally impressionable and vulnerable, seem objectionable to us," 675 said
the court, but added that the first amendment prohibits judicial inquiry into the
spiritual nature of its hold on its members.
V. CONCLUSION
America is in an age in which several socioreligious developments have brought
intense pressure on the alvays difficult relationship between church and state.
First, it is commonplace to say society has been desacralized. America may not
be a wholly secular society, but massive secularization has taken place, even in
67 Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 601-05; Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1140-41. It may be possible
in many instances for the judge to make an initial determination (based largely on common sense)
as to those statements that are "purely secular" and allow those to go to the jury on the claim of
fraud. But sorting out the "arguably religious" from the "purely secular" can never be reliably
performed by a jury consistent with the rule in Ballard. Claims against new religious movements are
simply too inflamatory and emotion-charged for a jury to make decisions that safeguard the liberties
of unpopular religions. Thus, sending these questions to a jury, as the court in Christofferson directed
(Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 599-605), is inviting error. The predictable happened when on remand
the jury returned a $39 million verdict for Christofferson. That verdict was later set aside by the trial
judge for prejudicial statements during closing argument and erroneous jury instructions. Leeson, Ore.
Jury: Church Must Pay $39 M for Fraud, 7 NAT'L L.J. 8 (June 10, 1985), and "$39 M Verdict In
Scientology Case Reversed, 7 NAT'L L.J. (July 1985). The case is now facing a third trial.
Also problematic in Christofferson is that the appeals court treated the first amendment as an
affirmative defense, thus placing the burden of producing evidence on the church concerning the
religious character of each representation alleged by the plaintiff to be fraudulent. Christofferson,
644 P.2d at 605.
112 Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1140.
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the brief passage of time since our parent's generation. Second, is the continued
pluralization of religion. Religion in America has always been diverse: initially
many Protestant sects, then both Protestant and Catholic, then Judeo-Christian.
Now with the proliferation of new religious movements and Eastern sects, one
wonders whether greater diversity is even possible. Third, following closely on
the heels of secularization and pluralization, is privatization of faith. To many
Americans, religion is best kept in the closet, to be spoken of in public, if at
all, only in hushed tones, and always in tolerant and inclusive language so as not
to offend. For the many who feel this way about religion, it is an uncivil act,
even crude barbarism, when others-be they media-evangelists, politicians, or
whatever-bring their religion into the public square in order to shape civic policy
in ways consistent with their world view.
These three socioreligious developments bring particularly stressful conflicts
into the civil courts. As emerging theories of tort law run headlong into claims
of religious liberty, courts cannot avoid the need to adjudicate the disputes and
thus make value choices. To be sure, the courts must make value choices. Al-
though they feign objectivity, there is no neutral ground in the choice between
either religious liberty or the recovery of damages for injury at the hands of
religion. For "the law of torts," too, "is a battleground of social theory. '61 6
In this face-off between liberty and theories of tortious recovery, churches
are both advantaged and disadvantaged. They are advantaged because they have
the first amendment, and it is frequently the trump card in this struggle. They
are disadvantaged because the civil courts and the jurisprudential community in
general are unschooled in ecclesiastical matters and thus often insensitive to claims
of church purity and institutional integrity. In part, this is because law itself has
been affected by secularization. And in part this is because American law has
forgotten the past. This near-loss of history is both by its distortion and by its
being disowned. Americans sometimes act as if our past is something to flee from
rather than to feed from. "Our conception of present and past is no longer the
dwarf standing on the giant's shoulders. In our art and literature and philosophy,
the dwarf has gotten down from the giant, to stand on the ground and kick the
giant's ankles. ' 677 If this pattern continues, church teaching, counseling and dis-
ciplining may be a major battleground of church-state relations for the balance
of this century. Accordingly, the sections in this article on the history of confession
and discipline in the church are particularly important in assisting the courts in
recapturing the past and sensitizing the juris to the unfamiliar matters of eccle-
siology and theology.
Serious confrontations will not be avoided, indeed, they are already upon us.
But when the judgments are handed down, it is hoped that they are made having
fully taken into account the consequences for the church and its interests in freely
pursuing its calling as it understands it.
' W. POSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 477, § 3.
'" Nisbet, The Most Unbelievable Thing, CHRON. OF CULTURE 22, 23 (Mar. 1986).
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